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INTRODUCrION
T he advertisement boldly proclaims: "Get your personal genetic
map today. Your destiny lies in your genes." Imagine a world with
one all-purpose genetic test, like the diagnostic machine attached to your car,
which yields a rich and accurate, albeit not conclusive, genetic profile of what
you are and what you will be. Consider a child born in the year 2004.
Routine blood tests reveal that the child will be five feet five and a half
inches tall, right-handed, and red-headed, will develop early near-sightedness,
is at high risk for heart disease and hypertension, is at moderate risk for
developing lung cancer and alcoholism, is at total risk for cystic fibrosis, and,
because the child is a genetic carrier, any future offspring will have a fifty
percent chance of developing Tay-Sachs disease. This scenario soon will be
closer to fact than to fiction.' It is predicted that, as a result of the Human
Genome Project ("IHGP"), by the year 2002, 99% of the human genome
sequence will be mapped at an accuracy of 99.9%.2 Consequently, the HGP
'In early March 1996, one multinational and one U.S. research team
reported drawing guides (called "maps") to all 23 human chromosomes and all
20 mouse chromosomes. These maps are extraordinarily detailed; for example,
the mouse map would require approximately 500 pages in a typical magazine.
Consequently, both the mouse and human maps were published on the World
Wide Web by the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research/MIT Center for
Genome Research (visited Nov. 15, 1996 <http://www.genome.wi.mit.edu>).
Resembling land surveys of the genes, the maps are thick with charted genetic
bumps, streams, and valleys, allowing geneticists to find their way around the
chromosomes. Publication of these maps ended the first phase of the Human
Genome Project, the mammoth undertaking to describe every shred of genetic
material in the human body.
2 Patrick Young, Funds are Key to Sequence Success, 378 NATURE 655,
655 (1995) (quoting Francis S. Collins, director of the U.S. National Center for
Human Genome Research, regarding the progress of the HGP).
Commencing in 1991, the HGP, also referred to as the Human Genome
Initiative ("HGI"), is actually a number of separate projects. There is no single
human genome project in the United States; instead, three major organizations
(National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), Department of Energy ("DOE"), and
Howard Hughes Medical Institute) finance discrete aspects of a comprehensive
initiative for genetic mapping. Simultaneously, specific projects are also ongoing
in other countries (including France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada)
and under the auspices of a private organization, the Human Genome Organiza-
tion ("HUGO"). Francis Collins & David Galas, A New Five-Year Plan for the
US. Human Genome Project, SC., Oct. 1, 1993, at 43 (describing international
aspects of the HGP).
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has the potential to have a major impact on the ways insurers evaluate
each applicant's health risks.
At this point, no one really knows what the future of genetics will do
for, or to, insurance consumers or the insurance industry as we know it.
Insurance consumers fear that genetic testing and genetic information will
be used by insurers to separate out the "genetically inferior"3 and deny
them insurance or charge them excessively high premiums. They fear that
even applicants for insurance who simply have a chance of developing a
genetic-based disease will not be able to obtain insurance. In contrast, a
1995 report by the Ohio Task Force on Genetic Testing provides a
calming finding: "Insurers will not use genetic tests, if ever, until such
tests are in common usage."4
On the other hand, insurers fear some consumers will use their
knowledge about their own genetic predisposition for particular diseases
or medical conditions to "adversely select" against insurance companies.
They explain that adverse selection occurs when individuals with a high
probability of loss apply for more insurance than do other "genetically
normal" individuals.
Genetic mapping and testing have the salutory capacity to revolution-
ize medicine. But revolutions customarily have casualties and genetic
discrimination foreseeably will be the civil-rights issue of the twenty-
first century. So before genetic mapping and testing become routine in
our twenty-first century society, it seems prudent to address the serious
problems that will naturally arise regarding the potential use in private
insurance' of personal genetic information to create insurance risk
' This Article primarily explores the adverse effects which might occur as
a result of insurers having unrestrained access to genetic information. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to address the history of and potential problems
associated with the eugenics movement and similar areas of potential abuse of
genetic information. Since the advent of the DNA era, there has been concern
that genetic testing will create a biological underclass of people branded as poor
risks for employment, marriage, and child-bearing, as well as insurance.
4 OHo TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, FINAL REPORT iii-iv (Dec. 31,
1995). But see Geoffrey Cowley, Flunk the Gene Test and Lose Your Insurance,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 48, 49 (reporting mid-1990s studies at
Georgetown and Harvard showing that several hundred healthy people lost or
were denied health and life insurance because of genetic testing).
' This Article concerns private commercial insurance except to the extent
that public taxation or another public approach is deemed a preferable solution
to the insurance/genetic dilemma. For instance, a distinguished law professor and
economist suggests public taxation as a viable approach for resolving potential
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classification, to control risk transference to insurers, and to achieve fair
and non-discriminatory risk distribution.6 Addressing those concerns
creates a dilemma over how to avoid unfair discrimination in insurance
underwriting while accommodating: (1) each individual's civil rights to
privacy and to protection of that individual's unique genetic property, and
(2) the insured group's right to fairly priced insurance without a forced
financial subsidy.
Two perspectives help to define "unfair" discrimination. First, does
unfair discrimination occur when insurers use sound actuarial analysis of
genetic data to differentiate among applicants and policyholders by risk
genetic discrimination in private insurance. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74
B.U. L. REv. 1, 21 (1994). But a public taxation solution would not constitute
"insurance" and issues of underwriting health risks using genetic information
would be irrelevant for the following reasons. The business of private insurance
has a significant but not exclusive role in American health care law. Private
health and health-relatedinsurance is only one approach for Americans to receive
health care. Public insurance (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security,
Veterans' Administration programs, and Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniform Services ("CHAMPUS")) provides another avenue. Public health
care, however, is not "insurance" because these programs are financed through
Social Security and other mandatory taxes and not through premiums contractual-
ly made by volition and consent. More importantly, because current public health
care programs do not apply risk selection and classification, the use of genetic
testing and genetic information following the results of the HGP will foreseeably
not occur.
As an aside, conventional private insurers occasionally attempt to relieve
themselves of liability where one, or the other, of such governmental plans is
operative. However, a private insurer is generally not exonerated of liability
merely because the insured, for example, turned to a governmental plan to pay
for a procedure after the insurer denied coverage. See, e.g., Fragner v. American
Community Mut. Ins. Co., 502 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Mich. App. 1993) (holding
that an insurer could not avoid providing coverage for a liver transplant merely
because the insured turned to Medicaid for help). Additionally, if health care is
legislatively determined to be a universal right, private health insurance may be
transformed from a voluntary bargained-for contract system to a public
mechanism for universally providing the -right to health care. In practical effect,
that would be the death of private commercial health insurance. If the public
insurance approach (discussed as one possible solution at infra Part IV.D (notes
548-69 and accompanying text)) becomes reality, then the private insurance
solutions discussed in this Article will become mostly irrelevant.
6 For a general discussion of the risks transferred and distributed in
personal insurance (life, annuities, health, medical, and disability), see ERIC
MILLS HOLMEs, 1 HOLMEs's APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 122-53 (1996).
[VOL. 85
1996-97] INSuRANCE/GENETIC FAm/UNFAm DISCRIMINATION 509
classifications and to price the insurance according to the risks each
person represents? In other words, is it unfair to permit equitable, but not
equal, treatment in insurance underwriting of genetically unequal
individuals? As explained in Part I of this Article,7 some insurance
consumers respond that it is unfair and discriminatory to price insurance
based on genetic traits. Genetic information is the unique property of the
person tested. In order to preserve individual autonomy regarding the
individual's genotype and to protect the privacy of genetic information,
it is appropriate to limit insurers' use of genetic information. All insureds
should be treated equally in insurance risk rating classifications based on
community risk sharing and redistribution of commonly shared losses. As
explained in Part II of this Article,8 insurers respond that actuarially
sound individual risk differentiation in rating and premiums constitutes
fair discrimination. Adopting a policyholders' economic rights viewpoint,
insurers assert a duty to treat all policyholders fairly by setting premiums
actuarially based on the risk presented by each policyholder and a
correlative right to fashion risk classifications for genetic and other
statistical differences among all applicants.
Second, does unfair discrimination occur when insurers are prohibited
or restricted in classifying risks and pricing insurance based on an
individual's immutable, private, and potentially stigmatizing genome? In
other words, is it unfair to require the equal treatment in insurance
underwriting of genetically unequal individuals? Insurers obviously
answer that it is unfair. As explained in Part I of this Article,9 consum-
ers respond that prohibitions, or at least restrictions, on insurers requiring
and using genetic testing and mapping constitute fair discrimination
because they promote fair risk classification and fair risk distribution.
Insurance consumers offer various reasons for adopting the individual
rights viewpoint: (1) to maintain the bedrock insurance principle of
economic risk distribution, sometimes called redistribution, in pooling and
sharing common fortuitous risks; (2) to avoid potential misuse and unfair
genetic discrimination because, like gender and race, genetic information
is involuntary, immutable, and potentially stigmatizing; (3) to maintain
the confidentiality of the individual as well as family and relatives who
may be adversely affected; (4) to preserve personal autonomy and the
individual's singular genomic property rights; (5) to protect the civil right
to privacy against intrusion and potential public disclosure through
' See infra notes 140-216 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 68-139 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 140-216 and accompanying text.
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computerized data banks; (6) to safeguard the individual's right not to
know; (7) to rectify potential insurer misunderstanding of genetic data in
creating risk classifications; ° and (8) to rectify unsound actuarial
analysis due to the absence of reliable, definitive genetic information.
Implicated here is the ongoing debate regarding health care as a universal
right, the socialization of health risks, the demands of distributional
justice, and the question of how the medically uninsured will acquire their
right to health care."
Parts II and III strongly state the positions of, respectively, the
insurance industry and insurance consumers. This author does not
necessarily agree or disagree with those positions but asks whether
middle-ground solutions can be fashioned in order to avoid, or at least
fairly ameliorate, unfair genetic discrimination in insurance.'2 That may
"0 The concern for misunderstanding geneticdata is discussed at infra Part
I.B. 1 (notes 49-62 and accompanying text). For example, the presence of a
genetic marker does not imply that a carrier will develop the disease but only
that the individual is asymptomatically ill with a higher predisposition to such
disease.
" For an excellent discussion of this debate in its formative years, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED:
BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (1988). The debate continued during the
first two years of President Clinton's administration, especially regarding the
grave shortage of employer-sponsored health insurance for high-risk employees.
The stated purpose of President Clinton's proposed, but unenacted, 1300-page
plan was "to ensure individual and family security through health care coverage
for all Americans in a manner that contains the rate of choice in health care, and
to ensure and protect the health care of all Americans." H.R. 3600, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993). The heart of the President's plan was the creation of health
alliances, run by the states under federal scrutiny, offering consumers three types
of medical plans: "an H.M.O., a fee-for-service plan, or a combination of the
two." Clinton's Health Plan: A New Framework for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23,.1993, at A22. Unlike many other countries, the United States does not
have a universal health care system; therefore, the debate over universal health
care continues. For a useful analysis, in the context of the universal health care
debate, of insurance as a free market product versus a public good, see Deborah
A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y, & L. 287 (1993).
12 This Article's underlying assumption is that universal genetic mapping
will occur following completion of the HGP. This Article then proceeds to
examine significant issues that will arise in the next century. For example:
Should insurers be permitted to require insurance applicants to undergo genetic
testing and mapping? Should insurers have access to any future voluntary genetic
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not be possible, because in the end "it is likely that the compromise
between efficiency and broad distribution of risk that is inevitable in
any insurance system will never fully satisfy the proponents of either
value."' 3 Much depends on one's viewpoint in judging what is fair. The
conflicting points of view will lead to a debate regarding insurers' use
of information from genetic testing. Foreseeably, the positions in this
debate will resemble the structure of the debates over insurance and
gender, or insurance and AIDS. 4 Some will advocate the group per-
spective for fair, economically efficient risk classification, while
others will support the individual perspective for distributionally fair
risk classification.
testing and mapping? Does an applicant have a civil right to privacy and
protection from disclosure of the applicant's genetic information? Rather than
stating and justifying simplistic yes/no answers, this Article seeks middle ground
by stating and later evaluating arguments for insurers and then against insurers
requiring and/or having access to genetic information in contract formation (i.e.,
in underwriting genetic risks) and in risk distribution (i.e., in socializing genetic
risks).
" KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 100 (1986).
4 In the last few decades, insurance law has involved two significant issues
of fair versus unfair insurance discrimination; first regarding gender, and then
BIV and AIDS. This Article naturally draws upon, and is grateful for, the
veinlode of scholarly ink in the legal literature devoted to those important topics.
Appropriate citations are given throughout. For an excellent overview of the
controversy regarding unisex and gender-based insurance ratings as well as the
Supreme Court's Title VII cases forbidding gender discrimination in employer
benefit plans, see ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 102-
09 (2d ed. 1996). Concerning the debate over prohibiting testing and health
insurance coverage for IIV or AIDS, see Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance
Crises: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1782 (1987)
(making a powerful argument for prohibiting insurers from pricing their policies
or selecting insureds on the basis of either sexual orientation or HIV testing) and
Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Rationale for
AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1806 (1987) (strongly stating the
insurance industry's position for using HIV antibody tests and against legislative
and regulatory restrictions). For an extraordinarily fine critique of these two
articles, see Deborah A. Stone, The Rhetoric ofInsurance Law: The Debate over
AIDS Testing, 15 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 385 (1990) (emphasizing broader risk
sharing and risk redistribution in health insurance based on need and not on fair
or unfair discrimination). For a more recent, equally outstanding summary and
evaluation of the issues, see Alan I. Widiss, To Insure or Not to Insure Persons
Infected with the Virus that Causes AIDS, 77 IowA L. REv. 1617 (1992).
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But new solutions may require new viewpoints, or at least a
concoction of familiar ones. The classic posturing in debates over
insurance between group and individual rights may shift in light of future
advances in genetic screening and mapping which will evidence the
universality of our human condition. For example, a geneticist explains
that only two to ten million nucleotide bases, out of three billion, differ
from individual to individual, and instructs us that "'most of the
information in [genetic maps] will pertain to everyone."" 5 Each of us
has a common interest in insuring that fortuity. That common interest
may cause a shift to a more group-centered, societal perspective.
Since insurance is a social institution, the idea of the social contract
may provide a different viewpoint from the classical debate over
insurance. Assume insurance companies use medical testing to create risk
classifications for the avowed purpose of selecting and excluding medical
risks. Standing behind what the philosopher John Rawls describes as a
"veil of ignorance"' 6 before the formation of the social contract, people
would most likely not select rules that penalize people who incur medical
and health-related costs from illness, disease, and other conditions. Each
person would perceive herself/himself as potentially in the "worst-off"
insurance risk classification and prefer, in self-interest, to protect the
interest of the insurance applicants most disadvantaged by risk classifica-
tion. That seems to make good economic, social, and moral sense.
In any event, if the HGP is successful, then everyone will have a
personalized genetic map. Genetic maps may provide the quintessential
predictive data for sound actuarial analysis in selecting and excluding
risks. For example, scientists estimate that over 2000 diseases are genetic
in origin. 7 Carrying sound actuarial analysis to its logical extreme may
"5 Marc A. Lapp6, Justice and the Limitations of Genetic Knowledge, in
JuSTIcE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 153, 155 (Timothy F. Murphy &
Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994) (quoting CHARLES WILLs, ExoNs, INTRONs, AND
TALKING GENES: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE HuMAN GENOME PROJECT 3
(1991)).
16 See id. at 160 (citing JoHNs RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). The
social contract concept is discussed in greater detail at infra Part III.C.3 (notes
215-16 and accompanying text).
" Catherine M. Valerio Barrard, Genetic Information and Property Theory,
87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1037, 1043 (1993) (examining an individual's property
interest in the information encoded in that individual's genetic material). The
point is that the potentially enormous amount of genetic data discovered by the
HGP would provide insurers with a powerful sword for excluding or limiting
insurance coverages of genetically caused diseases and medical conditions.
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toll the bell for private insurance. Private insurance is defined as the
transfer and distribution of the risk of fortuitous losses.' 8 The element
of risk distribution of fortuitous losses would be eliminated if actuarial
rating, using genetic mapping in risk transference, is accomplished
perfectly.'9 The end result of this scenario would, by definition, be the
death of private insurance; certainly an unwelcome prospect for the multi-
trillion dollar insurance industry. In re-establishing post mortem the
requisite risk-distribution element, private health and health-related
insurance would foreseeably be changed into a system of public
insurance. Given the possibility of death to private insurance, insurers
should rethink and reassess their policy of actuarially fair discrimination.
But, perfect actuarial rating may not be possible because the
information obtained from mapping the human genome will not allow
absolute predictability of all illnesses, diseases, and medical conditions.2 °
When the HGP completes its development of detailed maps of the
genome, determines the complete nucleotide sequence of human DNA,
and creates new technology for genetic analysis, a new era of sequence-
based biological investigation by twenty-first century scientists will begin.
However, it is unclear whether perfect genetic data will ever be available
for perfect actuarial rating. Consequently, solutions for rectifying
perceived flaws in the current system of private health insurance will be
explored and evaluated in this Article. Thus, the purpose of this Article
is to analyze: (1) whether insurers can require or should have access to
genetic tests and maps; (2) if so, how insurers should be allowed to use
"8 Risk transfer is controlled by actuarial classification and rating. Risk
distribution requires pooling, sharing, and redistributing potential fortuitous
financial losses. For a more thorough discussion of the nature and definition of
insurance, see Risk; Classifications and Definitions, in HOLMES, supra note 6, at
2-43.
" Perfect actuarial risk rating of each individual would eliminatethe fortuity
element, resulting in either an exclusion, limitation, or higher premium charge
for each individual's genetically-based future medical costs. Thus, there would
be no group risk sharing of that individual's future medical costs. The basis for
pooling and common risk sharing among a similarly situated group is the notion
of fortuity. A simple example is the risk of being struck by a meteor. That risk
is unpredictable, equally affects all people, and does not cause adverse selection;
and issues of imperfect information are not applicable because nobody has more
or less information regarding the probability of the fortuitous meteoric event
occurring. Epstein, supra note 5, at 8-9.
20 See infra Part I (notes 26-67 and accompanying text).
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genetic information; and (3) what new state or federal legislative action,
if any, should be implemented to prevent misuse of this new technology.
Historically, insurers used predictive diagnostic tests to select and
exclude risks. As more predictive tests became available, more and
broader risk classifications were established, and private insurance
underwrote and protected fewer people. At that juncture, governmental
regulation intervened, prohibiting some classifications and mandating
some insurance coverages. Part IV of this Article2' probes federal and
state statutes to ascertain if effective solutions already exist proscribing
unfair genetic discrimination in insurance or whether further legislation
is desirable and necessary. Part IV first considers relevant federal
legislation. These statutes include the 1945 McCarran Act, which
established the primacy of state insurance regulation; ERISA, which
affords protection to employees under employer benefit and insurance
plans; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which may prevent some
genetic discrimination in insurance. Finally, Part IV discusses and
evaluates state legislation that both mandates coverages for genetic
diseases and conditions, and specifically addresses genetic discrimination
in insurance.
Ostensibly, an overriding issue is where fairly to place the responsi-
bility for health loss - on the individual, or the insurer, or the public. In
addition to risk transference and distribution, fortuity is a significant
defining element of insurance. Each of us has a bundle of discrete,
individualized risk factors affecting our health and longevity. Some
factors are within our control and some are not.22 Arguably, only those
health risks that can be classified as fortuitous should be the subject of
private insurance. The issue of fortuity must be kept in mind in reading
this Article.
21 See infra notes 217-569 and accompanying text.
22 Included are gender, race, genome, level of education, job, home, family,
doctor, spirituality, socio-economic status, good habits (exercise, healthy eating),
bad habits (smoking, drinking, lack of exercise), driving habits, etc. For an
enlightening discussion, see Deborah A. Stone, At Risk in the Welfare State, 56
Soc. REs. 591 (1989) (Discussing the tension between the "lifestyle factor theory
which holds that much disease and disability is caused by behavioral factors that.
are within an individual's control," id. at 591, and "the theory of 'genetic
predisposition' or 'susceptibility' which holds that there is a specific gene or set
of genes that controls whether an individual will develop a disease," id. at 592.
Stone analyzes this tension in "the conservative context of the American welfare
state .... [that] emphasizes individualism, responsibility for oneself, and
deterrence."Id at 593.).
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Before turning to the broader philosophical and policy issues, this
Article will first address the basic science of genetic mapping. What the
HGP will discover accurately is the primary concern. Undoubtedly, upon
completion of the HGP, our understanding of genomic information will
be transformed. Often, however, laypersons ascribe too much definitive
significance to what science discovers. Unfair genetic discrimination in
insuring can occur simply because of insurer ignorance in granting
statistical validity to genomic data that is not sufficiently precise for that
purpose. In an attempt to address the potential for misconceptions about
science, Part I of this ArticleP is intended as a genetics primer. This
section provides a basic understanding of the goals of the HGP, the
meaning and scope of genetic testing, and genetic terminology relevant
to insurance. Participants in this debate need to understand what is meant
by genotype, phenotype, and karyotype; monogenic, chromosomal, and
multifactorial diseases and disorders; genetic predisposition to disease,
genetic carrier, asymptomatic genetic condition, presymptomatic genetic
condition, expression (the variability in severity of a genetic trait), and
other genetic terminology relevant to insurance risk classification. This
scientific information is critical for addressing and attempting to solve the
foreseeable future insurance/genetic fair/unfair discrimination dilemma,
especially in health insurance.2 4
'3 See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
24 Obviously, the HGP's findings will affect many forms of insurance which
extend beyond what we customarily perceive as health insurance (e.g.,
automobile liability insurance coverage of people with genetic conditions that
affect their motoring risk). "Health" insurance is used as a shorthand in this
Article to refer to the variety of personal insurances (e.g., medical including
physician's services, hospitalization, health and accident, disability income,
annuities, and life) as well as other forms of insurance for which personal genetic
information may be pertinent in classifying, pricing, and underwriting "genetic
risks." However, distinctions may be made between "health" insurance and other
lines of health-relatedinsurance such as life and disability income insurance. This
Article recognizes that insurance underwriting differs among lines of insurance.
Adverse selection, see infra Part II.B.2 (notes 99-102 and accompanying text),
for example, is a significant factor in all lines of health-related insurance, but its
statistical importance, operation, and avoidance differs among types of insurance.
Moreover, medical (including genetic) screening using predictive diagnostic tests
historically is used more in individual and small (fewer than 10-15 employees)
employer-provided health insurance than in group health insurance. But with the
advent of modem technological advances in genetic testing, group health insurers
will increase their use of predictive genetic diagnostic testing. Historically,
medical testing and screening of applicants were more frequently used and had
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For instance, upon completion of the HGP, we will understand that
some diseases and medical conditions are a complex fusion of genetic
and non-genetic factors; others are not. Mapping the human genome
sequence25 may be 99.9% accurate, but whether a person will (one
hundred percent), or may (fifty percent), or will not (zero percent)
genetically express a physical or mental disease or other medical
condition as well as the degree of that expression (as influenced by
personal life-style habits and by the environment) may not be sufficient-
ly accurate for customary actuarial analysis in underwriting health risks.
Insurers may consider some health risks to be wholly genetic and, further,
may believe that genetic mapping allows the statistically accurate
prediction of illness. Reality is more complex, however. The gene for
Huntington's disease, for example, accurately predicts the fatal expression
of the disease, but environmental factors and personal habits of diet,
exercise, smoking, drinking, and so on, may or may not affect the
expression. Cancer and heart disease are currently known examples of an
expression diversely affected by a combination of genetics, personal
habits, and the environment. Cancer, as expressed by genetic alteration
in an individual, may be caused by genetic inheritance, random mutation,
viruses, radiation, toxic chemicals, or their combination, and may be
affected by personal habits. An individual's serum cholesterol level and
the risk of heart disease are based on a number of genes and not solely
on personal habits in exercise and diet. In other words, insurers without
sufficient genetic understanding may be unaware that their actuarial
analysis based on genomic data is unfair and discriminatory. Given that,
it may prove difficult to identify when unfair genetic discrimination
occurs in insurance underwriting.
their greatest impact in life insurance rather than in health insurance; individual
life insurance applicants were medically tested evidencing an opposite market
structure from group health insurance. See infra Part II.A.2 (notes 76-82 and
accompanying text). The trend, following completion of the HGP, however, will
be toward more medical/genetic testing among all lines of insurance. Thus, this
Article recognizes that the fundamental issues regarding genetic information and
insurance must be initially addressed and solutions evaluatedbefore drawing any
resulting fine distinctions between lines of insurance.
2 For a detailed explanation regarding the methodology of gene mapping,
see Victor A. McKusick, The Human Genome Project: Plans, Status, and
Applications in Biology and Medicine, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND
ETHICS AS GUIDES 18 (George Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (discussing
aspects of social policy in the area of human genetics and the developing
technologies).
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I. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
The HGP is not a single effort, but rather is comprised of a number
of independent international research efforts with the common goal of
analyzing the structure of human DNA and mapping and sequencing the
estimated 100,000 human genes, the basic units of heredity.26 The
HGP's purpose is to generate information, material, and technology that
will be readily available to the whole scientific community.2 7 That
scientific infrastructure will significantly improve the capacity of
investigators from a variety of fields to apply molecular approaches to the
study of wide-ranging biological problems in the twenty-first century. The
HGP will develop efficient, cost-effective detailed genetic and physical
maps of the human genome,2" determine the complete nucleotide
26 For discussion of the HGP's history, see Robert Mullon Cook-Degan,
Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 97
(1994); MAXINE SINGER & PAUL BERG, GENES & GENOME: A CHANGING
PERSPECTIVE (1991) (examining the molecular structures and mechanisms that
underlie the utilization of genetic information by complex organisms); George
J. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome and the Meaning ofMonster Mythology,
39 EMORY L.J. 629 (1990) (presenting a history of genetic fascination and
analysis of the HGI); Jon Beckwith, Foreword: The Human Genome Initiative:
Genetics' Lighting Rod, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1991) (analyzing the most
serious problems arising out of the HGI); John C. Fletcher, Where in the World
Are We Going with the New Genetics?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33
(1989) (discussion of "old" and "new" genetic research and analysis of related
ethical issues); James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present and
Future, 248 Sci. 44 (1990) (discussing the development, current status, and
future of the HGP in the U.S.).
27 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MAPPING OuR GENES - THE
GENOME PROJECT: How BIG, How FAST? 7 (1988) [hereinafter MAPPING OUR
GENES].
28 Simply put, the genome is the human genetic endowment. This
information is stored in every cell. An individual's genome is essentially
synonymous with that individual's genotype, or genetic makeup. More
specifically, genes determine all inherited characteristics. Each gene governs a
biochemical function, such as protein synthesis or cell division; individually or
collectively genes determine a trait, such as hair color. Genes consist of
molecules of DNA arranged on microscopic structures called chromosomes
within each cell. Genetic mapping, broadly defined, is the process of locating
genes on chromosomes. The gene locus is the position on the chromosome of a
specific gene. The HGP's goal is to construct a finely detailed map of all human
genes.
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sequence of human DNA, and create the new technology required to
fulfill its purpose. With the maps, DNA sequences, and improved
technology for genomic analysis, a new era of biological and medical
investigation will be initiated.
Federal funding for the project began in 1991 and the budget is
estimated at three billion dollars over a projected fifteen-year completion
time.2 9 Many believe the HGP to be one of the most important research
projects ever undertaken.3" The ultimate objective of the HGP is to map
and sequence the human genome,31 the inclusive database within every
cell of an individual which stores the total genetic information. This
research will yield information that will be a resource for the study of
gene structure and function. Scientists working on this project are
attempting to map the human genome by identifying and locating genes
and the specific information they contain. Once the human genome has
been deciphered, medical researchers intend to use the information to cure
genetically-based diseases by designing interventions to prevent the
manifestation of these diseases. The scope of intervention could include
either gene therapy or gene design. Notwithstanding these worthy
aspirations, the HGP presents many practical, ethical, social, and legal
concerns.
Since the HGP will reveal vast information about individuals, the
potential for abuse of genetic information in the underwriting and
marketing of health and related personal insurance coverage is but one of
many concerns raised by this new technology. The HGP initially
engendered controversy concerning: its scientific merit relative to other
projects, its use of resources that might be better employed for human
health and research, and the diverse means and ends in which the newly
discovered information might be used or misused. Those controversies
prompted the allocation of five percent of the federal government's HGP
29 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs. & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
UNDERSTANDING OuR GENETIC INHERITANCE, THE U.S. HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT: THE FIRST FIvE YEARS, FY 1991-1995, at ix (1990) (estimating costs
for the HGP at $200 million per year for 15 years).
30 Mark A. Rothstein, The Human Genome Project As Public Policy, 68
BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 144, 146 (1992) (noting that the project is "expected
to move [genetic] science beyond single gene disorders to a wide range of
genetically predisposing conditions").
31 Dennis Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human Genome
Initiative, 32 JURMETRICS J. 121, 147 (Winter 1992) (presenting the results of
a project to identify legal issues raised by the HGI and the work necessary to
resolve them).
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budget to study the ethical, legal, and social implications ("ELSI") of the
project.32 The more disputed ELSI include: the patentability of DNA
sequences identified by the HGP, privacy issues of both the person tested
and that person's genetic family, the history of past misuses of genetic
information, racial and genetic prejudices, the fear of a new eugenics
movement, and, the subject of this Article, potential unfair genetic
discrimination in insurance.33 To fashion any solution and to prevent or
rectify this potential insurance/genetic discrimination, one must have a
basic understanding of genetics.
A. A Genetics Primer
34
The central unit of heredity is the gene. Genes determine the
production of proteins which, in turn, determine the function of each cell
and, ultimately, an individual's traits. Each cell in the human body
(except for red blood cells and sperm or egg cells) contains the complete
set of genes located on the twenty-three chromosomes inherited from
each parent. What differentiates one human cell from another, say a heart
cell from a liver cell, is not the genes, but which of the genes are turned
on. Through reproduction, the total genetic code is transmitted. This total
genetic code, stored within each cell, constitutes the genome. Conceptual-
ly speaking, the genome is the genetic blueprint for the species and it is
the goal of the HGP to map this blueprint.
The science of human genetics evolved from traditional physical and
biological sciences, and seeks to understand the transmission of biological
information from one generation to the next.35 The gene, the basic
physical and functional unit of heredity, is comprised of DNA. In 1953,
James Watson, Rosalind Franklin, and Francis Crick first postulated the
double helix model of DNA to be the chemical basis of heredity.36 In
32 See, e.g., James D. Watson & Eric T. Juengst, Foreword: Doing Science
in the Real World: The Role of Ethics, Law, and the Social Sciences in the
Human Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES
xv, xviii (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992).
33 Id. at xix.
3' For more detailedinformation on genetics, see JOEL DAVIS, MAPPING THE
CODE (1990).
35 Louis J. Elsas II, A Clinical Approach to Legal Education and Ethical
Problems in Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 811, 811 (1990) (discussing legal,
ethical, and moral responsibilities in genetic science).
36 James Watson & Francis Crick, Genetical Implications of the Structure
of Deoxyribonucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 964, 965-66 (1953); ANNE SAYRE,
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1961, the genetic code of DNA was broken.37 From this breakthrough,
scientists recognized that the DNA's linear arrangement of paired bases
in triplets provided the blueprint for protein synthesis. They also
recognized the start and stop sequences of strings of amino acids on
proteins which perform the cellular functions of genes. These relatively
recent advances allowed scientists to develop recombinant DNA
technology, which permits the search for the genetic basis of a disease to
proceed directly at the gene level. Currently, two direct DNA-based
techniques are used in this search: the linkage or direct marker technique,
and direct gene probes.38
A gene probe is a way of directly looking at the gene responsible for
a particular disease. While it is a complex task to determine exactly
which base pairs cause a particular disease, additional gene probes are
developed virtually each month. Gene probes can be used in general
screening. 9 The other method of conducting genetic tests is through
genetic markers which indirectly link genes with known locations to
genes with previously unknown locations.4"
A genome is the totality of the genetic information that is stored in
cells and passed from one generation to the next. Genetic information is
a type of chemical blueprint for any species of plant or animal. This
information directs an organism's development from a seed or fertilized
egg into an adult plant or animal. The genome is central because it
largely determines how cells behave and how complex organ systems
interact throughout life. Different genes carry the instructions not only for
different inheritable characteristics, such as hair color, eye color, gender,
musculature, and intelligence, but also for many inheritable mental and
physical conditions and diseases. Of course, each individual has a
ROSALIND FRANKLIN AND DNA (1975).
37 JAMES WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE
DISCOVERY OF THE STRUCTURE OF DNA (1968).
38 DAvID T. SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH
BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS AND HUMAN VALUES 144 (1989).
39 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MEDICAL
TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE 135-39, OTA-H-384 (1988).
40 Direct gene probes are biologically or artificially constructed pieces of
DNA containing DNA sequences complementary to the human gene. The probe
is labeled with a radioactive isotope and seeks out its matching DNA sequence.
If the probe combines with a segment of human DNA, the human DNA
fragments can be identified. Fragment lengths differing from those of unaffected
individuals indicate that a genetic defect is present.
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different genetic makeup and a crucial part of medical genetics is the
study of variation in the genome.
In the 1940s, scientists discovered that genes consisted of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid). The accepted model of DNA takes the form of
an elegant double helix and looks much like a ladder that has been
twisted. The rungs of the ladder are the base pairs: the union of two of
the four molecules, known as nucleotides, each one from an opposing
strand of DNA. The four nucleotides which make up the base pairs are
adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T). Through
consecutive base pairing, the double stranded structure of DNA is formed.
The order of the nucleotides in the DNA chain is referred to as the DNA
sequence.
The genetic code, or DNA sequence, provides these instructions in a
language of three letter words composed from the four letters from the
chemical bases or nucleotides: A, C, G, and T. The instructions passed
on by DNA are spelled out in various sequences of the four chemical
bases. These bases match up in predictable ways; for instance, A pairs
with T, and G with C. Hence, this language yields sixty-four words,
called codons. These three-letter codons encode for one of twenty amino
acids, the chemical compounds which are the building blocks of proteins.
Proteins are chemical compounds made from different combinations of
the twenty amino acids. Proteins are responsible for determining cell
structure and function in living organisms. Therefore, genes control the
production of proteins and proteins control cell function; thus, ultimately,
cellular function is dictated by an individual's genes.
DNA gets its characteristic "double-helix" structure from the bonding
of the four chemical bases. Approximately three billion base pairs are
contained in human DNA. The bonds between bases can be thought of
as steps on the DNA spiral staircase. The sequence of these bases within
DNA is fundamental to the cell's ability to perform the most basic
activities of life. As explained, a gene is a series of instructions that tells
cells how to behave. The segments of DNA that constitute a gene vary.
Genes contain varying numbers of bases ranging from a few hundred to
over a million. All the information stored in a complete strand of human
DNA - the three billion base pairs comprising roughly 100,000 genes -
constitutes the human genome.
Genes are grouped together in distinctive structures called chromo-
somes. In a nutshell, a chromosome is a very long strand of DNA. Each
human cell contains forty-six individual chromosomes grouped into
twenty-three pairs. One chromosome of each pair is inherited from each
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parent.4 Along with the seemingly benign characteristics that determine
one's physical appearance, one may also, unfortunately, inherit ostensibly
undesirable family diseases and disorders, such as heart disease, arthritis,
and breast cancer. Scientists have determined that there is a link between
human genes and diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs disease,
sickle-cell anemia, Alzheimer's disease, and various forms of cancer.42
Some report that genes may even "predispose people to behavioral traits
such as alcoholism, schizophrenia, depression and even 'aggression.' 
43
The presence of some hereditary diseases can be explained by a single
gene, or monogenic, defect. But the majority of hereditary diseases are
multifactorial, caused by the interaction of environmental factors and
numerous abnormal genes presumably on different chromosomes. Many
diseases have a molecular mechanism of pathology at the gene and
protein levels. Some genetic disorders are understood at the molecular
level, but the mechanisms underlying most genetic diseases remain
unknown. The HGP will eventually provide insights into the treatment
and prevention of both inherited disorders and diseases caused by our
genetically influenced physiological reactions to pathogens, toxins, and
mutagens of external origin. It will shed light on our evolution as a
species and our development as individuals. The culmination of the HGP
will be the starting point for scientific research exploring the biological
elements in human behavior.'
The combined efforts of government agencies, university researchers,
and private supporters of biomedical research have produced rough, but
extremely useful, maps of DNA markers covering most regions of the
human chromosomes. As of 1990, chromosomal locations of over 1215
human genes were known, including those causing twenty of the most
common genetic diseases.45 As of March 1996, maps to all twenty-three
4' Each gene is located on a specific site on one of the 23 chromosomes.
Each cell, therefore, has copies of all of that individual's genes. (Red blood cells
and sperm and egg cells, however, have only one set of genes.)
42 See infra note 45.
41 CARL F. CRANOR, ARE GENES Us? THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW GENETICS 1 (1991).
44 Id. at 7.
41 MAPPING OUR GENES, supra note 27, at 24. The following list shows the
conditions and year a specific gene was recognized: 1986: retinoblastoma,
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, and chronic granulomatous disease; 1990: Wilms
tumor and neurofibromatosis type 1; 1989: cystic fibrosis; 1991: fragile X,
familial polyposis coli, X-linked Kallmann syndrome, and aniridia; 1992:
myotonic dystrophy, Norrie syndrome, and Lowe syndrome; 1993: Huntington's
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human chromosomes and all twenty mouse chromosomes were drawn
4 6
Although sequencing of human DNA has rapidly increased, fewer than one
percent of the more than three billion base pairs comprising the human
genome have been sequenced. It is expected that 99% of the human genome
sequence will be completed at an accuracy of 99.9% by the year 2002, which
is considerably earlier than the original completion date of 2009."7 A 1995
NIH report states that the beginning phase of the HGP has been remarkably
successful. The amount of genetic data describing human DNA and the DNA
of other organisms that is available in public databases has increased
enormously, and the information is being used at an increasing rate. The
contributions that the HGP has already made to advance the study of inherited
disease and other biological phenomena are, by now, widely recognized in the
scientific community. The community is no longer arguing whether the HGP
is a good idea, but instead is now debating the most effective ways to reap
its rewards. We are rapidly approaching the time when we will have the
initial products of the HGP, including maps, genomic DNA sequences, and
the improved technology for genomic analysis, in hand. "That will represent
the true point of initiation for the era of sequence-based biological investiga-
tion."1
48
B. Scientific Issues for Insurance Underwriting
1. Defining "Genetic Testing"
Genetic testing or screening49 is the process of scanning an individual's
genetic composition to determine if the individual has genetic material
disease, neurofibromatosis type 2, adrenoleukodystrophy, amyotropic lateral
sclerosis, Menkes syndrome, and X-linked agammagloulinemia. NIH-DOE
WORKING GROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN
GENOME RESEARCH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH,
GENETIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE
ON GENETIC INFORMATION AND INSURANCE 12 (1993) [hereinafter REPORT].
46 See supra note 1.
47 Young, supra note 2, at 655.
41 Mark S. Guyer & Francis S. Collins, How Is the Human Genome Project
Doing, and What Have We Learned so Far?, 92 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA
10,841, 10,847 (Nov. 1995).
49 Genetic screening should not be confused with genetic monitoring, which
refers to the periodic testing of an individual to check for changes in the
individual's genome that may have been caused by toxic substance at the
workplace. Genetic monitoring is of great interest to employers, and it raises a
host of issues which are beyond the scope of this Article.
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rendering him or her susceptible to developing or transmitting a
genetic defect or disease." Techniques that identify genetic varia-
tions are known as genetic tests." A blood sample is drawn, and DNA
is then extracted from the blood cells to determine a base pair sequence
of a section of the individual's DNA. The technician then maps that base
sequence and compares it to other known sequences. In this manner,
physicians can determine whether an individual's genome contains a
specific gene or set of genes known to cause a disease or to render an
individual more susceptible to a disease. Currently, for proven genetic
disorders, genetic testing can identify individuals with three types of
genetic conditions: (1) individuals who have, or are certain to develop,
a specific genetic disease,52 (2) individuals who do not have a genetic
disease, but are genetic carriers of a disease,53 and (3) individuals
with a genetic predisposition to developing a specific disease in the
future.5
4
The problem, then, is whether to limit insurers' use of genetic testing
information in underwriting. One obvious solution is to do nothing; but
other resolutions seem more likely. For instance, in any solution
involving state or federal efforts to prescribe or proscribe insurers' use of
genetic testing information, the first step is to define "genetic testing"
with linguistic precision. In formulating this definition, legislators must
decide whether to describe genetic testing broadly or narrowly. Quite
50 SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 38, at 144.
5' DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOsTICs:
THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION 51-105 (1989) (discussing the
potential uses and abuses of biological tests that are emerging from genetic and
neuro-scientific research).
52 Robert Wachbroit, Making the Grade: Testing for Human Genetic
Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 583, 586 (1988). Examples of disorders in the
first category are individuals who inherit the gene for Huntington's disease,
cystic fibrosis, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. The presence of the defective
gene is all that is required to cause the disease, and the individual with this
defective gene will develop the disease regardless of extraneous factors such as
lifestyle, diet, and environment. Id.
" Wachbroit, supra note 52, at 587. Examples in this category are carriers
of sickle-cell anemia and Tay-Sachs disease. Carriers pass the genes to their
children who will probably develop the disease if both parents are carriers. Id.
" Id. Examples include a predisposition to lung cancer, other cancers, heart
disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and epilepsy. Individuals with such a
predisposition have the ability to affect the likelihood of developing a disease by
controlling influences such as tobacco, toxic environments, diet, lifestyle, and
alcohol. Id.
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frankly, however, prior to the completion of the HGP, one cannot know
all the possible forms of future genetic tests.
So why try now to divine a definition? The moratorium on genetic
testing for insurance provides one good reason. As explained later in Part
III.B. 1 of this Article,55 several states have recently enacted insur-
ance/genetic legislation. Three of those states (California, Ohio, and
Virginia)56 have imposed a moratorium, suspending insurers' use of
genetic tests and genetic information for a specified time. The moratori-
um approach requires defining what "genetic testing" is prohibited.
Genetic tests can include scientifically precise testing such as direct
molecular manipulation of genetic material, or simply an individual's
medical examination. As commonly understood, however, "genetic
testing" can be defined in terms of one or more of the following current
genetic tests: (1) direct and indirect determination of "altered" DNA
composition using molecular genetic techniques to analyze a blood or
skin sample (e.g., gene mutations evidencing cystic fibrosis or adult
polycystic kidney disease), (2) microscopic examination of chromosomes
from a blood or skin sample to detect an abnormal number of chromo-
somes or chromosomes with aberrant structures (e.g., Down's syndrome
(extra copy of chromosome), Turner syndrome (females missing one X
chromosome), Klinefelter syndrome (males with an extra X chromosome),
and fragile X syndrome (a DNA test is also now available) (which
sometimes causes mental retardation)), and (3) chemical, immuno-
chemical, or biochemical analysis which detects genetic conditions by
measuring chemicals or enzymes in blood or other body samples (e.g.,
Tay-Sachs disease, sickle-cell anemia, hypercholesterolemia, phenylketon-
uria, and galactosemia can be detected by this genetic test).
Although there is no uniformity among the states that currently have
comprehensive insurance/genetic legislation, a number of states have
adopted a narrow definition that results in only limited protection for
genetically-tested individuals. For instance, the intent of Colorado's 1994
statute is to prevent the use of information derived from genetic testing
s See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
56 The California moratorium is from October 9, 1995 (when the governor
signed Senate Bill No. 1020) until January 1, 2002. The bill amended CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 10123.3, 10123.31, 10123.35, 10140, 10140.1, 10140.5, 10143, 10146-
10149.1, 11512.96, 11512.65 (West 1994) and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.7 (West 1995); and the bill added id. § 1374.9. The Ohio moratorium is
from February 9, 1994, through February 9, 2004. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§
1742.42, 3901.49, 3901.50 (Page's Supp. 1994). The Virginia moratorium is for
two years. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-508.4 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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to deny access to health care insurance, group disability insurance, or
long-term care insurance." The statute, however, narrowly defines
genetic testing as any direct laboratory test "of human DNA, RNA, or
chromosomes that is used to identify the presence or absence of
alterations in genetic material which are associated with disease or
illness. '58 This definition does not include the two other diagnostic tests:
microscopic examination of chromosomes or chemical, immunochemical,
and biochemical tests measuring bodily enzymes or chemicals. Florida's
1995 act employs a similarly restricted definition in its efforts to protect
the confidentiality of DNA tests - except for genetic information used
in criminal prosecutions and for paternity suits.59 Similarly, Georgia
specifically excludes "routine physical measurements; chemical, blood
and urine analysis; tests for abuse of drugs; and tests for the presence
of [PY]" 60
In contrast, Ohio, in its 1994 act, more broadly defines "genetic
screening or testing" to mean:
a laboratory test of a person's genes or chromosomes for abnormalities,
defects, deficiencies, including carrier status, that are linked to physical
or mental disorders or impairments, or that indicate a susceptibility to
illness, disease, or other disorders, whether physical or mental, which
test is a direct test for abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, and not an
indirect manifestation of genetic disorders.6'
Currently, none of the states that has attempted to define genetic
testing includes in its statutory definition two common and low-tech ways
insurers obtain genetic information. One is the familiar medical or
physical examination which can provide genetic information about an
applicant for insurance. Some of the genetic conditions that can be
diagnosed directly from a medical examination include: neurofibromato-
sis, von Hippel-Lindau syndrome, and tuberous sclerosis. The other is the
taking of a family medical history, which is useful to insurers in assessing
the risk of an applicant contracting a disease or in predicting a future
genetic disorder or condition. Obviously, a family medical history is a
primitive means of obtaining genetic information and it differs from a
true genetic test in its lack of accuracy. One can predict, for instance, that
57 COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1994).
58 Id. at (2)(b).
59 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 1995).
60 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-2(1) (1996).
61 OHIo REv. CODE §§ 1742.42(A), 3901.49(A)(1), 3901.50(A)(1) (Ander-
son Supp. 1995).
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on average one out of every two progeny of a person with Huntington's
disease will have that disease, but one cannot predict which child will
contract the disease and which will not.
Finally, whether insurance companies will use any of the foregoing
tests following the HGP's completion will certainly depend on costs.
Some current genetic tests for a specific disease or disorder cost only a
few dollars, but others cost several thousand dollars.62 Obviously, the
future cost for a genomic analysis of an individual applicant is unknown.
Nonetheless, in drafting insurance/genetic legislation or regulation, one
factor for consideration is the costs of genetic testing as it relates to the
probability of use by insurance companies. That relationship might affect
not only the definition of genetic testing used but also whether or not
regulating insurers' use of certain testing techniques is deemed necessary.
2. Misunderstanding Genetic Data in Actuarial Analysis
Most critically, the HGP will reveal data concerning the genetic
predisposition to diseases, illnesses, and disorders, and not merely to their
occurrence. In advance of the onset of the actual disease/disorder, the
HGP should unveil significant gene-based differentiation in human
proclivities to environmental factors or infectious organisms. Those
expected discoveries are important in determining how to fairly distribute
health care costs and individual resources via the risk distribution nature
of private insurance, or through a national- or state-mandated health
insurance pool.
Also critical is an understanding by insurers and others of the genetic
nature of disease. A significant part of the study of medical genetics is
the variation in the genome. Geneticists can determine with accuracy in
some cases that when a particular abnormality in a gene is present, an
individual will be affected with a particular disease; but in many cases the
relationship between genes and disease is significantly more complex.
Genetic anomalies can cause diseases in four ways:63
(1) Monogenic or Single Gene Disorders. Some diseases may be
caused by one improperly functioning gene: these are termed single gene
or monogenic disorders. This type of disorder is characterized by a
pattern of transmission in a family. If an abnormality is evident when
62 A list of the costs of most current tests is included as an Appendix to this
Article. See Appendix infra p. 664.
63 The description of the four classifications of genetically-caused diseases
is adapted from the OHIO TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, FINAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 3-4.
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only one of the chromosomal pair contains the variant gene, the disorder
is termed a dominant single gene disorder. Typically, a person affected
by the dominant single gene disorder had a parent who was affected, who
had a parent who was affected, and so on through the family line, back
to the occurrence of the initial gene miutation. If the disease manifests
itself only when both of the chromosomal pair possess the variant gene,
it is termed a recessive single gene disorder. The recessive disorder
occurs when an affected person inherits a mutant gene from each parent,
often even though neither parent has the disease. Most recessive single
gene disorders occur at a rate of one in 15,000 to 100,000 births.
Common examples are sickle-cell anemia in one of every 600 African
Americans, and cystic fibrosis in one of every 2500 births. These single
gene disorders are rare, but there are about 3600 different identified
disorders. Approximately three percent of the population will develop a
single gene disease.
(2) Chromosomal Disorders. Other diseases result from visible
aberrations in chromosome structure or number: these are termed
chromosomal disorders. These disorders account for a significant
percentage of birth defects, mental retardation, and miscarriages.
Chromosomal disorders arise if the number or structure of any of an
individual's forty-six chromosomes is abnormal. This type of disorder
concerns a large number of genes typically on one or two chromosomes.
Disease results because there is either a missing or an extra chromosome
which results in physical or mental maldevelopment. People with Down's
syndrome, for instance, have three rather than two copies of chromosome
"twenty-one." Irregularities may also occur during the division of cells
resulting in either too little or too much chromosomal material in the new
cells. The material may also be rearranged in the new cells which disturbs
the normal balance and may result in abnormal development.
(3) Multifactorial Disorders. Probably the largest genetic-disorder
classification is termed multifactorial. This category has statistical, but
potentially misleading, value in insurance underwriting. If a disorder is
not within the foregoing two classifications and if it runs in families, it
is usually classified as multifactorial in origin. Multifactorial means that
these disorders result from the interaction of environmental factors and
many abnormal genes presumably on different chromosomes. Examples
include asthma, epilepsy, coronary heart disease, diabetes mellitus,
multiple sclerosis, schizophrenia, and some forms of arthritis and
emphysema.
(4) Non-Inherited Disorders. The fourth classification encompasses
the disorders resulting from genetic changes occurring during one's life
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that are not inherited disorders. During a person's life, the genetic
structure of certain cells may be altered. Thus, people genetically
"normal" at birth may develop disorders when the DNA in a cell mutates.
This change can happen when genes are damaged or if external factors
(such as chemicals, radiation, viruses, or cigarette smoking) alter the
genetic structure of cells. Most cancers are examples.
Although the HGP has uncovered monogenic disorders, diseases
caused by a single specific gene are, as explained, rare. Even if a disorder
is monogenic, its expression may depend on other factors.
Once genes for monogenic disorders are sequenced, some may be
found to be almost completely determinative of the particular disorder.
To that extent, we must regard genetic testing as deterministic.
However, in the vast majority of cases, the result of the genetic test will
simply be an increased or decreasedsusceptibility to a particular disease
or ... to diseases associated with environmental influences (such as
smoking or asbestos).' 4
Although the presence of specific genes is all that is required to bring
on a disorder, the degree of severity, timing of onset, or whether the
disease will ever manifest itself at all, remain a matter of statistical
probability. For these reasons, most genetic test information is largely a
matter of probability theory and less conclusive than might be assumed
from popular perception. This distinction of statistical probability from
absolute conclusiveness is important when one explores the issues of
economic and social policy in health insurance underwriting, which may,
in turn, depend upon the accuracy of genetic testing. For instance, one
goal of insurance underwriting is the accurate prediction of an insured's
future medical needs, costs, mortality, and morbidity. With this informa-
tion an insurer can establish a premium at a level consistent with the
medical/health risk represented by each individual policyholder. In other
words, an insurer must fairly differentiate and discriminate among
insureds regarding health risks by setting "actuarially fair" rates.65
64 Karijala, supra note 31, at 146.
6' Risk transference and risk distribution are the basis of underwriting. the
Mother Mold of insurance is "risk" (i.e., statistically probable, future "fortuitous
harm" of an applicant for insurance). That risk is transferred to an insurance
company. The insurer then distributes the risk among a group, exposed to similar
risks, who pay premiums to a common fund. Risk distribution refers to the
process insurers use to decide if an insurance application by an individual,
family, or group represents an actuarially acceptable risk.
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Actuarial fairness then turns on accurate genetic information about each
policyholder. Although the HGP seeks to find the genetic causes for
diseases, it is imperative to keep in mind that there are many factors
which affect disease. Excepting those rare monogenic diseases, it may be
many years before genetic testing will be completely accurate in terms of
its ability to predict with any accuracy the likelihood of an individual
developing a genetic disorder solely on the basis of a positive genetic test
result.
Risk determination through the identification of specific genes which
either directly or indirectly cause a disease differs from the age-old
reliance on an individual's written or verbal account of family history to
determine risk of disease. The increased specificity of identifying the
presence of so-called "problem genes" gives insurers a powerful tool
which they may use to deny insurance coverage to individuals. In an
effort to reduce their health care expenditures, insurers may wish to use
genetic testing to identify individuals with an increased risk of developing
costly medical conditions. An overall, primary concern is that insurers
may misunderstand, misinterpret, and misuse genetic information in
creating risk classifications and excluding or limiting insurance coverages.
Insurer decisions could be based on an applicant's or an insured's
genetic testing information and not on their actual state of health. A
common misunderstanding equates the presence of a genetic trait with an
actual disease or medical condition. People most prone to genetic
discrimination include unaffected carriers (heterozygotes), asymptomatic
individuals, at risk presymptomatic people with a predisposition to
disease, and people with a minor expression of a disease or medical
condition.66 Insurer decisions based on risk classifications may also fail
to account for the early identification of a genetic disorder which may
lead to early intervention, which may in turn prevent the disease from
developing. Moreover, scientists anticipate the eventual development of
routine cures for gene disorders through genetic replacement therapy.
In its recent 1995 report, the NIH's National Center for Human
Genome provides wise, circumspect counsel. After extolling the current
research findings regarding the causes of human disease and disability as
66 High heritability must not be equated with inevitability because the
environment can dramatically affect the expression of a disease. For example, the
genetic disease phenylketonuria (which causes profound mental retardation) has
a 100% heritability. But eliminating the amino acid phenylalanine from the diet
of affected individuals prevents retardation from occurring. John Horgan,
Eugenics Revisited, 268 Sci. AM. 122, 125 (June 1993).
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well as discovery of genes and genetic markers associated with other
human characteristics, the report strongly cautions:
Typically, such genetic studies provide only introductory and incomplete
clues about the interplay of biological, psychological, and sociocultural
factors that influence the development and expression of these complex
human traits. However, the results of such research can be misinterpret-
ed in two important ways. First, they can be interpreted to imply that
such traits can be reduced to the expression of particular genes; this has
the effect of de-emphasizing the important role of psychosocial and
other environmental factors. Second, the results can also be interpreted
in a way that narrows the range of variation considered to be 'normal'
or 'healthy.' Such overly deterministic interpretations can, in turn, be
misused to undercut the respect owed individuals as responsible moral
agents or to inappropriately label individuals as sick or abnormal. Both
forms of misinterpretation can have untoward consequences, such as
devaluing human genetic diversity or fostering social discrimination on
the basis of genotype. As it proceeds, the HGP will need to foster a
better understanding of the meaning of human genetic variation among
members of the public and the professions and expand its efforts to
propose policy initiatives designed to prevent genetic stigmatization,
discrimination, and other misinterpretation or misuses of genetic
information.6 '
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING INSURERS'
USE OF GENETIC INFORMATION
A. Fair Discrimination Is Efficient Underwriting
1. The Equitable, Not Equal, Justification
Risk transference and distribution are the keys to understanding the
nature of insurance and insurance underwriting. Insurance is an arrange-
ment for the transference of the risks of fortuitous losses to an insurer
and the distribution of those risks among insureds who pay a premium to
a common fund. The principle underlying insurance underwriting is "fair
discrimination" predicated on efficient, actuarial analysis in establishing
risk transference and risk distribution (also called redistribution). In
underwriting risks, insurance companies seek "to measure as accurately
67 Guyer & Collins, supra'note 48, at 10,847.
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as is practicable the burden shifted to the insurance fund by the policy-
holder and to charge exactly for it, no more and no less. To do so is
'fair' discrimination .... Not to do so is unfair discrimination."68
Gender discrimination is illustrative. In life insurance, for instance, failure
to distinguish women, who present lower risks of early death, from men
is unfairly discriminatory against women and in favor of men.69 Regard-
ing annuities which pay until death, it is unfairly discriminatory against
men and in favor of women. Hence, the failure to differentiate between
insureds results in unfair discriminatory rates because it forces policy-
holders with lower actuarially predicted risk to subsidize other policy-
holders with higher expected risk.70
Underwriting of insurance is the process which an insurer uses to
determine whether, and on what basis, it will accept an application of
insurance. Underwriting requires the application of risk classification
principles to a particular insurance applicant, or block of business, to
ascertain if insurance coverage will be provided and what premium rates
are required. In every insurance arrangement, each insured contributes to
,a common fund from which amounts are paid to or on behalf of
policyholders who suffer covered losses. To maintain equity among the
policyholders, each must contribute according to the loss probabilities
each individual transfers to the common fund. If one policyholder is
permitted to pay less than that policyholder's share, it will necessitate an
overcharge against the other policyholders which constitutes an unfair
"forced subsidy." Thus, insurance companies must, by sound actuarial
analysis, determine the loss expense presented by each applicant and
68 Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 83, 105.
69 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
70 The HGP has the potential of providing insurers with a wealth of
information about eachhealth insurance applicant's geneticdisposition to disease,
illness, and other conditions. Denying insurers that genetic information would
prevent insurers from accurately differentiating among insureds and actuarially
predicting each applicant's future medical, mortality, and morbidity costs. To
deny insurers the right to conduct genetic tests and to obtain genetic information
will result in unfair discrimination and adverse selection. For an explanation of
adverse selection, see infra Part II.B.2 (notes 99-102 and accompanying text). "It
seems more than a little ironic that, in a society which generally has prized
maximizing access to information for both consumers and investors, to suggest
societal interests are now served by blocking an insurer's access to information
which is clearly relevant to the risks to be undertaken." Widiss, supra note 14,
at 1648 n.138.
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charge a fair premium for each. Circumspect selection and classification
of risks accomplishes that principle of pricing based on risk.
The very nature of insurance is discriminatory because individuals
with a higher risk are routinely charged a higher premium. For example,
a smoker is charged a higher premium than a non-smoker for a life
insurance policy because, all other factors being equal, a smoker
represents a higher mortality7" and morbidity72 risk than a non-smoker.
Thus, rates are established and premiums charged based on the principle
of equity, not equality, so that insureds with the same or similar
actuarially predicted risk of loss are charged the same. The lower the
actuarially expected risk, the lower the premium. The higher the expected
risk, the higher the premium. Whereas equal premiums would simply
mean that all insureds pay the same price, equitable premiums vary
according to the risks transferred. Thus, the goal of insurance underwrit-
ing is equity; that is, equitable, but not equal, treatment of applicants and
policyholders. To achieve that goal, insurers must differentiate among
policyholders by risk classifications and discriminate fairly so that each
insured will pay a premium at a level consistent with the risk represented
by each individual insured. In sum, the fundamental tenets of underwrit-
ing are the selection of insureds based on sound actuarial standards,
proper balance within each rate classification, and equity among
policyholders.
An important final point must be made regarding the impact of fair
discrimination by health insurers' use of genetic testing information in
medical underwriting. The non-governmental, private health insurance
industry offers two types of insurance: individual health policies and large
employer group health policies.73 Approximately eighty-five to ninety
percent of all private health insurance policies are group policies.74
"' "Mortality" is defined as the "death rate at each age as determined from
prior experience." HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, A COURSE
IN GROUP LFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE, pt. A, at 379 (1985), quoted in
Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 14, at 1808 n.9.
72 "Morbidity" is defined as the "incidence and severity of sickness and
accidents in a well-defined class or classes of persons." Id. at 366.
" Rather than purchasing a traditional medical insurance policy, some large
employers opt for self-funded plans or administrative services only ("ASO")
contracts. Under an ASO contract, the insurer charges the group for only the
actual cost of the claims made plus administrative expenses.
74 Stone, supra note 14, at 389. Although the data is somewhat out of date,
unquestionably the great majority of health insurance is acquired by employees
through their employer. See Richard Kronick, Health Insurance, 1979-1989: The
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Approximately ten to fifteen percent of private health insurance policies
are individual policies, or small groups of less than ten to fifteen people,
sold through private commercial insurers and Blue Cross/Blue Shield. The
important point is that medical underwriting occurs for individual policies
and small groups and, generally, not for group policies. Because of their
ability to average utilization over a large number of employees, large
employer groups customarily are not medically underwritten. New
employees are eligible for coverage without medical underwriting by the
insurer. In buying insurance, large groups are typically not denied health
insurance due to the poor health of some employees or their dependents.
Large groups are experience rated; in other words, their insurance
premiums will vary at renewal based on the discrete group's total claims.
Experience rating will vary based on the group's size. For instance,
groups of fifty to one hundred employees could be thirty percent
experience rated and seventy percent pool rated. That means thirty
percent of the group's premium is based on the group's claims and
seventy percent on the general experience of all similarly-sized groups
using customary insurance industry classification. The larger the group,
the greater the weight given to the particular group's claims experience.
In sum, concern over discrimination is greatly diminished when medical
premiums are based on experience rather than calculated through
underwriting. 75
2. The History of Insurance Risk Classification
The pooling of risks with similar characteristics for the purpose of
determining insurability and price is the bedrock principle of a workable,
voluntary, private insurance system. This process, called risk classifica-
tion, not only permits insurers to exercise their right to earn a reasonable
profit but also creates an equitable insurance system for all policyholders.
Through underwriting insurers create risk classifications,76 based on the
abundant differences among individuals, to put applicants into groups
with comparable expectations of future loss. Risk classification necessari-
Frayed ConnectionBetweenEmploymentandlnsurance, 28 INQuIRY 318,320-22
& fig. 3 (1991).
15 The statements in this paragraph are based on the findings of the OHIO
TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 17-18.
76 For perhaps the best article on risk classification in the legal literature to
date, see Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to
the Actuaries, 19 MICH. L. REv. 349, 349 (1986) ("War is much too important
to be left to the generals.").
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ly includes the use of data about an applicant's age, sex, occupation,
health status, and medical history including genetic tests and genetic
information. Allowing insurers access to genetic testing, mapping, and
other relevant information regarding an individual's genotype based on
techniques developed by the HGP will be necessary for proper risk
classification. A system that does not classify risks will inevitably cease
to be a private insurance system. If insurers are denied access to genetic
information it would threaten insurers' solvency by undercutting the use
of actuarially sound risk classifications to properly and fairly price
insurance policies.
Risk classification is a process whereby an insurer develops a number
of different categories, or classes, that accurately reflect the varying
degrees of risk which members of the classes represent. While individual
outcomes cannot be predicted, -trends and averages for classes composed
of people with similar characteristics can be predicted with an adequate
degree of certainty. The present risk classification system permits private
insurance companies to respond fairly to experience-related differences
and the costs of policyholders' claims for loss. The standard for the
practice of risk classification, developed for the actuarial profession by
the Actuarial Standards Board, states three requirements for an appropri-
ate risk classification system: (1) it must be fair, (2) it must permit
economic incentives to operate thereby encouraging widespread availabili-
ty of insurance coverages in the marketplace, and (3) it must assure that
insurers will be solvent." The great flywheel of a sound insurance risk
classification system is efficient, fair discrimination.
The history of insurance risk classification provides further support
for fair discrimination. A brief review of this history evidences that
properly utilized risk classification fuels an efficient private system,
enhances insurer solvency, encourages fair treatment of all policyholders,
and provides an enormous public benefit through widely-available, low-
cost health, life, and other health-related insurance.78 The risk classifica-
" Robert J. Pokorski, Use of Genetic Information by Private Insurers, in
JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PRoJECr 91, 95 (Timothy F. Murphy &
Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994) (arguing that genetic information must be made
available to insurers as a matter of equity).
78 As of 1988, more than 143 million people nationwide had life insurance
coverage. The overwhelming majority (approximately 96% of ordinary life
insurance) were classified as "standard" risks for insurance purposes and were
charged standard insurance rates. See AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK UPDATE 1989, at 54 (1989). Similarly, most
insurers accept 70-80% of applicants for individual health coverage at standard
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tion system developed without specific regard to any individual risks. It
evolved independent of the response to a discrete disease or medical
condition and it established the framework within which underwriting for
all medical/genetic conditions can be performed.
The contemporary system of employer-funded health insurance
evolved because of the economic pressures on hospitals during the Great
Depression. In response to their extraordinary financial burden, hospitals
arranged to provide certain services to patients in exchange for a set
annual fee.79 These arrangements for "hospitalization insurance" were
made with employers who offered the programs as a benefit to their
employees. These early programs were the predecessors of Blue Cross.
Although "medical insurance" which reimbursed for physicians' services
was a known quantity with a longer history than hospital insurance
arrangements, medical societies quickly followed suit and began to offer
similar plans. This led to the creation of Blue Shield. The shortage of
workers during World War II led employers to offer and expand these
health plans as fringe benefits.80
Community rating and experience rating are the two primary
approaches that insurers historically used to establish premium rates. With
an emphasis on fair discrimination, experience rating bases premium rates
on the current claims made by the particular group - the group's
experience. In contrast, with an emphasis on fair risk distribution,
community rating bases the premium rate on the average cost of all
insured policyholders within a defined geographical region. The early
non-profit Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans used a community rating system
to price their group health insurance. This method took into account the
average expected health expenses of the population in a particular
geographic community, not the expected health expenses of any particular
employee or work force. This community rating system, which included
those for whom insurance would otherwise have been expensive or
unavailable - such as the elderly, infirm, and those unable to work -
rates. Most individual health insurers' declination rates are less than 10%. See
HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE pt. A at 132 (1989). These statistics evidence that the risk classification
system operates to afford the great majority of applicants with ready access to
insurance coverage at a reasonable premium reflecting the risk acceptedby their
insurer.
79 Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing ofHealth Insurance,
74 B.U. L. REv. 109, 113 (1994) (discussing the origin of health insurance in the
United States).
0Id. at 114.
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worked well with no competitive markets. But the advent of health
maintenance organizations and other forms of competition revealed the
weaknesses in this system. These more recent commercial insurers used
an experience rating system to classify risks, and because this system
looks only at the group being insured,8 it allows these insurers to offer
lower rates by excluding from the calculation of premiums higher risk
individuals. This shift in pricing has the effect of reducing the forced
subsidy of redistributing risk of loss from those with high expected
medical costs to those with low expected medical costs.
In 1933, Blue Cross used community rating. All premiums were the
same for all policyholders regardless of the actual experience of the
group. Then came stiff competition from for-profit insurers who lured
away low-risk Blue Cross insureds by separately classifying them and
giving them a lower premium.
The effect of community rating, or the failure to classify risks, is the
creation of a situation in which high-cost subscribers are subsidized by
low-cost subscribers. In a market where subscribers are not forced to
purchase coverage and may choose among several competing sources
for insurance, the failure to classify risks will be fatal.82
This brief history teaches one lesson: private insurers must classify risks
to remain in business.
In other words, the health care system in the United States is
financially administered through a private insurance system. Therefore,
any analysis of the system must keep in mind the idea that health
insurance is a business. If this private system is to survive, it is necessary
to allow the continued operation of the free market to the extent that it
is equitable for all involved.
3. Use of Genetic Tests Is Efficient and Equitably Fair
Insurers use risk classification methods to establish premium rates
commensurate with the level of risk an individual or group represents.
81 Id. at 113.
82 Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classification after McGann:
Managing Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59,
71 (1995) (discussing the development of the market for small group insurance
and the community rating system as a result of the competitive market's demand
for an efficient risk classification system).
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Insurers' use of such techniques has expanded the availability of health
and medical insurance because premiums are fixed at levels representing
the relative risk of insuring an individual or a given group. Because the
primary goal of insurance underwriting is the accurate prediction of
mortality and morbidity costs,83 any medical tests which will be useful m
assessing risks should be available to insurers. Insurance underwriting
involves the classification of applicants based upon one's medical/health
history, including static factors (such as age, sex, and genotype) and
personally diverse factors (such as occupation, diet, and tobacco/alcohol/
drug use).84 Although these factors may affect individuals differently,
they are statistically sigmficant in affecting mortality and morbidity
Insurers uniformly use them in an effort to assess risk accurately before
agreeing to insure an individual applicant.
If risks are not properly assessed and factored into the rates charged,
then two scenarios could potentially arise: (1) If an insurer underassesses
risks, it will have insufficient funds to pay claims submitted unless it
overcharges people who represent low risk. If insurers have inadequate
funds and are unable to meet their contractual obligations to pay claims,
the insurers will go bankrupt, leaving people uninsured. (2) If an insurer
overassesses risk and overcharges, the free market and competitive nature
of business logically dictate that people will purchase insurance else-
where. Thus, accurate risk assessment is essential to the business of
insurance." In addition to accurate risk assessment, the methods used
to transfer and distribute costs have affected the insurance companies'
need to remain competitive and to keep costs as low as possible for their
insureds.
The present health insurance industry has fundamentally abandoned
an equitable community-wide rating system where the health costs for
everyone in society are aggregated and premium charges are spread
83 Mortality costs are based on how much an insured has paid in premiums
before he or she dies. Morbidity costs are based on how much the insured has
paid in premiums versus the cost of medical care for diseases the insured will
contract.
14 According to the Health Insurance Association of America, medical
underwriting may be based on some or all of these sources of information: the
application, agent's statement, medical or paramedical examination, attending
physician's statement ("APS"), hospital medical records, inspection reports, and
the files of the Medical Information Bureau ("MIB"). HEALTH INSURANCE
AssOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 78, at 122-32. See infra notes 209-13 and
accompanying text for a description of the MlB.
85 Clifford & Iuculano, supra note 14, at 1810.
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equally among all insureds. Health underwriting has been replaced by a
system based on "experience rating" by selective groupings.8 6 These
changes in underwriting practices combined with the competitive nature
of the insurance business provide a compelling argument that the use of
genetic testing will provide a valuable tool for insurers. Insurers agree
that the use of genetic testing is discriminatory, but they would argue that
it is fair discrimination because it is based on sound actuarial analysis.
Accordingly, the rate-setting philosophy of insurance companies is
founded on the equitable treatment, not equal treatment, of all applicants
for health insurance. Rates should be adequate, not excessive, and
discriminate fairly between insureds. Adequate rates provide insurers with
sufficient income to process and fairly pay claims at a reasonable profit
and without fear of bankruptcy. Rates should not be excessive, because
excessive rates impose undue burden on insureds. To achieve adequate
non-excessive rates, insurers must discriminate fairly so that each insured
will pay in accordance with the quality of his/her life and health."
An analogy can be made to the arguments of those in favor of using
gender as an actuarially relevant criterion in assessment of risk. Insurers
argue that charging an insured a premium that is proportional to the
individual's actual risk of loss is fundamental to the principles of the
insurance business. The insurers argue that women live longer than
men,88 are safer drivers than men, 9 and incur higher medical costs
than men.9" Because the risks are different for men and women, the
premiums should reflect these differences.9"
86 Roger J. Bulger, How the Genome Project Could Destroy Health
Insurance, WASH. PosT, Aug. 4, 1991, at C4.
87 Pokorski, supra note 77, at 93 (quoting Herman T. Bailey et al., The
Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REv.
(Insurance Annual) 23 (1976) (discussing federal and state regulatory approaches
which threaten the current insurance risk classification system)).
18 NATIONAL SAFETY COuNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 8 (1989) (containing
statistical information regarding accidents causing injury or death in the United
States).
89 Id. at 54.
90 JERRY, supra note 14, at 102 ("In health and disability insurance, because
of maternity costs women as a group present more of a risk to insurers than do
men as a group. Thus, women often pay more than men for the same health and
disability insurance coverage.").
9, See generally George J. Benton, The Economics of Gender Discrimina-
tion in Employee Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489
(1982).
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The insurance industry's ability to fairly discriminate based on the
actuarial knowledge derived from the HGP could have a positive impact
on many insureds. Because insurers try to correlate premiums with
actuarial risk, genetic information could lower a person's premiums or
allow an individual previously considered uninsurable to obtain health
insurance. For example, because Huntington's disease is a monogenic
disorder, a child of parents who are both carriers of the gene would have
a fifty percent chance of inheriting this genetic disease. However, if the
couple's child tested negative for the disease-causing gene, the child
would then be able to obtain more affordable insurance. Consequently,
instead of all children whose parents are Huntington's disease gene
carriers being rejected, half of them would qualify for insurance.
Currently, about three percent of individual insurance applications are
rejected due to high risk - in fact, in these cases it is often impossible,
currently, to make accurate predictions of risk.92 Through the use of
genetic information in these cases, however, insurance companies could
accurately assess risk. Assuming that the risk was ascertainable but found
to be high, the applicant, with this confirmed knowledge, would likely
feel that it was fair to pay a higher premium for the correspondingly high
risk. An applicant would probably not accept a policy with a very high
premium charge unless the applicant had reason to believe that even
though the premium was quite high, the insurer had nevertheless
underestimated the risk. Thus, equal access by the insurer and insured to
the insured's genetic information would produce fair results: not only
would previously uninsurable people find coverage, but relatively high
premiums would be justifiable.
Another example where equal access to the insured's genetic
knowledge would produce favorable results to the insured is where an
insured has a gene which in conjunction with known external factors
results in disease. That insured's decision to take appropriate measures to
reduce the risk of disease would include the economic benefit of a lower
premium based on the insurer's use of risk classifications. For instance,'
if an insured has a gene associated with cancer, then he or she would
likely choose to periodically monitor the condition and follow a
physician's advice in reducing the risk through appropriate changes in
lifestyle. Not only would adverse selection be avoided, but immediate
economic and potentially long-lasting health benefits would be derived.
Risk classification positively promotes efficient, less risky behavior.
Therefore, equal access to genetic information for proper risk classifica-
92 Pokorski, supra note 77, at 104.
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tion has the positive effect of creating loss prevention incentives in
insureds.93 This incentive to avoid losses arises only if insurance
premiums are a function of risk classifications and experience rating.
B. Equal Access to Genetic Tests Fairly Rectifies the Unfairness
of Imperfect Genetic Information in Underwriting
1. Applicant's Good Faith
Duty to Disclose Genetic Information
As a prerequisite to risk transference based on actuarially fair risk
classification, insurers submit that they be allowed to require applicants
to undergo genetic testing, or minimally, to disclose genetic information
from prior tests. The rationale is that the absence of genetic information
will cause economically inefficient unfairness arising from imperfect risk
information between insurer and applicant about the applicant's future
health care needs. Imperfect information is an obstacle to an effectively
functioning market. Almost always there is a disparity in knowledge
between the insurer and the prospective insured regarding the factors that
affect the degree of risk presented by the applicant. If an applicant knows
materially adverse genetic facts regarding the applicant's foreseeable need
for later medical treatment and care, and also knows that the insurer does
not have equal access to these material genetic facts, then that applicant
has a good faith obligation to disclose this information to protect the
insurer's solvency and to ensure equitable premiums." If, however,
' For a discussion of behavioral activity and care level effects, see Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980)
(comparing strict liability and negligence on the basis of how effectively money
reduces accident loss based on incentives found under each scheme).
" For a discussion of the insured's duty of good faith (uberrimaefide) to
disclose material facts based on unequal knowledge in insurance contract
formation, see Eric Mills Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good
Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 381,
409-35 (1978). The American rule recognizing an affirmative obligation to
disclose material facts in insurance contract formation requires the following six
elements: (1) when the insurance contract is formed, the insured knows fact X
(i.e., material genetic information); (2) insured does not disclose fact X to insurer
and insurer is not chargeable with its knowledge; (3) fact X is material; (4)
insured knows fact X is material; (5) insurer does not know fact X when
insurance contract is formed; and (6) insured knows that insurer does not know
fact X. Id.
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insurers are granted equal access to an applicant's genetic tests and
genetic information, then the good faith obligation to disclose does not
arise.
In the famous English marine insurance case of Carter v. Boehm,95
Lord Mansfield, deftly mixing natural law, continental codes, and the lex
mercatoria with English equity and law, established for the first time in
our common.law a good faith duty to disclose material facts in contract
formation. Mansfield assumed, as does classical contract theory, that
parties are legal equals in contracting. This legal equality often leads to
a violation of equitable principles as recognized in modem contract
law.96 Mansfield recognized the potential inequity to the contracting
parties resulting from non-disclosure of material facts.
The special facts, upon which the contingent chance is to be
computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only: the
underwriter trusts to his [applicant's] representation and proceeds upon
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstances in his
knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief that the circum-
stance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risqu6, as if it
did not exist.97
An applicant for insurance, with material genetic knowledge that the
applicant knows the insurer does not know, has an obligation to disclose
those material genetic facts to the insurer in the insurance contract
formation process.98 An applicant should not be allowed to take advan-
9s Carterv. Boehm, 3 Burr. 1095,97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B. 1766). This case
is thoroughly explained in Holmes, supra note 94, at 426-35.
96 For example, the equitable principles of good faith and conscience, so
important in insurance law, are recognized as contract policing principles in
modem contract law. Under the heading "Considerations of Fairness and the
Public Interest" in the RESTATEI~mNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs (1981) are
section 205 "Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" ("Every contract imposes on
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.") and section 208 "Unconscionable Contract or Term" ("If a
contract term is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract .... "). See generally JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR.,
MURRAY ON CoNTRAcTs 473-81 (3d ed. 1990) ("The fact situations requiring
disclosure are myriad." Id. at 473).
97 Carter, 3 Burr. at 1909, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164 (emphasis added).
9' The requirement of good faith disclosure in insurance contract formation
is well-established. In his monumental insurance treatise, Professor Vance states:
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tage of that undisclosed personal knowledge in purchasing insurance at
an unreasonably low premium rate that subsequently will not adequately
cover the applicant's claims. An applicant's bad faith non-disclosure is
tantamount to fraud against the insurer and other policyholders. The result
is that the equity rationale - the principle of fair discrimination -
underlying risk classification is violated if an insurer raises premiums for
all policyholders to cover losses, unexpected from the insurer's stand-
point, but expected by the applicant.
In order to address the danger of relying on a duty to disclose genetic
information, both the applicant and insurer should, instead, have equal
access to all material genetic data. Allowing insurers access to an
applicant's genetic tests and personal genomic information rectifies the
problem of imperfect information regarding genetic risks. It renders the
duty to disclose irrelevant and fairly avoids the unfairness to insurers
associated with the issues addressed in the next two sections: adverse
selection and incontestability clauses.
2. Adverse Selection
Whenever applicants for insurance are treated similarly, regardless of
some risk factor or risk element that differentiates them as insurance
risks, adverse selection takes place.99 If an insurer cannot distinguish and
classify high-risk from low-risk applicants, the insurer must offer all
applicants the same premium for the same coverage. Low-risk applicants
are then worse off and high-risk applicants are better off than in a
properly functioning insurance risk classification system. If insurers are
denied genetic information for purposes of risk classification, insurers will
be forced to treat applicants equally rather than equitably. The result will
be adverse selection because applicants will have more information about
their risk of loss due to disease, illness, or medical condition than
insurance companies. Adverse selection occurs when people with a
greater probability of loss than reflected in their premiums buy and
continue insurance coverage to a greater extent than other people. In an
insurance market in which adverse selection is substantially present, low-
"If the applicant is aware of the existence of some circumstance which he knows
would influence the insurer in acting upon his application, good faith requires
him to disclose that circumstance, though unasked." WILLIAM R. VANCE,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 372 (3d ed. 1951).
" For a more comprehensive discussion, see Adverse Selection and
Discriminatory Practices, in HOLMES, supra note 6, § 3.5, at 361-69.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
risk people "'actually subsidize the insurance purchases of high
risks.' "100
Applicants for health, disability, and life insurance are said to
adversely select when they seek insurance coverage based on information
in their possession which they conceal from the insurer. Consequently, an
accurate assessment of risk cannot be calculated and an appropriate
premium cannot be determined for those applicants. If the insurers cannot
efficiently and accurately assess risks and apply rates based upon actual
risks, insurers are "at risk" not only of violating state insurance laws, but
also of becoming insolvent because they will not have sufficient resources
to pay claims. If an insurance company does not fairly differentiate
among the applicants for insurance, a disproportionately high percentage
of applications will typically be submitted by people at higher risk
because they will pay a lower premium. In turn, more claims for payment
are submitted than would be made if there were no adverse selection.
Thus, adverse selection can seriously threaten insurers' financial stability.
The problem is inequality in knowledge between applicant-insureds
and insurance companies. An applicant with knowledge of a high risk of
loss will probably apply for insurance covering that high risk more than
the average person. If insurers charge an equitably rated premium without
knowledge of the high risk or charge an equal premium for all applicants,
the high-risk person will select to apply and obtain insurance in greater
proportion than low-risk people. Thereafter, the cyclical adverse
consequences of that selection are set in motion.
In the first part of this cycle, the insurer must increase the premium
price for insurance coverage because of unexpected claims. Second, low-
risk insureds, noting the increase in premium, select to discontinue their
insurance coverage. Third, the remaining pool of insured-policyholders
has a higher than average risk of loss. Fourth, insurers then must again
raise the premium price. Finally, either an equilibrium is reached with
some of the low-risk insureds still buying the insurance, or the insurer's
risk pool entirely separates. In either situation, unless the insurer has the
requisite information to distinguish, classify, and appropriately rate the
high- and low-risks, low-risk people purchase less coverage and high-risk
people purchase more insurance coverage.
100 Hylton, supra note 82, at 72 n.41 (quoting Mark J. Browne & Helen I.
Doerpinghaus, Information Asymmetrics and Adverse Selection in the Marketfor
Individual Medical Expense Insurance, 60 J. OF RISK & INS. 300, 300 (1993)
(discussing empirical studies that concluded that low-risk subscribers subsidize
medical insurance for high-risk subscribers)).
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Avoiding adverse selection is one of the fundamental tenets on which a
statistically sound, and hence fair, insurance classification system is founded.
Specifically, four primary principles are recognized: (1) "[r]isk classification
should reflect cost and experience differences;" (2) "[t]he system should be
applied objectively and consistently;" (3) "[tlhe system should be practical,
cost effective, and responsive to change;" and (4) most importantly, "adverse
selection should be minimized." '° In order to minimize adverse selection,
insurers must receive all material information including genetic information.
The potential for adverse selection increases as genetic information
becomes available to insurance consumers. If an individual undergoes genetic
testing and tests positive for a genetic disorder, that person may seek to buy
as much insurance as is available to cover the costs of future illnesses which
may later be expressed. If insurers are legislatively prohibited from requiring
genetic tests and from obtaining the results of genetic tests, they may insure
individuals at rates that do not reflect the true risk. Companies that specialize
in biotechnology may market at-home tests which can disclose genetic
disorders. If these tests are widely used, and the insurers are legislatively
precluded from obtaining the same genetic information to which individuals
have access, then there is a risk of widespread adverse selection based on
genetic information. Carrying this scenario to its logical extreme, if individu-
als test negative for a variety of genetic disorders, they may elect to purchase
little or no insurance, while those who test positive, and who will submit the
majority of claims, will be the primary people to purchase as much health
insurance as possible. This adverse selection would likely result in catastroph-
ic failures in the insurance industry, leaving many individuals uninsured
altogether.
02
3. Incontestability Clauses
Health, life, and disability insurance applications require applicants to
answer sundry questions concerning their health, medical histories, and related
... Pokorski, supra note 77, at 95-96.
102 The argument against adverse selection is that consumer choices depend
dramatically upon insurance marketing and upon what people are told about rate
increases. The importance of adverse selection is also diminished because the real
issue is whether an individual can afford insurance at all. Those who can afford
it can make choices. "[P]eoplehave enough discretionary income to buy a whole
lot more health insurance or life insurance. You either have health insurance or
you don't. The difference in cost between the really good policy and the really
[lousy] policy is not that much." Reginald Rhein, Federal Disability Law Bans
Genetic Discrimination, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, May l, 1995, at 6,
available in 1995 WL 2196533 (quoting Paul R. Billings).
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personal information in order to promote efficiency and fairness in risk
classification as well as in rating and pricing.0 3 Most insurers use this
information to determine if further information should be provided by the
applicant, by doctors and hospitals, or by medical tests (blood, urine, or
complete physical), which foreseeably might include genetic testing.
Assume an applicant has a good faith duty to disclose material facts about
prior genetic testing or personally-known related genetic data, and
conceals that genetic information in the application/contract formation
process. ' °4 Or assume an applicant affirmatively misrepresents or omits
personal genetic information. In those situations, insurers may have a
garden-variety of familiar contract-vitiating defenses for fraud, non-
disclosure, concealment, misrepresentation, and possibly mistake.
Typically, insurers will seek rescission of the insurance contract. 5
103 See supra Part II.B. 1 (notes 94-98 and accompanying text). Applicants
have an obligation to fully and fairly inform insurers of material facts affecting
their risk.
104 See supra note 96. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs 366-71 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing situations
in a bargaining transaction where there is a duty, predicated on community
expectations of good faith and fair dealing, to disclose information to the other
party).
105 See, eg., Slevin v. Amex Life Assur. Co., 695 F. Supp. 712 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (granting summary judgment because the applicant's failure to disclose his
history of venereal diseases was a material misrepresentation as a matter of law);
Zachary Trading Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 343, 347
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that an applicant with AIDS who failed to disclose two
prior visits to physicians had committed a material misrepresentation entitling the
insurer to summary judgment on its rescission counterclaim). In some jurisdic-
tions, if misrepresentations are material, it makes no difference whether the
applicant acted fraudulently, negligently, or innocently. See, e.g., William Penn
Life Ins. Co. v. Sands, 912 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding that,
under Florida law, material misrepresentation in an insurance policy application
provides the basis for rescinding an insurance contract even when the applicant
could not have known the information was incorrect or inaccurate); Elder v.
SMA Life Assur. Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4030 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 1990)
("There is no requirement in O.R.S. § 742.013(1) that Elder's misrepresentations
be 'intentional' in order to preclude recovery by Elder" under a disability income
insurance policy. Id. at *5); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Tillinghast, 512 A.2d 855,
859 (R.I. 1986) (holding that a material misrepresentation, even if innocently
made, may provide a basis for rescinding a contract); Hendren v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 672 P.2d 1137, 1140 (N.M. App. 1983) (holding that insurer's misrepresen-
tation, whether fraudulent or negligent, may allow resqission). For further
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In many cases, however, the insurer is contractually barred from
seeking to vitiate the insurance contract. All life insurance, and many
health and disability insurance policies, contain "incontestability
clauses."'', 6 These clauses, which are typically prescribed by state
insurance statutes or insurance regulations,' 7 prevent insurers from
asserting contract-vitiating defenses and disputing the validity of a policy
after it has been in effect for two years. Practically speaking, contractual
incontestability provisions' 8 create a type of contractual two-year
statute of limitations during which insurers must uncover an applicant's
fraud or bad faith in the contract formation process. Insurance companies
have a two-year period during which they must raise any potential
contract-vitiating defenses. Thus, incontestability clauses not only foster
discussions regarding the legal effect of an applicant's undisclosed knowledge of
the true state of his/her health or physician, see ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I.
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 5.7, at 570 (1988) (discussing whether the insurer
must prove fraudulent intent of insured in order to obtain rescission).
106 Incontestability means that the insurer is foreclosed from legally
contesting the insurance policy's validity and that the policy stands as is.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 101-02 (1920)
(Holmes, J.) (explaining the clause's object is "to create an absolute assurance
of the benefit, as free as may be from any dispute of the fact except the fact of
death, and as soon as it can reasonably be done."). As insurance law students
well know, interpreting the effect of the clause, beyond its precluding contract
formation defenses, can be an enigmatic and perplexing exercise. The best
instruction in the legal literature for understanding what is incontestable is
written by my insurance casebook co-author, William F. Young Jr., Incontestable
- As to What?, 1964 ILL. L. F. 323 (1964) (comparing advantages and
disadvantages of incontestability clauses). For an excellent explanation of the
history, scope, purposes, and problems of incontestability clauses, see JERRY,
supra note 14, at 701-12. "Incontestability clauses do not need to be as broad in
health insurance policies because, unlike the situation in life insurance, the
insured under a health policy usually survives and is able to testify and take other
steps to protect his or her interests when the insurer denies coverage."Id. at 702.
.07 For citations to each state's legislation, see Eric K Fosaaen, Note, AIDS
and the Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REV. 267, 270 n.27 (1990).
08 An excerpt from an incontestability clause is as follows: "The validity of
this policy shall not be contested, except for the nonpayment of premiums, after
it has been in force for two years from the date of issue." This language is from
a policy litigated in Crawford v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 305 N.E.2d 144, 147
(Ill. 1973) (insurer's defense based on insured's non-eligibility for employer-
provided group insurance plan, due to her lack of status as an employee, was not
foreclosed by incontestability clause even after two year period).
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a moral hazard of fraud but also unfairly require insurers to pay claims
that should not be paid. Fraudulent insureds are rewarded for their
misconduct by paying an unfairly low premium, while honest insureds
pay an unfairly high premium. The effect on underwriting and insurance
pricing, therefore, is similar to adverse selection. The untoward, unfair
effects of uncontestability clauses can be avoided by granting insurers
equal access to an applicant's genetic information.
In summary, many genetic disorders can be detected many years
before their expression. Consequently, where an applicant had knowledge
of personal genetic information regarding medical diseases and conditions
which would affect insurability or premium rates and did not fairly share
this information with the insurer at the time of application, these
incontestability clauses may later prevent an insurer from claiming bad
faith non-disclosure or. even fraudulent misrepresentation.' 9 In fairness
to insurers and other policyholders, such an applicant should be required
to disclose that information or provide insurers reasonable access to
obtain it. Required disclosure of genetic testing data thereby would
eliminate problems associated with imperfect information and provide a
fairly priced product of insurance for all applicants.
C. State Insurance Law Requires Insurers to Use Genetic Information
to Achieve State-Mandated Fair Discrimination
Prior to the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act of 1945
(the "McCarran Act"),"0 competition was essentially the only method
for assuring that rates were fair and nondiscriminatory. The McCarran
Act was a compromise which, in effect, recognized the supremacy of
states to regulate the business of insurance. A few years after the passage
109 See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. v. Sheehan, 450 S.E.2d
228 (Ga. App. 1994) (holding that, although insured lied on his application that
he was not BIV-positive, incontestability clause barred insurer's rescission).
Some states, however, provide that fraudulent misstatements in individual
accident and health insurance applications are excepted from the application of
the incontestability clause. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (d)(B)(i) (1995)
("After two years from the date of issue of this policy no misstatements, except
fraudulent misstatements, made by applicant in the application for such policy
shall be used to void the policy .... ).
1' McCarran-Fergusonlnsurance RegulationAct of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15,
59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1996)). The
McCarran Act is discussed at infra Part IV.A (notes 218-38 and accompanying
text).
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of the McCarran Act, there was widespread state adoption of model
regulatory legislation, prepared through the joint efforts of state insurance
departments and insurance industry committees. The legislation contained
strictures against deceptive practices, unfair methods of competition, and
excessive, inadequate, and unfairly discriminatory rates. The acts are
sometimes referred to as the "All Industry laws," and were avowedly
designed as an "umbrella" against federal intervention. Congressional
committees, federal agencies, and others have inveighed repeatedly
against various shortcomings in state regulation. Nonetheless, the
settlement achieved in the McCarran Act has proven to be surprisingly
durable on the whole. In the insurance/genetic debate, insurers continue
to support the McCarran compromise and the supremacy of state
regulation of the business of insurance.
As a result of the All Industry laws, fairness and equity are now an
integral and regulated aspect of insurance underwriting."' In addition
to assuring insurer solvency and preventing contractual overreaching, one
significant objective of state insurance regulation is to require fair,
equitable, and nondiscriminatory rating classifications. This objective is
achieved by regulation fashioned to produce premium rates which are
equitable to all insureds while providing insurers with a fair return for the
risks underwritten. Fair discrimination under states' unfair discrimination
statutes is required, giving rise to insurance risk classifications that
differentiate between individuals. The history of state unfair discrimina-
tion statutes is evidence of public support for the equitable treatment of
applicants/insureds premised upon differentialization in statistical
association with loss - in other words, actuarial fair discrimination.'12
The central question of what is fair discrimination is answered by the
Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA" or the Act), which was developed
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") and
enacted by all states, in some form, by 1960.13 For life insurance
.' However, there has historically been "relatively little regulation of life,
health and accident insurance policy forms and even less regulation of life, health
and accident insurance rates." R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 558
n.2 (1971). An untoward result is that it is extremely difficult for the ordinary
consumer to make price comparisons. See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball & Werner
Pfennigstorf, Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts: A
Comparative Study, 40 IND. L.J. 143, 214-15 (1965).
..2 Stanford Research Institute Final Report 49, cited in U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULA-
TION OF INSURANCE 117-19 (1979).
"13 For a current version of the NAIC UTPA, see NAIC MODEL LAWS,
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contracts, the UTPA prohibits any insurer from "making or permitting
any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and equal
expectation of life in the rates charged for any life insurance policy or
annuity.... 4 For health insurance, the UTPA has a similar provision that
proscribes "unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class
and of essentially the same hazard." ' 5 Since differentiation is the
linchpin of underwriting, pricing, and selling insurance, the litmus test is
to ascertain what types of differentiation are fair. The UTPA's answer is
to distinguish between fair and unfair discrimination, and then prescribe
fair discrimination and proscribe unfair discrimination.
State insurance statutes, modeled on the UTPA, compel fair
discrimination in certain areas and prohibit unfair discrimination in other
areas. For example, the Act deems it inequitable to charge the same
premiums for life insurance to a fifty-year-old man in poor health and a
twenty-year-old woman in good health.116 To charge an equal premium
would be inequitable. Therefore, insurers are required by the UTPA to
discriminate fairly between the two people to determine an equitable
premium. "'[R]ates should be adequate but not excessive and should
discriminate fairly between the insureds.... so that each insured will pay
in accordance with the quality of his risk: 39117 By requiring adherence
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 880-1 (1996). For an extendeddescription of the
McCarran Act and the development of state unfair practices acts, see infra Part
IV.A (notes 218-38 and accompanying text). Some states make HMOs subject
to their TPA. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 10-3-1102(2) and 10-3-1110(3)
(1996) (including IMOs in the definition of "person" under the unfair
competition deceptive practices statute).
"' NAIC, supra note 113, § 4.G(1).
115 Id. § 4.G(2).
116 See, e.g., Langan v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 130 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. 1939)
(Missouri's unfair trade practices statute declares a "legislative policy that the
older the applicant the more he shall pay for a given amount of insurance").
17 Bailey et al., supra note 87, at 782 (quoting ANDREW MOWBRAY ET AL.,
INSURANCE 411 (6th ed. 1969)). All three authors are listed as counsel for
Bankers' Life Company as of the publication date. This influential article gave
academic authenticity to the insurance industry's rationale of fair discrimination,
justifying differentiation and classification of risks so that each insured person
will pay according to the quality of his/her risk. Of course, this rationale is valid
only if one accepts that the notion that "each policyholder pays only for himself
or herself' comports with the true nature of insurance. The rationale ignores the
fundamental insurance characteristic of risk distribution - the idea that losses
from fortuitous risk of loss are pooled and shared. For instance, if you pay for
a one-year health insurance policy and make no claims under it, you will have
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to actuarially sound classification systems, state unfair trade practices
statutes help assure that insurance companies are not rendered financially
unsound due to an improper risk classification.
State versions of the UTPA explicitly require discrimination, when
fair, in the issuance of insurance policies. Indeed, the risk classification
system is a frank expression of such discrimination. On the other hand,
unfair discrimination is proscribed." 8 Unfairness in the insurance
context occurs when equal risks are treated differently or unequal risks
are treated equally. As a New York court explained:
[D]ifferential premium rates on the basis of sound underwriting
practices accurately assessing risks/future costs are not by nature
misleading to the public or prejudicial to policyholders. Indeed, valid
underwriting practices promote fairness to the policyholder in not
requiring him or her to bear in the premiums the costs of insuring
others in higher risk categories, and solvency of the insurer, another
goal of insurance regulation." 9
paid for the claims that other policyholders made during that year. In other
words, pooling and sharing the risk of loss is also at the heart of insurance; and
that is also fair.
118 It may be difficult, however, to set equitable rates under a UTPA regime
that disallows "unfairly discriminatory" insurance premiums. See, e.g., Spencer
L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471, 495-98 (1961).
" In re Health Ins. Ass'n v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618-19 (N.Y.
App. Div.) (The court unanimously struck down a New York regulation which
prohibited insurers from testing applicants for individual, and small group, health
and accident insurance policies to determine if they were infected with the HIV
virus. The court held that the Insurance Superintendent exceededhis authority by
substituting legislatively recognizedinsurance principles of fair risk classification
with his own vision of societal policy choices. The New York Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed.), aff'd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990); see also Life Ins.
Ass'n v. Comm'r of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168, 171-72 (Mass. 1988) (The court
struck a regulation similar to that struck in Corcoran. The court stated: "The
basic principle underlying [Massachusetts' unfair trade practices act] governing
underwriting practices is that insurers have the right to classify risks and to elect
not to insure risks if the discrimination is fair."); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Denenberg, 327 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. 1974) (holding that health insurance policy
provisions providing an annual monthly premium of $1, regardless of insurance
coverage or risk of insured, were actuarially unsound and constituted unfair
discrimination under Pennsylvania's unfair trade practices statute).
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In other words, unfair discrimination occurs, from the insurance
industry's point of view, when there is no sound actuarial justification for
the manner in which risks are classified. For example, charging blue-eyed
insurance applicants a higher premium than brown-eyed applicants is
unfair discrimination because there is no recognized actuarial, medical,
or scientific basis for such differentiation and classification.
In addition to assuring insurers of adequate funds to pay losses and
their administrative costs and eliminating excessive profits, one specific
purpose of state rate regulation is to prevent discriminatory rates. "In
other words, the regulation of premium rates is generally intended to
assure that an insurer's income is adequate to cover the risks (with a
reasonable margin) without being either excessively expensive for the
purchasers or unfairly discriminatory among purchasers."' 2 ° In that
economic sense, unfair discriminatory rates occur when one insured pays
too much and another pays too little. In others words, grouping high-risk
insureds with low-risk insureds and charging all an equal premium is
unfair discrimination because the low-risks pay too much and subsidize
the high- risks who pay too little. The apparent solution is to equalize the
difference by creating as many rating classifications of insureds as
feasible, thereby achieving actuarial fairness. Providing insurers access to
applicants' genetic information will accomplish that state-mandated goal.
However, the more rating classifications an insurer creates, the higher the
insurer's administrative and overhead costs, and the higher the premiums
for all insureds to cover these costs. Another apparent solution is to fairly
balance the difference by creating just enough rating classifications to
minimize both the subsidy by low-risk insureds and the administrative
costs.
In summary, insurers have a responsibility under the UTPA to treat
all their policyholders fairly by setting premiums at a level consistent
with the risk presented by each individual insured. Upon completion of
the HGP, genetic information will become available and insurers will be
required to use this information under the states' versions of the UTPA
to fulfill the statutory mandate of fair discrimination. Those individuals
who have a documented genetic disorder are not of the same class as
those who do not have such a genetic disorder, and thus when the risks
are not equal it would be unfair discrimination to the latter group to
charge them the same insurance rates as those charged to the former
120 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 105, at 955. For an excellent discussion
of the history, objectives, and methods of insurance rating and regulation, see id.
at 954-67.
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group. Sound and fair actuarial underwriting principles necessitate the
consideration of genetic information in classifying and underwriting
risk.' Therefore, to avoid violating the states' versions of the UTPA,
health insurers must require and use genetic testing of applicants in the
insurance contract-formation process.
D. Insurers Will Fairly Use Genetic Tests in Risk Rating
The foundation of private health insurance is risk rating. Through
competition, risk rating should be fair and should give policyholders the
best value for their money. "However, with half of all expenses incurred
by 5% of the population and 70% of all expenses incurred by 10% of the
population, risk rating can be both highly profitable and highly injurious
to its victims.' 22 Direct risk rating is a method used by health insurers
to document the medical problems or risks people have, and to address
those risks in one of several ways. First, an insurer can elect to charge a
higher premium for certain medical conditions.' Alternatively, an
insurer can write exclusion clauses within a policy so that any costs
arising from pre-existing conditions are not covered." Finally, the
insurer can elect to deny coverage altogether.'25
12! For instance, OHio REv. CODE § 3923.021 (1996) makes rate increases
for non-group health and accident policies subject to review by the Superinten-
dent of Insurance. Absent evidence that the rates were not calculated in
accordancewith sound actuarial principles, the Superintendent must find that the
benefits are not unreasonable in relation to the premium charged and must
approve the rate increase. See Community Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fabe, 556 N.E.2d
1155, 1160-61 (Ohio 1990) (holding that the Superintendent has no authority to
object to a rate increase if it meets sound actuarial principles). Similarly,
Washington requires insurers to practice "equity" in all insurance matters. WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1994).
12 Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health
Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503, 2503 (May 13, 1992).
" Id. at 2504. An insurer may charge a higher premium for: allergies,
asthma, back strain, controlled hypertension, arthritis, gout, glaucoma, obesity,
mild psychoneurosis, kidney stones, mild to moderate emphysema, alcohol-
ism/drug use, heart murmur, peptic ulcer, and colitis. Id.
124 Id. An insurer may write an exclusion waiver for: cataract, gallstones, a
uterine fibroid tumor, a hiatal or inguinal hernia, migraine headaches, pelvic
inflammatory disease, recent chronic otitis media, spine/back disorders,
hemorrhoids, knee impairment, asthma, allergies, varicose veins, chronic or
severe sinusitis, and fractures. Id.
"z Id. An insurer may totally deny coverage for: AIDS, ulcerative colitis,
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Insurers have specified at least eight conditions that must be met
before they will consider using a medical test in risk classification:
(1) the test must supply information in addition to information
otherwise available from other sources (e.g., from a medical question-
naire), (2) the disease of interest must have serious morbidity and/or
mortality implications, (3) the disease must be common enough to
ensure that the test is predictive and that the cost can be justified, (4)
the test must be predictive of disease (or absence of disease) and
reliable, (5) the test must be understood, accepted and used by the
medical profession, (6) laboratories must be able to readily perform the
test, (7) the test must be affordable and able to provide results quickly,
(8) the test must be risk free.'26
The American Academy of Actuaries has indicated how these
conditions are interpreted:
Insurers will want to know (1) whether the test improves the equity of
the risk classification by more accurately assigning individuals to
appropriate risk classes, and (2) whether the test enhances value to the
consumer by keeping insurance costs low and product availability high
for the great majority of insurance applicants. 27
The results of a survey conducted by the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment of fifty-one commercial health insurers, over twenty-seven
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, and twenty-three HMOs provides evidence
of the potential detrimental effect of "imperfect information," such as
insurers not knowing the results of genetic testing of applicants when
cirrhosis of the liver, diabetes mellitus, leukemia, schizophrenia, uncontrolled
hypertension, emphysema, stroke, severe obesity, severe angina, coronary artery
disease, epilepsy, lupus, and alcoholism/drug abuse. Id.
126 T.H. Cushing, Should There Be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk
Classification? Arguments Both for and Against the Use of this New Technology
May Be "Right, " and Some Form of Universal Health Care May Be the Result,
60 DEF. CouNs. J. 249, 252 (1993); see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLO-
GY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC TESTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE: RESULTS OF A
SURVEY 141, OTA-BP-BA-98 (1992) [hereinafterGENETC TESTS AND HEALTH
INSURANCE].
127 Cushing, supra note 126, at 252 (citing Robert Pokorski, Genetic Testing
in Private Insurance - Bridging the Gap Between New Knowledge and Its
Application, CONTINGENCIES, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 20).
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determining risk classifications. 2 According to the survey, sixty-seven
percent of the commercial insurers, seventy percent of the IMOs, and
approximately sixty percent of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans stated
that the widespread availability of genetic tests, with concurrent restraints
on insurers' access to the results, would likely have a negative financial
effect on their business.'29 In addition, seventy-four percent of the
IMOs' responses asserted that carrier status for mono-genetic conditions,
such as Huntington's disease or cystic fibrosis, are statistically considered
to be pre-existing conditions and must be taken into consideration.' 0
The bottom line of this survey suggests that personal and family medical
histories are probably the most meaningful factors in ascertaining
insurability 13 Thus, genetic tests, along with more traditional medical
questionnaires and tests, are essential in providing insurers with medical
history for statistically fair evaluation of all applicants for health
insurance.
E. Genetic Testing Conforms to Current Underwriting Practices
and Will Not Affect an Applicant's Ability to Obtain Insurance
Insurers do not expect that genetic information will affect many
people's access to private health, life, and disability insurance.3 2 First,
the cost of genetic testing and mapping may be too high for insurers to
use these techniques routinely Insurers are not likely to require genetic
tests that cost several hundred dollars or more per applicant if the total
cost of all tests for all applicants will exceed the loss from additional
risks of a small number of applicants. Second, most health insurance and
forty percent of the life insurance obtained in the United States is
obtained by large groups of employees from their employers. Insurers do
not customarily undertake individual underwriting or testing in connection
with employer-provided large-group insurance. Thus, most insureds will
be unaffected. Third, for the smaller group of individuals applying for
private health insurance policies, insurance companies will have little
reason for generally requiring genetic tests. Of the individuals who are
128 GENETIC TESTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 126, at 31.
129 Id.
110 Id. at 32.
3 1 Id. at 33.
132 R. Steven Brown, The Impact of Advances in Genetics on Insurance
Policy, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, ADVANCES IN GENETIC
INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR STATE POLICY MAKERS 42, 57 (Steven R. Brown
& Karen Marshall eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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tested, some will have their eligibility adversely affected while others will
be positively affected if, for instance, the test reveals no deleterious
genetic conditions. Fourth, and finally, a considerable amount of genetic
information is presently obtained through means other than DNA-based
genetic tests. These non-DNA genetic tests include biochemical tests,
chromosome examinations, and physical examinations.133
Genetic testing is not radically different from the many other tests
which are currently performed by physicians and to which insurers have
access. The information these tests provide to health, life, and disability
insurers is similar to that attributable to medical questionnaires currently
in use and upon which coverage is limited or denied with actuarial
justification. Many current tests also predict future diseases and illnesses.
But, on balance, most applicants will be found to present an average risk,
with a few at lower risk and a small number of applicants at a higher
risk.
F. Analogous Employment Discrimination Based on Genotype Is Fair
Employment discrimination has long been legally, ethically, and
socially acceptable. Employers differentiate, or discriminate, routinely
among job applicants with differing educational, intellectual, and
experiential qualifications. While invidious discrimination - discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability
- is illegal, employers may fairly discriminate based on other genetic
characteristics. In other words, employers may hire and retain individuals
predicated on occupationally-relevant physical and character traits which
are largely dictated by genetics. When an employer refuses to hire an
individual because that person lacks certain relevant physical qualifica-
tions, or conversely, when an employer prefers one individual over
another because of physical characteristics, the employer has discriminat-
ed based on factors which are, in part, genetically controlled.
Data suggest that many employers would use test results indicating
employee propensities to certain diseases to limit, but not deny, the
company's health care liability. These statistically fair limitations could
be effected through exclusions from insurance coverage of pre-existing
conditions, waivers of specific disease coverage, or caps on pay outs.3
The rising cost of health care has significantly increased employer health
133 Id.
134 Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of Genetic
Screening, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992).
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insurance costs,'35 and these costs have continued to increase at least
ten to twenty percent per year.' 36 This trend has pressured employers
to reduce health care expenditures. In response, employers have attempted
to limit the number of employees who are high-cost users of health care
such as cigarette smokers, 1I{V positive individuals, and those with high
cholesterol.'37 Employers have, in many cases, virtually assumed the
role of the insurance companies and have a strong financial incentive to
reduce their health care expenditures by more accurately assessing health
risks.' 8 The cost of providing medical care has drastically changed.
More sophisticated forms of diagnostics and specialized treatments
translate into high medical bills for some individuals, especially when
compared with expected low medical expenses for a healthy individu-
al.1
39
In other words, employers may control their premiums for large-
group experience rated health insurance policies or the costs of self-
insurance by discriminating against genetically high-risk individuals in the
hiring process. If employers are allowed to discriminate in this manner,
it would be inequitable to not allow insurers to create fair risk ratings
based on genetic information.
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INSURERS'
USE OF GENETIC TESTING INFORMATION
Insurers compellingly argue that they should not be legislatively
prohibited from including genetic test results in their actuarial assessment
and classification of risk. Equally compelling, however, are the arguments
against insurers' use of genetic information. Those who oppose the use
of genetic testing data base their case on a variety of considerations,
including: the need for fairness in risk distribution; the availability of
insurance; the danger of discrimination, abuse, and stigmatization of
individuals with genetic diseases and their relatives; concern over
confidentiality of genetic information; the desire to protect an individual's
right not to know his or her genetic profile; the preservation of individual
135 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH
COST CRISIS 4 (1989) (discussing how medical screening procedures may be
implemented by employers as health care costs control measures).
'36 A. Foster Higgins & Co., Indemnity Plans: Cost, Design and Funding,
MED. BENEFITS, Feb. 28, 1991, at 3.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 135, at 63, 84.
,38 See Ford, supra note 79, at 124.
19 Id. at 125.
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autonomy regarding genetic information; and the absence of absolute
reliability, accuracy, and predictability based on genetic testing for sound
actuarial risk classification.
A. Use and Availability of Genetic Testing Information Is Subject to
Abuse
One compelling argument in opposition to insurers' use of genetic
information is that it would produce essentially unfair discrimination and
unfair results. 4 ' Injecting genetic risk information into insurance
underwriting will result in ever more refined classifications and ratings,
thereby increasing the difficulty for many applicants in obtaining
affordable health and health-related insurance coverages. If insurers either
have access to the results of genetic tests already performed, or are
permitted to require genetic tests as a pre-condition to insurability, then
those individuals who have the least need for health insurance will be
eligible to obtain comprehensive coverages at reasonable rates. Those
individuals who test positive for the presence of a defective gene will
either be denied insurance; or they will be offered an exclusion or
coverage limited by a low maximum financial limit, a cap, for treatment
of the genetic defect; or they will be unable to afford the premiums. The
critical issue, therefore, is whether society prefers a system where the
only individuals allowed to purchase reasonably priced health and health-
related insurance coverages are those who were born with "healthy
genes." Allowing insurers either to mandate genetic testing of applicants
or to have access to an applicant's voluntary genetic tests can lead to
abuses that will result in unfair discrimination.14" '
Recently, state legislatures have acknowledged such abuses. In
conjunction with its 1996 Genetic Privacy Act, the Virginia legislature
made the following findings of fact:
140 See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 4. One definition of genetic discrimination
is "discrimination directed against an individual or family based solely on an
apparent or perceived genetic variation from the 'normal' human genotype."
Billings et al., supra note 134, at 476 (applying this definition to a survey on
genetic discrimination).
141 Lori B. Andrews, Public Choices and Private Choices: Legal Regulation
of Genetic Testing, in JUsTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PRoJECT 46, 56
(Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994); see also E. Brom Marne,
Note, Insurers and Genetic Testing: Shopping for that Perfect Pair of Genes, 40
DRAKE L. REv. 121, 133 (1991) (describing insurer use of genetic test
information).
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[N]umerous accounts of anecdotal information from around the country
have been provided to the committee to indicate that there is a great
potential for misuse of genetic information, especially in the field of
health insurance;... [T]he presence of a genetic marker does not imply
that the carrier will ever develop the disease but only that the person
has a higher predisposition to such malady, thereby giving rise to the
term 'asymptomatic ill;' ... [T]here are persons who have lost health
care coverage because a member of their family developed a disease for
which a genetic marker has been identified, thereby potentially
increasing their risk of developing the disease, persons who have lost
coverage because of an inherited condition that was declared to be a
previously preexisting condition, and persons who were denied coverage
for certain members of their family who were determined to have a
genetic predisposition for a certain condition. ,.42
The New Jersey 1996 Genetic Privacy Act made a similar finding: "The
improper collection, retention or disclosure of genetic information can
lead to significant harm to the individual, including stigmatization and
discrimination in areas such as employment, education, health care and
insurance.'
143
Indeed, the popular press is replete with examples of such insurer
abuse. 44 The National Institutes of Health task force on genetic infor-
142 Virginia Senate Joint Resolution Bill No. 50, Va. 1996 session, 1996 Va.
S.J.R. 50 (adopted Mar. 4, 1996). The Virginia legislature established a "Joint
Subcommittee to Study the Legal and Policy Ramifications of Genetic Research
[and] review existing and new Virginia law on genetic information and privacy."
Id. Concurrently, Virginia enacted a Genetic Privacy Act, VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-508.4 (Michie 1996 Supp.), signed by the governor on March 6, 1996,
which established a two-year moratorium on health insurers' use of genetic
information.
143 N.J. REV. STAT. § 178:30-12(2)(C) (1996).
144 In Boston, a woman with a family history of Huntington's disease
made 13 unsuccessful applications for health insurance before the test
showed she hadn't inherited the gene . . .. "She couldn't even get
insurance for her children".... These are some of the "unbelievable
things" confronting people at risk for serious diseases with genetic
origins .... "I would think that people who have [genes predisposing
them to breast or colon cancer] have a hell of a lot to worry about in
terms of insurability and employability," said Dr. Ellen Clayton, a
pediatrician and lawyer at Vanderbilt University in Nashville. "I think
you'd have to be nuts to let anybody know about it."
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mation and insurance reported cases of genetic discrimination and recom-
mended: "Information about past, present or future health status,
including genetic information, should not be used to deny health care
coverage or service to anyone."'45 Studies have shown that applicants
who are asymptomatic are being rejected by insurers when it is revealed
that a genetic disorder is present. 46 In a survey of genetic information,
Dr. Paul Billings found thirty-two cases of unfair genetic practices. 147
These anecdotes "do not necessarily show the prevalence of discriminato-
ry practices by insurers, and insurers have challenged the research
methodology used in such surveys.', 4' However, proponents of these
studies point out that the studies do not necessarily document the
complete range of prejudices faced by those people considered as having
defective or abnormal genes. 49 Research by the Office of Technology
Assessment ("OTA") of the U.S. Congress uncovered examples of people
being denied health insurance coverage based on their genotype."'
Moreover, the OTA reported that approximately thirty percent of
Richard Saltus, Fear of Insurers Leading to Gene Testing in Secret, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1-2 (discussing the trend of secret gene testing).
"Joshua is a healthy, normal two-year-old .... Joshua has been
diagnosed as suffering from an inherited disorder called polycystic
kidney disease .... The disease ... usually doesn't cause health
problems before adulthood .... Yet when Joshua's father changedjobs,
the new employer's health insurer wouldn't cover the child ....
Joshua's case illustrates an issue usually raised only by experts gazing
darkly into crystal balls and foreseeing the classification of people by
their genes. A number of similar cases have surfaced... [which may
foretell] 'a big problem 10 years from now, when we have 100 tests for
genetic diseases. Such tests could put millions of people into high-risk
disease categories, branding them for insurance and employment
purposes .... '
David Shipp, Health: Genetic Testing May Mark Some People as Undesirable
to Employers, Insurers, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1990, at B1 (quoting Philip Reilly,
head of Boston's Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, who argues that people
are being singled out based on genetic test results).
41 REPORT, supra note 45, at 9.
146 Billings et al., supra note 134, at 478.
141 Id. at 476; see also infra note 158.
148 Brown, supra note 132, at 52.
149 id.
'5o U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CYSTIC FIBROSIS
AND DNA TESTS, IMPLICATIONS OF CARRIER SCREENING 200, OTA-BA-532
(1992).
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Americans indicated that someone m their immediate family has remained
at a job because of concerns related to the preservation of their health
care coverage.' 5' In another instance, soon after the development of a
test for fragile X syndrome, a form of inherited mental retardation, there
were at least twelve cases in which families carrying the fragile X gene
were refused health insurance.)52 They were denied coverage despite the
fact that the individuals were asymptomatic and the fragile X mutation
can result in normal children for many generations.'
5 1
Perhaps this abuse is best summarized in the words of Theresa E.
Morelli, an attorney, describing her experience with genetic discrimmna-
tion:
I have had problems getting insurance although I am a young, healthy,
and productive attorney. Because my then-employer did not provide
disability income insurance coverage, I purchased my own policy in
1990. I completed an application, had a medical examination, signed an
authorization for the release of my medical records, and paid my
premium. More than one month later and without any prior notice, the
insurer returned my premium without giving me a reason. I wrote the
home office, and an underwriter informed me of the reason for the
demal: my father may have Huntington's Disease (HD), a hereditary
illness. I remember that the application did not ask if I had a genetic
disorder or was at risk for one. The insurer got my father's diagnosis
from my doctor. I was angry and upset. The insurer did not offer to
exclude coverage for HD should I inherit it. The insurer did not even
offer me coverage at a higher rate. Rather, the insurer denied me
coverage absolutely. 54
The foregoing examples of insurers abusing genetic information in
underwriting will suffice here; but there are many other examples of
"eligibility denial" and other insurer misuses of genetic information.'55
I-" Id. at 192.
152 Fragile X Gene Sparks Hopefor Mass Screening,Fear ofDiscrmnation,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Nov. 16, 1992, at 14, available in 1992 WL
2512940, at 2 (discussing a new test which would make mass screening for
mental retardation possible).
153 Id.
154 TheresaE. Morelli, GeneticDiscrtmination by Insurers: Legal Protections
Needed From Abuse of Biotechnology, HEALTH SPAN, Sept. 1992, at 8.
's- See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrtmination: The Use of Genetically
Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L.
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In sum, insurers should be legislatively prohibited from using genetic
tests in the same ways that they use currently available diagnostic tests.
There is a noteworthy difference between tests which indicate the
presence of genes which may, at some future time and under specific
conditions, cause a disease, and medical tests which reveal the existence
of an extant disease or a physical condition. For example, if an individual
is examined by a cardiologist and is found to have an elevated cholesterol
level and a poor result on an exercise EKG, the medical report may
indicate that she is at high risk for a heart attack. If she then applies for
health insurance, she may be denied coverage based on this information.
This decision would be based on sound actuarial analysis. Alternatively,
assume that through the efforts of the HGP the familial gene for heart
disease is located. Another individual might undergo a test for this gene
because he has a family history of heart disease. If he tests positive for
this gene, but he is a healthy individual, he should not be denied health
insurance based solely on the fact that he possesses this gene. Insurers
should not be permitted to deny this individual health insurance,
especially in light of the fact that heart disease, like many diseases, is
known to be multifactorial, and family history is but one of many factors
associated with actual heart disease. This individual may choose to alter
his lifestyle, diet, exercise, and alcohol consumption with the knowledge
that the gene is present, and his actions may help prevent the onset of
heart disease.
Finally, commercially available genetic tests do not meet the
conditions customarily required by insurers to consider medical tests in
the assessment and classification of risk. 56 Current genetic tests: "(1)
are still experimental, (2) [are] expensive, (3) yield information of
uncertain applicability and (4) do not provide any significant additional
information beyond that which insurers can get from an applicant's
medical history questionnaire."' 57 Despite these limitations, some
insurers are currently using genetic information to deny health and life
insurance. 5 Genetic tests, at this early stage, can offer insurers no
& MED. 109, 115-19 (1991) (analyzing Office of Technology Assessment reports
on genetic screening in the workplace). For additional examples, see also Brown,
supra note 132, at 51-53.
16 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
' Cushing, supra note 126, at 252; see GENETIC TESTING COMMITTEE TO
THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE,
POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN RISK CLASSIFICATION 21 (1989).
158 See supra notes 140-44. See also Paul R. Billings, The Context of Genetic
Screening, 64 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 47, 50 (1991). While at the Clinic for
[VOL. 85
1996-97] INsuRANcE/GENETIC FAm/UNFAm DISCRMINATION 563
more information than they could already obtain by requesting a detailed
family history. Until genetic testing can be shown to be significantly
relevant from an actuarial standpoint, these tests cannot be said to be the
equivalent of contemporary testing methods which are currently available
to physicians.
B. Unfair Discrimination in Insurance Pricing and Availability
1. Insurance Requires Fair Redistribution,
Not Fair Discrimination
The American concept of fairness centers on our right of voluntary
choice and our correlative responsibility for the freedom to choose. For
better or for worse, a person's genetic endowment is received before birth
and lasts a lifetime. Unlike smoking, or other bad habits used in efficient
risk classifications, 159 a person's genetic nature is entirely beyond that
person's voluntary choice. One has the capacity to improve bad habits
and develop good habits, but one's genetic circumstance cannot be
improved or enhanced through willful effort in the same way that skills
or talents can be improved. Since one cannot choose one's genetic make-
up, arguably there should be no duty to pay more for insurance because
of a poor genetic make-up. The nature and purpose of insurance is risk
Inherited Diseases at Harvard Medical School, Dr. Billings conducted a study in
which he concluded that discriminatory denial of insurance policies was already
in practice. Dr. Billings placed an ad in the American Journal ofHuman Genetics
soliciting responses from individuals who had experienced discrimination based
on genetic information. Dr. Billings reported his findings: 29 respondents who
reported 41 incidents, 32 of which involved insurance discrimination, 7 of which
involved employment discrimination, and 2 of which involved adoption. Billings
et al., supra note 134.
"' Risk classification regarding smoking is customarily considered fair
discrimination because sound actuarial principles in insurance underwriting can
account for the health care costs attributable to cigarette smoking. See, e.g.,
Emmett W. Lee & Gilbert E. D'Alonzo, Cigarette Smoking, Nicotine Addiction,
and Its Pharmacologic Treatment, 153 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 34, 35 (1993) ($17
billion estimated annual medical care costs resulting from smoking); Kenneth E.
Warner, Health and Economic Implications of a Tobacco-Free Society, 258
JAMA 2080, 2084 (1987) (stating that $22 to $23 billion estimated annual
medical care costs and $30 to $43 billion estimated annual indirect costs of
productivity losses are associated with premature smoker mortality and excess
morbidity).
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transference and distribution, or fairly redistributing and equally sharing
the fortuitous risks among all policyholders. Fair risk sharing is a
fundamental insurance principle. Fair risk redistribution is a matter of
equal fairness for all of us because all of us are genetically unequal.
Because genetic differences are morally arbitrary, the notion of good
or bad genetic luck ought not be the reason that one person receives
better or worse insurance treatment than other people. 61 Everyone
deserves health care regardless of genetic luck.
Many people do not believe that individuals own their own talents and
abilities. Still more people believe that they should not be burdened
with bad luck in the genetic draw. When differences in luck are
attributable solely to external circumstances, this modem view holds
that something ought to be done to rectify the situation. That is, we
must equalize the positions of various individuals or groups, even if it
means (as it always does) that property, wealth, and opportunities must
be taken from one group of people and given to another... This
general view offers fertile ground to support some general prohibition
against genetic discrimination.'"'
It is not genetic information per se which is unfair; it is the unfair
treatment of genetically unequal people which is unfair. Each of us is
genetically different and potentially unequal in insurance rating and
classifications, but we attain equality through socializing and redistribut-
ing our immutable genetic risks. Each of us thereby receives value
through insurance. Thus, the issue to resolve is when, if at all, should
genetically unequal people be treated unequally in insurance underwrit-
ing.62
2. Misunderstanding and Misuse of Genetic Information
The American component of the U.S. HGP's Working Group on
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research
("ELSI"), sponsored an independent Task Force on Genetic Information
160 See Lapp6, supra note 15, at 160 (discussing the basis of equality in
systems of justice).
161 Epstein, supra note 5, at 4-5.
162 The converse - the equal treatment of genetically unequals in pricing
health insurances constitutes unfair discrimination - was explained above as the
insurers' justification for fair discrimination. See supra Part I.A (notes 68-93
and accompanying text).
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and Insurance. The task force consisted of experts in the fields of health
care, genetics, health policy, and insurance analysis, as well as representa-
tives of national genetic disease organizations. The majority of the group
issued a report entitled Genetic Information and Health Insurance,
outlining issues and solutions to the genetic information problem.'63
Intended to be included as part of President Clinton's 1993 health care
initiative, the report states: "the problems associated with increasing
genetic information expose inequities and perversities in the current
system, and would exacerbate them unless the system itself is altered in
certain fundamental respects."'" Because almost all diseases have
environmental or other non-genetic components, the Task Force explains
that it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish non-genetic from
genetic diseases, and non-genetic information from genetic informa-
tion.165 However, because the contemporary American health care
system erects barriers to health care coverage for citizens most likely to
need it, the Task Force suggested that information regarding a person's
present, past, or future health status should not be used to deny health
care coverage. "In the past, medical histories and conventional genetic
diagnostic techniques have resulted in limitation or denial of insurance
coverage or claims for the relatively small percentage of the population
burdened by debilitating conditions such as cystic fibrosis and Hunting-
ton's disease."'
66
In order to ensure that those people who most need access to genetic
information and its attendant medical benefits are able to do so free from
fear of losing coverage or paying higher premiums, the receipt of basic
health services should not be conditioned on the disclosure of this
information, whether genetic or not. "[T]he sensitivity of genetic
information and the importance Americans historically place on privacy
and self-determination argue strongly for a policy that does not hold
access to health care hostage to one's willingness to reveal or to discover
intimate facts about oneself.'' 67 However, the prevailing attitude within
163 REPORT, supra note 45. However, two insurance industry analysts
withdrew from the report. The American Council of Life Insurance opposed the
document, explaining that it "'directly conflicts with ACLI policy in its overall
thrust and specific recommendations."' Id. at v. Meanwhile, the Health Insurance
Association of America decided that it "'should neither oppose or support the
final report; that the association's position should be one of neutrality."' Id.
164 Id. at3.
165 Id. at 8.
166 Id. at 5.
167Id. at 11.
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the insurance industry is that genetic information should not be treated
any differently than any other medical history information.168 Conse-
quently, genetic discrimination in obtaining insurance already exists.'69
Often, this discrimination takes place following an individual's decision
to undergo genetic testing because of a family member's affliction with
a genetic disorder. Once a defective gene is detected within a family, all
of the relatives are stigmatized as being ill or having the disease, even
where no other relative ever manifests clinical signs of the disease. 7 °
Having a particular trait is equated with the burden of predetermined and
severe illness. "Decision making concerning these individuals is based
solely on a diagnostic label, without regard to the variable decision
making or testing procedures that occur and are worsened by this
irrational and unfair simplification of genetic condition.., the equating
of trait with significant disability.'' 
l
This flawed decision making may well take place because of
superficial similarities between genetic testing of applicants for insurance
and other tests currently available. Both can be said to serve the same
purpose, which is to assess more accurately the risk of disease or other
conditions necessitating medical attention. But there are also many
differences between genetic tests and the many diagnostic tests performed
by physicians upon which insurers routinely rely to assess risks. One
major concern in the area of genetic testing is the confusion between an
individual who is merely a carrier of a defective gene, and an individual
who has an inherited disease.
Tests currently available and in use by physicians identify the
condition of an individual at the time the test is taken. Blood tests, X-
rays, electrocardiograms, and other screening, scanning, and monitoring
tests reveal the presence or absence of specific chemicals, structures, or
functions which indicate the presence or absence of a particular disorder.
Genetic tests can only indicate if an individual is either a carrier of a
disease, or if she has a predisposition to developing a particular disorder.
Even if a test reveals the presence of a single gene which causes a
specific disorder, the test does not indicate when, if ever, the disease may
actually be manifested, and genetic tests do not indicate how severe the
disease might be if it ever does develop. 72 There are many genetically
168 Brown, supra note 132, at 53.
169 Billings, supra note 158, at 50.
170 Id. at 49-50.
'7' Billings et al., supra note 134, at 481.
172 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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controlled disorders for which an individual may possess a defective
gene; yet there is no certainty that she will ever become symptomatic and
develop the disease.'7 3 In addition, many genetically controlled diseases
are multigenic/multifactorial in origin,174 and an individual may not
possess all the genes necessary for a disease to express itself. 75 Further,
it may be that genetic research within the HGP will not discover all of
the genes necessary for a particular multigenic/multifactorial disease to
express itself. Lastly, a person who appears to have the requisite genetic
make-up for a particular disease may live a pristine lifestyle, and be
environmentally free from those extrinsic factors which can effect the
expression of a genetic disease.
76
3. The Availability of Insurance
Individuals rely on health insurance to absorb a large percentage of
their health costs.' 77 This reliance is due, in large part, to the escalating
costs of health care.' Insurance has become an integral part of our
health care system, and a denial of health insurance, for many, may be
the equivalent of a denial of health care itself. Individuals who are denied
health insurance based on their genetic make-up may refuse to seek
medical care because of an inability to pay for it. Such inaction then
shifts the burden of providing health care to the taxpayer, which is what
the insurance industry has attempted to avoid in lobbying against a
national health care system.'79 Regulation of access to the results of
genetic tests and the use of those results would encourage insurers to re-
evaluate the methods by which they assess risk. If known genetic risks
are not allowed to be calculated in rate setting, then insurers will, of
necessity, be forced to spread the costs for these present and future
diseases more evenly among their insureds.'
'7 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
,74 Karala, supra note 31, at 146.
175 Id.
176 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
'7' Wortham, supra note 76, at 397.
178 Id.
179 Schatz, supra note 14, at 1805 (stating that the insurance industry claims
that it is better equipped to manage health care costs than the federal govern-
ment).
.8. Insurers counter that they are already required by state law to cover
certain high-risk individuals through insurance assigned risk pools. Clifford &
luculano, supra note 14, at 1823. These legislatively createdpools are comprised
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C. Prohibiting the Use of Genetic Information Protects the Right
to Privacy
One of the most cherished, basic, and vital human rights is the right
to privacy, the long-standing American "right to be let alone."'' But
no one can guarantee the privacy of genetic information. The HGP has
radically transformed our perception of privacy rights, '82 and genetic
discrimination will thereby become the civil-rights issue of the twenty-
first century. Each genotype defines the humanness of each individual; a
person's genome is that person's unique property, like land. Society will
have to decide whether to allow, require, or forbid the use of genetic
testing in sundry contexts. As subsequently explained in Part IV.C of this
Article, 83 a summary of several states' statutes evidences a small but
of people that insurers consider to be uninsurable. Insurers who do business in
a state are then assigned a percentage of the pool based on the insurer's share of
the business in the state. However, these risk pools do not adequately address the
problems related to access to health insurance because employers continue to
become self-insured. Id. at 1824. Risk pools are regulated by state law, and
ERISA's preemption clause exempts self-insured employers, who make up a
large share of the insurance market, from participation in the risk pools. See infra
Part IV.B.1 (notes 239-314 and accompanying text). Because such a large
percentage of people are covered by employer sponsored health plans, MEDICAL
TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 39, at 107, the employer
exemption from participating in risk pools would place an additional burden on
private insurers, who would then pass the additional costs to their customers. The
result would be that people who were not covered by employer-sponsored health
insurance plans would bear the entire burden for covering those higher risk,
uninsurable individuals.
181 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117, at 849, 864 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting THOMAs M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888)). This quote is often attributed to Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
182 See, e.g., George P. Smith II & Thaddeus J. Bums, Genetic Determinism
or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL. 23, 43-50
(1994) (examining the extent to which discrimination against an individual by a,
state entity, based upon genetic material rather than a recognized suspect
classification, is proscribedby traditional equal protection analysis). To the extent
a genetic disease is confined to a specific race, genetic screening may involve a
Fourteenth Amendment issue. See Janet A. Kobrin, Medical Privacy Issue:
Confidentiality of Genetic Information, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1283, 1293 & n.62
(1983).
183 See infra notes 391-547 and accompanying text.
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evidently growing trend toward prohibiting genetic discrimination and
protecting the privacy of genetic testing information. For example, on
March 6, 1996, Virginia enacted a Genetic Privacy Act'84 which
prohibited health insurers from using genetic information to deny, restrict,
cancel, or impose other criteria on current or future policyholders.
Moreover, model legislation for state and federal consideration has been
prepared by the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues ("ELSI") Working
Group under the auspices of the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and
Department of Energy ("DOE"). "'85
Genetic testing and the subsequent use of immutable, potentially
stigmatizing genetic information may create a suspect genetic underclass,
the "genetically inferior," in insurance rating classifications and thereby
constitute unfair discrimination as a matter of law.'86 Such discrimina-
tion based on an individual's genome should be prohibited as a violation
of the individual's civil rights.'87 On March 14, 1996, New Jersey did
just that by enacting an insurance civil rights law, The Genetic Privacy
Act. '8 In pertinent part, the New Jersey statute provides:
No person shall discriminate against any individual on the basis of
genetic information or the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make
available the results of a genetic test to the person in the issuance,
withholding, extension or renewal of any hospital confinement or other
supplemental limited benefit health or credit life or credit accident
insurance coverage.., or in the fixing of rates, terms or conditions
thereof .... 189
In recently amending their insurance statutes,- Colorado and Georgia
provided their answers restricting insurers' use of genetic testing
184 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
185 See NIH/DOE ELSI Working Group, Genetic Privacy Act (visited Feb.
25, 1997) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/resource/pri-
vacy/privacyl.html>.
186 Carol Lee, Comment, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential for
Genetic Discrimination by the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REv. 189,
213-17 (1993) (discussing how various states regulate genetic testing).
187 See generally Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis
Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational
Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 479 (1990) (arguing that personal information,
including medical records, implicates the right to privacy).
18 S.B. 695, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1996) (Oct. 24, 1996 amended substitute).
18 9 Id.
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information and protecting an individual's property right in genetic
information. The two statues are virtually identical, stating:
(1) The general assembly hereby finds and determines that recent
advances in genetic science have led to improvements in the diagnosis,
treatment, and understanding of a significant number of human diseases.
The general assembly further declares that:
(a) Genetic information is the unique property of the individual to
whom the information pertains;
(b) Any information concerning an individual obtained through the
use of genetic techniques may be subject to abuses if disclosed to
unauthorized third parties without the willing consent of the
individual to whom the information pertains;
(c) To protect individual privacy and to preserve individual
autonomy with regard to the individual's genetic information, it is
appropriate to limit the use and availability of genetic information;
(d) The intent of this statute is to prevent information derived from
genetic testing from being used to deny access to health care
insurance, group disability insurance, or long-term care insurance
coverage.190
This state statutory approach illustrates the contemporary inchoate trend
toward recognizing and protecting the individual's personal property right
and privacy in the unique property of each individual's genome.
With the proliferation of highly proficient computers, modem
technology arms insurers with practical and, from the consumer's
perspective, clandestine means of obtaining, organizing, storing,
retrieving, releasing, and disseminating genetic and other actuarial data
about applicants and policyholders. A justifiable fear arises that wide-
spread delineation of genotypes and genetic profiles may, like credit
information, culminate in centralized genetic information databases.
Protecting privacy interests by restricting insurers' unrestrained access to
an individual's genetic information is a matter of basic civil and legal
rights.'9 ' Therefore, any state or federal law authorizing mandatory
190 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (1)(a)-(d) (West 1994). The
Georgia statute is identical except that in subsection (d), Georgia prohibits denial
of accident and sickness insurance. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (1)-(4) (Michie
1996).
'9' See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (signaling the Court's
concem regarding privacy implications of modem technology). An analogy may
be drawn to the employment context. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of
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genetic screening for insurance purposes would violate an applicant's
constitutional right to privacy.1 92
1. Genetic Information Can Cause
Stigmatization and Psychological Trauma
Genetic information represents a very sensitive category of medical
information. If the HGP is successful and genetic mapping becomes
routine, inaccurate testing and analysis could cause serious harm. For
instance, the "comparison of an individual's genetic profile to an error-
ridden prototype could have the same stigmatizing effect as do false
positives on drug tests and tests for the HLV antibody."'93 Additionally,
Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30
Hous. L. REv. 1263, 1319 (1993).
Operating within a modern, complex, heterogeneous, and litigious
society compels a private sector employer to acquire and retain
information regarding current employees and applicants for employment.
The centralized collection and easy accessibility of computerized data,
however, greatly increase the danger of abuse of information. This may
increase tension between the employer's need to know the information
and the employee's expectation of privacy.
Id. (citations omitted); see also George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational
Privacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521, 523 (1989)
(discussing federal studies documenting the impact of government computerized
data banks on personal privacy and noting that courts recognize the threat to
personal privacy posed by the accumulation of vast amounts of information in
computerized data banks).
192 Any statute authorizing insurers to require applicants to undergo
mandatory genetic screening would most likely not pass constitutional muster.
In the reproductive context, for example, mandatory prenatal screening interferes
with a couple's constitutional right to privacy regarding procreative decisions.
See, e.g., Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Ill.) (holding
that the right to privacy covers decisions regarding prenatal genetic testing),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), and cert. denied sub nom. Scholberg v.
Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991). If courts were to extend that reasoning to one's
genetic information, mandatory genetic screening should be upheld only to
further a compelling state interest. Ostensibly, requiring genetic testing to
promote fair discrimination in insurance rates among all policyholders is not such
a compelling state interest.
193 Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory,
87 Nw. U. L7 REV. 1037, 1047 (1993) (arguing that stigmatizing effects could
result from errors in centralized data banks of genetic profiles).
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unlike a discrete transient illness or disease, a genetic disease, disorder,
or condition is immutable. An inappropriate disclosure of genetic
information may stigmatize an individual for life, causing serious
emotional, financial, and perhaps physical harm.'94
One aspect of stigmatization arises from genetic ignorance of third
parties, including insurance companies.'95 Although data gathered from
genetic tests may appear to constitute sound actuarial information for
insurance classification, ambiguity surrounds the accuracy of this genetic
data in insurance underwriting. As discussed in Part I.B.2 of this
Article,'96 some genetic tests will predict the statistical probability of
developing a disease that may involve the interaction of: (1) multiple
genes, or (2) the presence of specific environmental factors, or (3) both
multiple genes and environmental factors. 97 Other genetic tests may
indicate the presence of specific genes, and along with that presence, the
certainty that an individual will develop a disease; but the extent of the
disease's development and its influence on any insured's life is uncer-
tain. 19
8
In addition to the social stigma, genetic screening can cause
psychological trauma. Genetic knowledge may have a devastating
psychological impact on individuals who are told that they will develop
a fatal, incurable disease. 99 For instance, in the early 1970s, some
states adopted laws mandating carrier status screening of African-
Americans for sickle-cell anemia. The idea was that carriers of the
disorder may wish to consider that information when making reproductive
plans, since if two carriers conceived a child together, there would be a
twenty-five percent chance that the child would be affected with sickle-
cell anemia. This screening program had a disastrous consequence.
Appropriate counseling was not provided, and people were psychological-
ly harmed by the information. Societal institutions did not know how to
use the test results, and consequently, carriers of sickle-cell anemia, who
194 Lori B. Andrews, The Future Confidentiality of Genetic Information, in
MEDICAL GENETICs: A LEGAL FRONTIER 187-88, 209 (1987).
... See, e.g., Billings et al., supra note 134, at 476-81 (affirming genetic
discrimination by insurers against people who are totally asymptomatic - their
only statistical "abnormality" lies in their genotypes).
196 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
197 Karjala, supra note 31, at 146-47.
' Joseph M. Miller, Genetic Testing and Insurance Classification: National
Action Can Prevent Discrimination Based on the "Luck of the Genetic Draw,"
93 DICK. L. REV. 729, 737 (1989).
199 See, e.g., id. at 742.
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were themselves healthy, were nonetheless discriminated against in
insurance and employment."'
Genetic information differs from other diagnostic tests that indicate
the presence of fatal diseases. If an individual is informed that she has a
life-threatening illness, she has choices. She can avail herself of any
treatment that might be available, put her affairs in order,. prepare for the
inevitable, and attempt to enjoy to the fullest whatever lifetime remains.
In contrast, when an individual is informed that she may develop an
incurable illness at some indeterminate time in the future, this information
may adversely impact her decisions about education, work, marriage,
having children, aborting a pregnancy, and so forth. A thoughtful
commentator explains that "[t]here is a risk of suicide, job loss, divorce,
and substance abuse for those persons so 'sentenced."' 20 ' For instance,
the suicide rate is four times greater among patients diagnosed with
Huntington's disease than among the corresponding American caucasian
population." 2
Genetic diseases do not have to be fatal to cause psychological harm.
One study reported that an American adolescent in a Tay-Sachs screening
program suffered a psychotic reaction when told she was a carrier of the
disease.0 3 Similar traumatic reactions can happen when people learn
that they are not carriers of a fatal disease following genetic screening.
For example, when at risk individuals learn that they are not carriers of
Huntington's disease, they can "experience 'survivor guilt,' similar to that
of soldiers whose buddies have died in war."" 4
How people react to being labelled as diseased does vary, but such
labels oftentimes have profound and far-reaching effects on the person's
self-conception. "[T]he understanding of ourselves as sick or diseased
tends to correlate fairly closely with our own and others' senses of us as
200 Andrews, supra note 141, at 53.
201 Richard Shapiro, New Frontiers in Genetic Medicine, 104 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 527, 536 (1986) (examining the ethical and legal issues of pre-
symptomatic diagnosis of people with the Huntington's disease gene).
202 Lindsay A. Farrer, Suicide and Attempted Suicide in Huntington Disease:
Implications for Preclinical Testing of Persons at Risk, 24 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 305, 305-11 (1986).
203 J.T.R. Clark, Screening for Carriers of Tay-Sachs Disease: Two
Approaches, 119 CANADIAN MED. AWS'N J. 549, 550 (1978) (comparing large
neighborhood screeningprograms to a more individualized case-findingapproach
to screening for Tay-Sachs disease).
204 Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture ofMotherhood, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 967, 977 (1996).
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having suffered some impairment of normal function."20 Since the
HGP will substantially enlarge the capacity to predict disease, genetic
testing will have a greater effect on people who feel healthy and suffer
no functional impairment; these people will increasingly be labelled as
sick, diseased, or unhealthy.2" 6
Because the foregoing psychological risks are inherent due to the
nature of the information revealed, they will exist even if an individual
chooses to be tested for a genetic disorder. Ethical issues arise, however,
when we consider whether insurers should be permitted to require genetic
testing given the potential dire consequences of such information. Fear of
"stigmatization, job loss, becoming uninsurable, or a heightened personal
anxiety" are all valid reasons for asserting a "right not to know.
207
During the course of writing this Article, the author made a very
unscientific, informal survey of several hundred people, explaining the
HGP and asking: "Assume the HGP is successful and everyone can have
their genome mapped. Should health insurance companies be permitted
to require genetic testing and genome mapping so that they can more
fairly price health insurance for each person?" Without exception,
everyone said no. Those instinctive, gut reactions evidence the American
ideal of freedom - individual rights to privacy and to decide to know or
not know.
There is a fundamental difference between genetic information and
other types of information currently available to insurers. In addition to
concerns about confidentiality and psychological effects, individuals who
fear losing or being denied health insurance may refuse to seek testing.
This result is in direct opposition to the stated purpose of the HGPY0 8
People may refuse to undergo genetic testing to determine compatibility
with a relative who requires an organ transplant, for fear that the test
results may be obtained by insurers and used to deny health care. This
may, in turn, result in a decrease of potential donors who are willing to
involve themselves in the screening process. People may be less willing
205 Dan W. Brock, The Human Genome Project and Human Identity, 29
Hous. L. REv. 7, 19 (1992) (arguing that a person's conception of self is often
influenced by being labelled as sick or diseased).
206 See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 31, at 165.
207 Id. (discussing an extreme example of a French privacy statute that
prevents geneticists from informing large numbers of individuals who have been
identified to be at risk for treatable juvenile glaucoma); see also Alexander
Dorozynaka, Privacy Rules Blindside French Glaucoma Effort, 252 ScI. 369
(Apr. 19, 1991).
208 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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to donate a kidney to extend the life or improve the quality of life of a
loved one if such a generous gesture comes at the risk of losing health
insurance coverage, perhaps permanently.
2. Confidentiality Must Be Protected
Personal medical information has become less protected and private
in the United States.2"9 Insurers utilize systems of national data banks
that allow them to keep track of those individuals who have tested
positive for certain diseases, and thereby reduce the risk of adverse
selection. Insurers exchange information about people through the
Medical Information Bureau ("MIB"), a data bank that contains medical
information about insurance applicants." ' The MIB is comprised of
over seven hundred insurance companies,2 ' and contains information
on over fifteen million people.' If genetic information makes its way
into these files without the appropriate legislation in place to control the
manner in which the information can be used, the results will be
devastating. Individuals who have credit problems or treatable medical
conditions often have the opportunity to "clear up the record." However,
the immutable nature of genetic status is similar to a birthmark; it is
permanent and irreparable. We are what our genes say we are, and action
needs to be taken to prevent unrestrained access to and use of such
personal information.
Tort claims for invasion of privacy, or intrusion, may be raised
against insurers based on the pervasive, computer-assisted collection and
dissemination of stigmatizing genetic information."' This tort could be
209 For example, when Earvin "Magic" Johnson announced that he was
infected with HIV, his physician released Magic's confidential medical
information to the New York Times, which published it with no comment
regarding confidentiality or violation of Magic's right of privacy. Richard W.
Stevenson, Magic Johnson Ends His Career, Saying He Has AIDS Infection,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1991, at Al.
210 Schatz, supra note 14, at 1801. See infra note 539 for a description of
efforts to regulate the MIB.
211 Lee, supra note 186, at 209.
212 Sandra Blakeslee, Ethicists See Omens of an Era of Genetic Bias, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1990, at B9.
213 However, the few extant cases hold otherwise. In an invasion of privacy
action by an insurance applicant against an insurer that transferred medical
information concerning the applicait to the MIB centralized data bank, the
Kansas Supreme Court held that the insurer had an interest in the medical
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triggered if insurers require genetic testing or collect genetic information
without an applicant's fully informed and genuine consent.214
3. Preferred Social Ignorance
It may be that our concept of health care is partly, but intrinsically,
related to those aspects of our lives that we can or cannot change through
voluntary effort. We can control our health to a certain extent through
information which it forwarded to MIB, that the insurer had a duty under its
MIB membership to supply such information, and that the transmittal of
information was a legitimate business procedure and vital to the life insurance
industry. Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358, 1363 (Kan.
1975) (holding that the information was qualifiedly privileged and, thus, its
transmittal was not actionable as an invasion of right to privacy); see also Mayer
v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 119 F. Supp. 536, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (holding that
defendant insurer causing false information "to be recorded in the records of an
agency subscribed to by life insurance companies" was a case of qualified
privilege under California statutory law which is not actionable as defamation
absent an allegation of malice); Milsaps v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 342 N.E.2d
329, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) ("Likewise the forwarding of a code number by
Bankers Life to MIB all of whose members had a common business interest and
access to information concerning insurability of applicants for insurance, comes
within the privilege doctrine.").
214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, at 378-79 (1977).
Analogous cases have arisen in the employment context. Cf. Borse v. Piece
Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620-21 (3d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that plaintiff,
a sales clerk terminated for refusing to sign a consent form for drug-use
urinalysis screening, had a valid privacy concern). With its potential for
stigmatization, an individual's genome may be recognized as within the sphere
of privacy protection. If so, an insurer's investigation intruding into that
recognized privacy zone may be actionable in tort if it is highly offensive to a
reasonable person. This has been recognized in the analogous employment
context where the employer acquires confidential medical information from an
employee's physician or psychologist without the employee's consent. See, e.g.,
Neal v. Coming Glass Works Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-99 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (allowing employee's colorable claim for wrongful intrusion where
employer induced emergency room doctor to disclose confidential results of
employee's drug test); Leggett v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 739 P.2d 1083,
1086-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (finding invasion of privacy when head of
personnel and employee counselor met with employee's clinical psychologist and
discussed plaintiff's condition without plaintiff's permission).
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voluntary lifestyle choices: exercising, refraining from smoking, and
developing healthier eating habits. On the other hand, we cannot control
our genes. The "accident of birth" is the randomness by which a defective
gene could be a part of the genetic makeup of anyone. Despite the risk
associated with this uncontrollable component of our health, we may
choose to live behind what the philosopher John Rawls refers to as the
"veil of ignorance."
215
A Rawlsian theory of justice advocates social policies based on
decisions that citizens would make in forming a social contract.
Rawlsians posit a hypothetical state during which citizens do not know
their race, their class, or their genetic make-up. Standing behind this veil
of ignorance before the formation of the social contract, people would
most likely not select rules that penalize individuals based on arbitrarily,
or fortuitously, assigned characteristics such as genetic diseases. In this
hypothetical initial position, all citizens have a common interest in
obtaining health insurance. Assuming that insurance companies would use
genetic testing information to create risk classifications for the avowed
purpose of selecting and excluding medical risks, each citizen would
perceive himself or herself as potentially in the "worst-off" insurance
rating classification and prefer, in self-interest, to protect the interest of
those insurance applicants most disadvantaged by risk classification.
Therefore, a Rawlsian theory of justice dictates that society should
regulate health insurance in order to protect the interests of those insureds
who are the most disadvantaged.216
In essence, our social mores have yet to catch up with the knowledge
obtainable as a result of the HGP. For instance, will parents want
knowledge that their children will have a strong propensity for traits now
considered part of personality (such as rage, impatience, or difficulty with
mathematics) that one day may be attributable to our genes? Responsible
parents may desire such information because parental concern for the
welfare of children invites parents to direct their children toward success
and well-being. But the social consequences and stigmatization which
may stem from this knowledge may be devastating in the hands of an
uncaring society. Thus, only when we can accept that a genetic "brand of
Cain" rests on each of us can we be comfortable in leaving the refuge of
our genetic privacy. Meanwhile, the veil of ignorance may be our best
ally in the world carved by the HGP.
21S See Lapp6, supra note 15, at 160.
216 Id.
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IV. STATE VS. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION OF GENETIC INFORMATION iN INSURANCE
A solution to the insurance/genetic fair/unfair discrimination dilemma
may include legislation - either a comprehensive uniform act or discrete
statutes for discrete problems. In considering legislative solutions, there
is an overriding political, economic, and jurisprudential issue that must
be addressed: Should Congress or each state legislature enact insurance/
genetic legislation? On the one hand, the history of American insurance
suggests state regulation. On the other, a national concern that affects
every citizen - each of us has four to ten genetic defects217 - suggests
a nationally uniform and comprehensive approach.
A. Preference for State Regulation of the "Business of Insurance"
Perhaps no other commercial business affects the public so intimately
as does the business of insurance. As a consequence, the insurance
business is held to be "affected with a public interest 2 8 and thus is
subject to stringent regulation. For instance, governmental regulation of
the business of insurance commenced over six centuries ago in Eu-
rope."19 In the United States, the business of insurance, like the banking
business, is subjected to more continuous and thoroughgoing governmen-
tal control and regulation than other varieties of private business
enterprise. Today, American insurance regulation commences and ends
with the states.
Influenced by political, business, and consumer interests in protecting
their respective turfs, insurance regulation has historically swung like a
pendulum between state and federal control. Insurers favored and lobbied
for that level of government, generally the states, which would regulate
the least. Naturally, consumers reacted conversely. Although Congress
could initially have exercised jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause,22 Congress sparingly exercised this power in the nineteenth
217 See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Genetics and the Law, Introduction, 39
EMORY L.J. 619, 619 (1990).
218 See, e.g., O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S.
251, 257 (1931) (upholding a New Jersey statute limiting commissions of fire
insurance agents); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406-07
(1914) (allowing legislative regulation of insurance rates).
219 See EDwIN E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALs OF INSURANCE LAw 2 (2d ed.
1957).
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate
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century. Consequently, regulation began with the states from the 1820s
to the 1850s when several states established insurance departments.221
Perceiving this uneven, piecemeal state regulation as unduly burdensome,
the insurance industry advocated that Congress enact uniform, national
standards that would have recognized insuraihce companies as federal
institutions analogous to banks. This nineteenth-century advocacy, which
questioned the efficacy and fairness of unequal, patchwork state
regulation and urged Congress to adopt a national approach, fittingly
applies to the current debate over insurers' use of genetic informa-
tion.22
2
The insurance industry organized and challenged, in 1868, the power
of state government to regulate interstate insurance tiansactions. Several
New York insurers, seeking to induce federal regulation and invalidate
state regulation, divined a test case. These insurers appointed Paul, a
Virginia resident, as their agent. The agent applied for a Virginia
insurance agent's license, but refused to deposit the required bonds with
the Virginia state treasurer and was denied a license. Thereafter, the agent
sold insurance to a Virginia resident and was convicted of violating
Virginia's licensing statute - a conviction the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed. Taking the case, Paul v. Virginia,223 to the United States
Supreme Court, the agent argued that the Commerce Clause authorized
regulation of insurance companies and that this regulatory power was
exclusively a federal power. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the
argument, held that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction
of commerce"224 and therefore is not within the purview of the Com-
merce Clause. That decision effectively put the insurance industry beyond
the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate for the next seventy-
six years.
One advantage of the Court's decision for the insurance industry was
that insurers were allowed to continue their customary practice of sharing
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States").
22' See generally EDWIN W. PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN
THE UNITED STATES (1927).
222 The same argument for federal regulation was made more recently. See
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF
INSURANCE 359-72 (1977) (proposing a dual system of insurance regulation
which would utilize the general scheme of the federal banking system).
"' Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (holding that insurance
contracts are created by local transactions to be governed by local law and such
contracts do not constitute interstate transactions).224 Id. at 183.
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"experience actuarial data," used to predict the probability of losses
associated with particular risks in setting premiums and were allowed to
establish rating bureaus to assist in determining premiums. Fair discrimi-
nation among applicants and insureds based on experience rated classi-
fications became the norm for our law of insurance. However, these
voluntary rate-making and price-fixing activities among insurers would
later cause the Supreme Court to reverse itself.
Until the 1940s, the states' turf was protected by the decision in Paul
that stood for the proposition that states had the sole power to regulate
insurance business conducted within their borders. Nonetheless, the states
came to recognize that the business of insurance was national in scope.
Thus, to coordinate administration of regulating a national enterprise, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") was
organized in 1871. Even though the NAIC is without power to enforce
any of its decisions, it has considerable influence over state legislatures
and has been a powerful force in solving insurance regulatory problems
since its creation.
By the early twentieth century, the pendulum had already begun to
swing toward federal regulation as state regulation of life insurers was
exposed as wholly inadequate. A striking episode involved an investiga-
tion conducted in New York by ajoint legislative committee in 1905-06:
the Armstrong Committee investigation.225 It exposed various unsavory
practices among life insurers, such as deferring dividends and creating
slush funds, and led to extensive legislation in New York and a few other
states. It also led, in 1905, to the introduction of a bill in the United
States Senate to federalize regulation of insurance. Although insurers at
this juncture differed in opinion, state regulation seemed preferable
compared to the tendency of certain federal agencies to become potent
proactive regulators, as reflected in the antitrust arena. Louis D. Brandeis,
then counsel for the Protective Committee of Policyholders in the
Equitable Life Assurance Society, scathingly protested federal insurance
regulation in the Brandeis tradition. Regarding insurance overhead and
stockholder dividends, he stated:
The sole effect of a Federal law would be... to free the companies
from the careful scrutiny of the commissioners of some of the States.
225 For a detailed description of the work of the Armstrong Committee, see
Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The 1906 Pacification of the
Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 639, 656-75 (1993).
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It seeks to rob the State even of the right to protect its own citizens
from the legalized robbery to which present insurance measures subject
the citizens, for by the terms of the bill a Federal license would secure
the right to do business within the borders of the State, regardless of the
State prohibitions, free from the State's protective regulations.226
Brandeis's advocacy prevailed, the federal legislation was not enacted,
and the primacy of state regulation continued for another forty years.
By the 1940s, however, another movement for federal regulation of
the insurance business had arisen. This movement was adamantly opposed
by the insurance industry which supported continued state regulation. One
important concern was a perceived unfair discrimination by insurers'
voluntary sharing of actuarial data based on experience and by insurers'
fixing uniform risk classifications and premiums. The argument against
this practice was that this collective action created discriminatory rates
and unfairly limited the availability of insurance for some applicants -
this same basic argument echoes in the current debate over genetic
information. Fairness in rate-making continues to be the issue.
The ongoing state-versus-federal debate was temporarily settled by
the famous decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association.227 This case concerned a Sherman Anti-Trust Act indict-
ment of an association of 198 stock fire insurance companies in six states
for fixing non-competitive premium rates and for monopolization in
boycotting nonmembers. The Court determined that Congress had not
manifested a clear intention to exempt insurance companies from the
federal antitrust laws and held the insurers in the association were subject
to the Sherman Act.228 South-Eastern Underwriters threatened .the
continued supremacy of the states in insurance regulation. This de~ision
caused confusion and created an uncertain void regarding the validity of
state regulation because, after the decision, Congress could assume
regulation of the business of insurance.
In response, NAIC, representing the turf interests of the states, as
well as the insurance industry's position now favoring state regulation,
226 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594
n. 17 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Louis D. Brandeis, counsel for the
Protective Committee of policy-holders in the Equitable Life Assurance Society,
Address before the Commercial Club of Boston (Oct. 26, 1905)), reh'g denied,
323 U.S. 811 (1944).
227 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, reh "g
denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944).
228 Id. at 938.
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drafted a compromise proposal that Congress enacted as the McCarran-
Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act of 1945229 (more popularly known
as the McCarran Act). For our purposes of deciding whether a state or a
federal statutory solution is the most practical, productive approach, three
pertinent points regarding the MeCarran Act are useful:
1. The Act states as a matter of public policy that "the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance
is in the public interest,""23 and then concedes power to the states to
regulate the business of insurance."' This public policy evidences a
preference for a state-by-state legislative response to insurance/genetic
discrimination issues. Yet that apparent public policy is undercut by other
provisions of the Act.
2. The Act provides that federal law shall not preempt state regulation
of insurance; however, it is unclear if the anti-preemption clause would
apply to the use by insurers of genetic testing in classifying and rating
risks or in the subsequent processing and paying or denying insureds'
claims.232 Assuming that new legislation is the appropriate approach to
229 McCarran-FergusonInsuranceRegulationAct of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15,
59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain and analyze the substance,
effect, and current status of the state-federal accommodation achieved by the
McCarran Act. For a discussion of these concerns, see generally JERRY, supra
note 14; KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 105, § 8.1, at 930-38 (discussing the
allocation of regulatory power between state and federal institutions).
230 § 1, 59 Stat. at 33; 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994).
231 "The business of insurance... shall be subject to the laws of the several
States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." § 2(a), 59
Stat. at 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1994).
232 "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(2)(b) (1958). This language, which was
primarily intended to create an antitrust exemption for the business of insurance,
has engendered the most litigation to date. The litigation has focused on what is
meant by the "business of insurance," which is not defined in the Act. The
Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test for determining when a particular
activity, such as the use of genetic tests in underwriting, is the "business of
insurance" as opposed to the "business of insurance companies." The three
factors to be evaluated in determining if a practice constitutes the business of
insurance are: 'first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, wheiher the practice is an integral part
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether
the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry." Union Labor
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Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (re-adopting the three-step test
articulated earlier in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205 (holding that a pharmacy agreement did not constitute the business of
insurance), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979)); cf Everson v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, 898 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (Under the four-part analysis
applicable to the McCarran Act, "a federal statute is precluded if (1) the statute
does not specifically relate to the business of insurance... ; (2) the complained
of activities constitute 'business of insurance'; (3) the state has enacted laws for
the purpose of regulating the complained of activity; and (4) the federal statute
would invalidate, impair or supersede the state law."). What is unclear from these
decisions is whether the use of genetic tests in either the underwriting process or
in the claims presentation-processing-payment process, or both, would be the
"business of insurance" controlled by state law, or the "business of insurance
companies" to which federal law applies. Using the third Pireno factor, for
example, ask: Is the genetic testing limited to entities within the insurance
industry? Unless insurers have in-house genetic testing facilities, the answer is
no, and federal law could preempt state law. Using the first Pireno factor, ask:
Does denying payment of an insured's claim based on genetic testing involve the
underwriting or spreading of risk? Based on Pireno, the answer is no, and federal
law could again preempt. The transfer of risk is complete upon the issuance of
the policy, which inexorably leads to the conclusion that no claim settlement
activity can comply with the Court's first criterion - the transferring and
spreading risk. Pireno held that the contract underwrites and spreads risk; thus,
all insurer activities after insurance contract formation would be the "business of
insurance companies," which is not exclusively regulated by the states under the
McCarran Act. Arguably, no insurer activity can comply with all three factors.
However, the Court indicated that none of the three parts of the test is always
outcome-determinative, Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129, which evidently means that any
insurer activity must be assessed against all three factors. Further uncertainty
results if a court, for example, emphasizes only the "relationship" part of the
three-pronged test. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio
law establishing the priority of claims against insolvent insurers governed despite
a federal statute purporting to give United States' claims higher priority; that the
federal statute did not preempt the state law; and, that the Ohio statute was one
regulating the business of insurance within the McCarran Act to the extent, at
least, of protecting policyholders. U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,
508-09 (1993); cf Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. American Family Life
Assurance Co., 846 F. Supp. 454, 458-60 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding that a false
advertising claim brought under the Lanham Act against insurer was preempted
by the McCarran Act because state laws regulating advertising are encompassed
within the McCarran Act because advertising clearly affects the relationship
between the insurer and insured). As just explained, the decisions applying the
three-pronged test have narrowed the scope of the "business of insurance" from
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the insurance/genetic problem, this "jurisdictional" uncertainty is a
convincing rationale for adopting a federal, rather than a state, legislative
solution. For instance, if diverse federal laws can preempt state insur-
ance/genetic statutes, then state legislation would provide neither the
requisite assured guidance for insurers, courts, attorneys, and the public,
nor an efficacious, comprehensive solution to the insurance/genetic
dilemma.
3. In the Act, Congress explicitly reserved the power to enact
legislation relating to the business of insurance.233 Thus, it would
neither violate public policy nor usurp state regulatory power for
Congress to enact exclusive, comprehensive or discrete, insurance/genetic
legislation.
Immediately following the passage of the McCarran Act, state
insurance commissioners and the insurance industry took joint action to
satisfy the Act's requirement for the exemption of insurers from federal
antitrust regulation."' With the participation of an All-Industry Com-
mittee, NAIC prepared and recommended for each state's adoption model
regulatory acts containing strictures against deceptive practices, unfair
methods of competition, and "excessive, inadequate, and unfairly
discriminatory" rates."' The acts (sometimes called the "All-Industry
laws") were avowedly designed as an "umbrella" against federal
intervention. By 1950, all states had enacted versions of this legislation,
thereby firmly establishing it as the sole province of the states.236
what probably was originally intended in 1945. But that observation may not be
accurate. Although a comprehensive critical analysis of the three-partPireno test
could be written, the bottom line is that to avoid the uncertainty regarding the
exclusivity and supremacy of any -state statutory solution to the insurance
problems that will arise upon completion of the HGP, a uniform, comprehensive
federal insurance/genetics statute appears to be the most certain and preferable
approach.
233 After stating in section 2(b) that "No Act of Congress" shall preempt state
insurance regulatory laws, Congress reserved the power by stating "unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance .... " 15 U.S.C. §
1012(2)(b) (1958).
234 The last part of section 2(b) states that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act "shall be applicable to the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." Id.
235 These acts primarily concerned rate regulation, a complex subject well
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally 1 GEoRGE RICHARDS, INSURANCE
LAW 216-20 (5th ed. 1952) (explaining NAIC's recommendations to 1947 state
legislatures and listing the states that adopted the recommendations).
236 See, e.g., James B. Donovan, State Regulation of Insurance, 1956 INs.
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Before attempting to resolve the underlying issue of federal versus
state regulation of insurance/genetic concerns, current federal and state
statutes addressing these concerns should be evaluated to ascertain which
approach appears to be the most efficacious. The reasons for governmen-
tal regulation are primarily to prevent contractual overreaching and to
assure the solvency and quality of insurers and their agents. More
importantly for purposes of this Article, regulation also seeks to assure
the availability of insurance coverages with premium rates and rating
classifications that are fair and nondiscriminatory. At present, the use of
genetic information by insurers is prohibited in a relatively small, but
growing number of jurisdictions. Of the regulation that does exist, most
falls specifically to address the use of genetic information in the
underwriting process. Since the enactment of the McCarran Act, there
have been some congressional efforts to regulate insurance classification,
but these efforts to date have been unsuccessful.237 This lack of federal
regulation allows insurers to exchange medical information through
organizations such as the Medical Information Bureau.238 The use of
this information is then at the discretion of the insurers, and other existing
laws are inadequate to protect people from the arbitrary and unfair use of
genetic information by insurers.
B. Current Federal Law Is Inadequate and Problematically Defers
to State Insurance Regulation
1. ERISA: Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
The issues surrounding health care in America cannot be adequately
addressed without considering the extent to which Americans rely upon
their employers for insurance coverage.3 9 Our employment-based
L.J. 11, 12-15 (discussing various regulatory provisions adopted by the states
following NAIC's recommendations). For a full explanation of the NAIC Model
Unfair Trade Practices Act and the state versions, see infra Part 1.C (notes 110-
21 and accompanying text).
'7 See, e.g., Wortham, supra note 76, at 364-66 (discussing proposed federal
bills that would prohibit discrimination by insurers on the basis of race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin).
28 See, e.g., Schatz, supra note 14, at 1801. See supra notes 209-13 and
accompanying text for a description of the Medical Information Bureau.
239 Tracy S. Guice, AIDS Discrimination in Employee Health Benefits: Is
There a Federal Remedyfor Modification of a Plan Once an Employee Develops
AIDS?, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 377, 377-78 (1990) ("'[Ojur society has
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health insurance arose from the desire of employers, confronting
governmental controls of wage rates during WWII, to attract and retain
scarce labor. One way to augment an employee's effective wage without
violating the WWII wage controls was to provide employees with health
insurance as a fringe benefit. Currently, most people under age sixty-five
obtain health insurance through their employers.24 As of 1990, eighty-
five percent of these Americans had some form of private health
insurance, and seventy percent of these insureds had employer-sponsored
health coverages.24' In the late 1980s, it was estimated that over 146
million Americans had some form of employer-provided health insurance,
either through an employer's self-insurance benefit plan or through a
group-medical insurance plan commercially purchased through a third-
party insurance company.242
Employer-based health insurance organizations are subject to
federal legislation known as the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"), 243 enacted in 1974 to protect the rights of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. ERISA promotes
continued coverage and assured benefits2" by providing civil remedies
over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. This exclusivity is
mitigated only by a grant to state courts of concurrent jurisdiction over
actions to recover benefits due, to enforce rights, or to clarify rights to
future benefits. 243 However, virtually all state and local regulation of
employer-established plans is preempted and eliminated by ERISA. The
problem is that this ERISA preemption of state remedies creates a
regulation-free void where state regulation of employee health insurance
and other benefits was and would be.246
placed the onus of health care funding on the employment relationship. . .
(quoting John F. Dudley, Comment, The Medical Costs ofAIDS: Abandoning the
HIV-Infected Employee, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 915, 915 (1992))).
240 See, e.g., Kronick, supra note 74.
241 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 30-33 (1992).
242 MEDICAL TESTING AND HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 39, at 41; see
also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING
AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 165
(1986) (noting that private insurance covers a significant proportion of the costs
of AIDS care); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988 (updating 1986 study).
243 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
244 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
24S Id. § 1132 (e)(1).
246 See Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
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Congress designed ERISA to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee welfare benefit plans that, through
insurance, provide medical, surgical, or hospital care as well as benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death.24 7 The statute
governs employee benefit plans, classifying them according to two sets
of characteristics: the types of benefits provided, and the means of
funding of the plan.24 The first distinction separates welfare plans249
from pension or retirement plans." Noteworthy for our purposes are
the following: (1) "ERISA does not mandate that employers provide any
particular benefits ... ";25 (2) ERISA does not proscribe employer
discrimination in providing employee benefits;252 and (3) unlike pen-
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274-75
(1990) (criticizing ERISA's preemption given the absence of federal substantive
regulation); Alan I. Widiss & Larry Gostin, What's Wrong With the ERISA
"Vacuum "?: The CaseAgainst Unrestricted FreedomforEmployers to Terminate
Employee Health Care Plans and to Decide What Coverage Is to Be Provided
When Risk Retention Plans Are Establishedfor Health Care, 41 DRAKE L. REV.
635, 655 (1992); Lizzette Palmer, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Its Effects
on Capping the Health Benefits of Individuals with AIDS: A Demonstration of
Why the United States Health andlnsurance SystemsRequire Substantial Reform,
30 Hous. L. REV. 1347, 1360 (1993) ("Ultimately, Congress, through ERISA
preemption of state remedies, has left a void where state regulation of employee
benefits was or would be.").
247 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983) (discussing ERISA's
purpose and relevant definitions).
248 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994).
249 Id. § 1002(1). An employee welfare benefit plan includes any program
that provides benefits for contingencies such as illness/medical/hospitalization,
disability, accident, death, or unemployment. Courts have broadly interpreted and
construed ERISA: "[S]ingle employer purchases of insurance constitute ERISA
governed plans." E. Thomas Bishop & Paula Denney, Hello ERISA, Good-bye
Bad Faith: Federal Pre-emption of DTPA, Insurance Code, and Common Law
Bad Faith Claims, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 267, 269 (1989).
250 29 U.S.C. § 1001(2)(A) (1994) (stating that an employee pension plan
provides income deferral and a retirement income).
25 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
252 Id. The absence of ERISA proscription or prescription regarding unfair
insurance discrimination issues is considered throughout this section. Employer-
sponsored self-insured plans are a primary concern. The principal problem is the
ERISA vacuum created by excluding employer self-insured plans from state
regulation while concomitantly providing no federal insurance regulation. See,
e.g., Widiss & Gostin, supra note 246, at 638-40; see also Palmer, supra note
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sion-retirement benefits,253 ERISA's strict funding2 54 and vesting 255
requirements do not apply to welfare benefits.
The second basic ERISA distinction relates to the source of a benefit
plan.256 A plan is either self-funded by the employer or purchased from
an insurance company. Because of ERISA's preemption, savings, and
deemer clauses, the distinction between employer self-insured plans and
employer plans purchased from commercial insurers is very significant to
the issue of health insurance coverage for employees with genetically
identified disorders.
a. Section 514's Preemption,
Saving, and Deemer Provisions
Understanding ERISA's section 514 preemption is difficult. Concen-
tric circles of confusion surround this preemption clause which was
intended to effect national uniformity in the regulation of employee
benefit plans.257 Confusion arises because section 514 has three relevant
clauses: a preemption clause, a saving clause, and a deemer clause. As an
overview, ERISA first preempts and supersedes all state laws relating to
an employee benefit plan. But the saving clause excepts from the
preemption clause state laws that regulate insurance. Then the deemer
246, at 1361-62 (discussing ERISA's preemption as providing a method for
employees to avoid state regulation by self-insuring).
253 See, e.g., Frances Figetakis, Retiree Welfare Benefits: ERISA, LMRA and
the Federal Common Law, 20 AKRON L. REV. 455, 456 (1987) (noting the
stringent funding and vesting requirements based on age and length of service
required of ERISA pension plans).
254 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1994). For an examination of ERISA funding
requirements, see MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS § 12.2 (1996) (offering a detailed examination of
ERISA funding standards in relation to the Internal Revenue Code).
25 When a benefit vests, it becomes nonforfeitable. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)
(1994); Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9
INDUS. REL. L.J. 183, 183-84 (1987) (noting that most cases have held that
retiree insurance vests at retirement). In contrast, employers under self-insured
plans may redraft a welfare plan to exclude or limit specific medical conditions
after learning that a particular employee suffers from an extraordinary medical
risk such as AIDS. This concem is considered in this Article in relation to both
ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
256 29 U.S.C § 1144(b) (1994).
217 Id. § 1001.
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clause provides that a state law that purports to regulate insurance cannot
deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. In other words,
if a state law relates to an employee benefit plan, ERISA preempts that state
law unless the state law regulates insurance and does not inaptly deem an
employer offering a benefit plan with health insurance coverages to be an
insurer.
(1) Preemption Clause
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan."'
The words "relate to" have been construed expansively by the Supreme
Court,2 9 so that ERISA's preemption has been applied to all forms of state
action that might affect benefit plans.26° Since ERISA preempts state laws
that conflict with its enforcement provisions, 261 the Court has interpreted
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme to be exclusive and controlling over state
law, including state insurance common-law causes of action262 as well as
state statutes mandating health insurance coverages.263 In sum, ERISA
258 ERISA section 514(a), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
259 See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 8 (1987) (noting
that "relates to" has been defined as "having a connection with or reference to").
260 See, e.g., Ingersoll-RandCo. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-42 (1990)
(holding that a state claim for relief was preempted by ERISA since it related to
an ERISA plan and because it directly conflicted with an ERISA claim for
relief).
261 ERISA's civil enforcement clause is stated in section 502(a), as set forth
in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
262 See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987).
Dedeaux, an employee, claimed permanent disability benefits under a group
disability policy which the employer purchased from Pilot Life. Dedeaux had a
disabling accident in 1975, which he alleged caused a permanent disability, but
Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years. Dedeaux sued under Mississip-
pi insurance "bad faith" law regarding the failure to pay the disability benefits.
The Court held that this common-law first-party-insurance "bad faith" cause of
action did not "regulate insurance" and was preempted by ERISA. Id. at 51.
263 For instance, under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation
Equity Amendment Act of 1990, the District of Columbia required employers
who provide health insurance for their employees to provide equivalent health
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preempts and eliminates virtually all state and local regulation of
employer-established employee benefit plans. 64
(2) Saving Clause
Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in
this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securi-
ties.2
65
Similar to the McCarran Act, 66 ERISA's saving clause expresses
a public policy preference for the continued regulation of the insurance
industry by the states. Obviously, the saving clause saves state laws
regulating insurance from ERISA preemption. In ascertaining if ERISA
preempts a state law that purports to regulate insurance, the Supreme
Court applied a common-sense construction to "insurance"267 as well as
the three-prong test used to define "business of insurance" under the
insurance coverage for injured employees eligible for workers' compensation
benefits. Assuring that federal regulation of covered employee benefit plans shall
be exclusive, the Supreme Court held that the D.C. statutory requirement is
preempted by ERISA. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125, 130 (1992).
2 Id.; Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108-09 (1983) (holding
ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights Law only to the extent it
prohibited actions permitted under federal law, but ERISA did not preempt New
York's Disability Benefits Law); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 62-63 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempted common law contract and tort
claims which were not laws regulating insurance); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 389-90 (Tex.) (finding that state law includes all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other action having the effect of law and is
preempted by ERISA if it relates to a coveredplan), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 1232
(1991).
265 ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1994).
266 See supra Part IV.A (notes 218-38 and accompanying text) for a
description of the McCarran Act.
267 The common-sense meaning of "regulates insurance" requires that the
state law specificallybe directedto the insurance industry. See Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50 (1987) (stating that in order to regulate insurance,
the state law cannot merely impact the insurance industry; it must be directed
specifically toward the insurance industry).
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McCarran Act.268 Under this dual test, ERISA has been found to
preempt insurance common-law "bad faith" claims,269 state deceptive
trade practices regulations,' and claims under state unfair settlement
practices acts.27'
268 In determining whether the state law regulates the business of insurance,
the Pilot Life Court, quoting Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119,
129 (1982), applied the three-part test: "[F]irst, whether the practice has the
effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry." Id. at 48-49; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (considered to be the leading case applying the three-prong
McCarran test in determining if a state law regulates insurance and falls within
the saving clause).
The Court in Pilot Life concluded: "Considering the common-sense
understanding of the saving clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining
the business of insurance, and, most importantly, the clear expression of
congressional intent that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme be exclusive, we
conclude that Dedeaux's state law suit asserting improper ["bad faith"]
processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is not saved
by § 514(b)(2)(A), and therefore is pre-empted by § 514(a)." Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 57.
269 The Supreme Court held that Mississippi's law of insurance "bad faith"
does not regulate insurance directly because its roots are in contract and tort law.
Id. at 50. Pilot Life has been followed regarding state common law causes of
action for delay in processing insurance claims that are preempted by ERISA.
See, e.g., Belasco v. W.K.P. Wilson & Sons, Inc., 833 F.2d 277, 281 (1 1th Cir.
1987) (holding that the saving clause did not apply because Alabama law of bad
faith had roots in contract and tort law).
270 Deceptive trade practices regulation, as well as the insurance bad faith
tort, do not affect spreading of risk nor are they limited to insurance companies.
See, e.g., Bishop & Denney, supra note 249, at 277.
271 For instance, lower 'federal courts have held that claims of unfair
settlement practices arising under CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1993) are
preempted under ERISA. See, e.g., Lee v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 673 F.
Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that, while a California statute that
prohibited fifteen unfair insurance claims settlement practices "regulated
insurance" for purposes of ERISA's saving clause, congressional intent that the
ERISA civil enforcement scheme be the exclusive remedy for assertion of
improper processing of benefit claims displaces claims under the California
statute); Roberson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 661 F. Supp. 416,
424 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that even if the California statute regulates
insurance and is within the scope of the saving clause, it must be preempted for
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In the 1970s and 1980s, ERISA preemption became a significant
issue for health policy. ERISA preemption forbade states from requiring
an employer to provide particular health benefits or to provide any
benefits at all.2 72 Hawaii mounted a concerted attack on ERISA's
preemption in the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act 73 which required
Hawaiian employers to provide health care for almost all Hawaiian
employees. But in the congressional debate that followed, other states did
not come to Hawaii's aid. State insurance commissioners were more
concerned with ERISA preempting their power to enforce state insurance
laws to regulate multiple employer-trusts ("METS"), set up by indepen-
dent agents that sold health insurance to small employers. The state
insurance commissioners worriedly witnessed the proliferation of self-
insured METS that had a propensity to become insolvent with millions
of promised benefits unpaid.2 7 ' However, Congress's main worry was
with Hawaii. In 1983, Congress amended section 514 to provide a partial
exemption for Hawaii that specifically stated that the Hawaii exemption
would not apply to any other state law.
275
infringing on ERISA's same exclusive civil remedy provision), affid, 869 F.2d
1498 (9th Cir. 1989). Additionally, tort claims of federal employees insured
under the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act ("FE-BA") for common-law
"bad faith" or violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) have been held to be
preempted by the federal FEHBA. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m); Hayes v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 921, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1987) (drawing an analogy to ERISA
preemption of state common law tort and contract claims), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1060 (1988); Hartenstine v. Superior Ct., 241 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that state law claims refer to plan and therefore fall under
preemption clause of FEHBA), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 899 (1988).
272 Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that
state law regulating insurance that requires employers to provide coverage for
treatment of mental illnesses and emotional disorders does not conflict with
ERISA, which does not require coverage, and thus is not preempted), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
273 HAW. REV. STAT. § 393 (1974).
274 For an account of multiple employer trusts, see Edward A. Scallet, The
Regulation of Multiple Employer Trusts: Past, Present and Future, 61 WASH. U.
L.Q. 359, 360-61 (1983) (discussing the ability of operators of METS to drain
assets of the trusts as a result of ERISA regulation).
275 For a thorough discussion of Hawaii's challenge to ERISA's preemption
and the special ERISA exemption compromise, see Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C.
Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47, 52-60 (1988).
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The 1983 exemption for Hawaii, which was coupled with permis-
sion to the states to regulate METS, was the last exemption but one to
ERISA preemption that Congress granted. In 1986, Congress granted the
state the power to mandate that employee health plans not include any
provision which require the employee to use Medicaid before claiming
benefits under the plan. Federal law required the states to make
Medicaid a secondary payor when a beneficiary had private health
insurance. This the states could do when the health insurance was issued
by a carrier: they could forbid carriers [insurers] to insert in policies
that the carrier would pay only after the insured had exhausted Medicaid
benefits. But the states could make no similar law as to self-insured
employee health plans: ERISA semi-preemption forbade it.276
The saving clause received further clarification when the Supreme
Court, in a 1985 opinion, held that states could regulate only the health
insurance in employee benefit plans that was written by insurance
companies, including nonprofit companies."' The saving clause allowed
the states to require insurance companies to include mandated benefits in
the insurance policies even though mandated benefits constituted "indirect
regulation" ' of the employee benefit plans that Congress had forbid-
den the states to regulate. The Court held that a Massachusetts statute
setting forth mandatory minimum health care benefits for inclusion in
general insurance policies was saved and not preempted by ERISA.2 79
However, a state was forbidden from regulating an employer's self-
insurance benefit plan by declaring it to be insurance or in the insurance
business. It is noteworthy that the Court explained that if the distinction
between insurer-insured and employer self-insured employee benefit plans
is to be abolished, Congress, and not the courts, would have to make that
change."8 The final section of this Article suggests that ERISA ought
to be so amended or that a comprehensive federal insurance/genetics law
should address the matter."'
276 Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(8) (1988)).
277 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985)
(holding that insured plans were not preempted by ERISA).
278 Id.
279 Noting that the preemption and saving clauses seem to contradict one
another, the Court nevertheless concluded that Congress did not intend to
preempt areas of traditional state regulation such as mandated insurance benefits.
Id. at 744.280 d. at 747.
281 See infra Part IV.D (notes 548-69 and accompanying text).
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For our purposes, then, the question is whether a state law concerning
genetic testing and insurance underwriting would be saved from ERISA
preemption? The answer seems to be "yes," but only as to insurer-
underwritten plans. Employers' self-insured plans are deemed beyond the
reach of state insurance commissioners. Therein lies the problem.
(3) Deemer Clause
Neither an employee benefit plan nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other
insurer or to be engaged in the business of insurance for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, [or] insurance contracts 282
The deemer clause makes clear that a state law purporting to regulate
insurance cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance
company The Umted States Supreme Court interpreted ERISA's deemer
clause to mean that employer self-insured plans are to be regulated only
by ERISA and are exempt from state insurance regulation. Employee
benefit plans funded by commercially purchased health insurance remain
subject to state regulation of insurance law but are also subject to ERISA.
The Supreme Court explained:
We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from
state laws that "regulat[e] insurance" within the meaning of the saving
clause. By forbidding States to deem employee benefit plans "to be an
insurance company or other insurer or to be engaged in the business
of insurance" the deemer clause relieves plans from state laws "purport-
ing to regulate insurance." As a result, self-funded ERISA plans are
exempt from state regulation insofar as that regulation "relate[s] to" the
plans. State laws directed toward the plans are pre-empted because they
relate to an employee benefit plan but are not "saved" because they do
not regulate insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are
"saved"; but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because
the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers,
or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws.
On the other hand, employee benefit plans that are insured are subject
to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures
282 ERISA section 514(b)(2)(B), as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(1994).
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a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws "purporting to
regulate insurance" after application of the deemer clause. The insurance
company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The
ERISA plan is consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar
as they apply to the plan's insurer.283
However, the deemer clause undercuts ERISA's public-policy
preference for state regulation of insurance by prohibiting states from
regulating self-insured employee benefit plans.8 4 State insurance laws
and regulations designed to assure adequate health insurance for
employees of commercially insured employers do not give any protection
to the millions of employees of self-insured employers.285 As a conse-
283 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
284 A "self-insurance"plan is also known as a "risk retention," "self-funded,"
or "employer-sponsored" plan. The Supreme Court recognizes the distinction
between commercially-funded plans and self-insured plans. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747 ("We are aware that our decision results in a distinction
between insured and uninsured plans .... "). Risk retention is an attractive
option for several reasons. Businesses that self-insure retain control over the
funds they allocate for employee health financing. Rather than paying a premium
to a commercial insurer, self-insured employers directly assume the risk of loss
and pay some or all of their employees' health care costs. Sometimes, they
purchase catastrophic loss coverage from commercial insurers to diminish their
financial exposure. Most avoid administrative costs of processing claims by
contracting with commercial or non-profit, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
insurers or other third-party administrators. But, most importantly, employers
with self-funded plans avoid the oversight of state insurance commissioners and
state-mandated health insurance coverages.
285 For instance, well over half of all employees work for employers that are
partially or fully self-insured. Robert Pear, Court Approves Cuts in Benefits in
Costly Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at 1 [hereinafterPear, Court Approves
Cuts]; Robert Pear, Bush Faces Hard Choice on Limits on Insurance, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1992, at A12 (noting that tens of millions of employees receive
health insurance from employers serving as their own insurers); Robert Pear,
Justices Leave Intact Ruling That Lets Business Cut Health Benefits, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1992, at Al8 (noting that a growing number of employers serve as their
own insurers). By 1992, almost two-third of all employers were self-insured. Milt
Freudenheim, Employers Winning Right to Cut Back Medical Insurance, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1992, at Al. For discussions of the employermovement to self-
insure, see L.H. Otis, Self-Insureds Proliferate in Soft Market, 95 NAT'L
UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 1, 38 ("Self-insurance
grew 19.4 percent (from $32 to $38.2 billion) while conventional market
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quence, employer self-insured or risk retention plans are becoming the
norm in employee health insurance.
Self-insurance is a very enticing option for employers. Self-funding
frees employers from scrutiny by state insurance commissioners. It allows
employers to escape state-mandated minimum health benefit require-
ments, 28' and to evade insurance premium taxes that subsidize state-
administered high-risk insurance pools. But self-insurance is not an
attractive alternative for employees. Whereas ERISA was intended to
effect national uniformity in regulating employee benefit plans, it fails to
regulate self-insured plans, which the states cannot regulate. ERISA has
no regulations either prescribing or proscribing self-insured plans with
health care benefits." 7 Notwithstanding that ERISA prohibits discrimi-
nation against an employee in exercising or attaining a right under a
welfare benefit plan (i.e., the employer cannot fire the employee),2"'
ERISA does not prohibit a self-funded employer, after finding out about
a particular genetic or other medical condition, from redrafting its
employee health insurance benefits to limit or exclude specific medical
conditions. The absence of federal ERISA regulation in the self-insured
context has been critically described as creating a regulatory vacuum, that
is, ERISA's regulation-free zone.289 It is said that ERISA's vacuum
premium volume rose just 3.8 percent (from $115.6 to $120 billion) between
1988 and 1990 .... "); Sara Marley, Alternative Risk Financing Continues to
Gain Strength: Larger Employers Explore Options in Many Lines, 27 Bus. INS.,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 3 (stating that self-insurance accounted for 27% of the
commercial market in 1992 and by the end of 1993 will account for 30% of the
market).
286 All states currently regulate the terms of group health insurance policies.
See infra Part IV.C.1 (notes 391-422 and accompanyingtext). See, e.g., Mark A.
Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REv. 23, 80 (1992) (noting more than 1000 extant
state insurance coverage mandates).
287 Henry T. Greely, AIDS and the American Health Care Financing System,
51 U. PrrT. L. REv. 73, 104-11 (1989). But see EEOC Issues Guidance on
Relationship Between Insurance and ADA, BNA News and Background
Information (June 14, 1993), available in Westlaw, 143 LRR 193 d8 (discussing
health-related insurance conditions based on disability as possible violations of
the ADA).
288 ERISA section 510, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
289 See generally Fox & Schaffer, supra note 275, at 48-49 (commenting that
ERISA's regulatory vacuum was not carefully considered but was hurriedly
inserted in the conference committee just before Congress took final action on
ERISA). See also Marci A. Firfer, Direct Employer-Provider Contracting and
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exorcising state regulation has seriously impeded the capability of state
governments to create appropriate universal coverage solutions for
millions of uninsureds.290 Others retort that ERISA's regulation-free
zone protects employers from conflicting, inconsistent state regulatory
laws and permits employers to operate uniform employee health care
plans across many states.29'
One point is clear. The extent to which self-funded plans will cover
employees is, with ERISA's blessing, at the absolute discretion of the
employer. Moreover, an employer's power to limit or exclude employee
health insurance benefits under conditions solely determined by the
employer has been upheld in the context of medical coverage for AIDS
under an employer's self-insured plan.292 When considering this power
ERISA Preemption:A RegulatoryLoophole?, 40 FED'N OF INS. & CORP. COUNS.
Q. 195, 195-242 (1990) (concluding that ERISA's regulatory loophole creates
significant policy issues yet to be resolved by the courts); Morelli, supra note
154, at 8 ("Even if there were some type of protective legislation [regarding
genetic testing] in every state, persons working for self-insured employers would
not be covered because of ERISA which exempts self-insured employers from
state laws pertaining to health benefits."); Jeffrey A. Mello, Limitations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in Protecting Individuals with HIV from
Employment Discrimination, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 73, 104-08 (1994)
(discussing ERISA's vacuum as a loophole in insurance laws); Edward F. Shay,
Discrimination in Health Benefits: ERISA and Beyond, 7 AIDS & PUB. POL'Y
92-95 (1992); Widiss & Gostin, supra note 252, at 654-55 (recognizing that
ERISA allows employers to enter a regulation-free zone); Palmer, supra note
246, at 1360 (noting the void left by ERISA preemption); Steven L. Brown,
Note, ERISA's Preemption of Estoppel Claims Relating to Employee Benefit
Plans, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1391, 1416-22 (1989) (discussing the emergence of
federal common law under ERISA to fill gaps created by state law preemption);
Jonathan Goldstein, Comment, ERISA "s Deemer Clause and the Question ofSelf-
Insureds: What's a State to Do?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 291, 299-303 (1989)
(discussing ERISA's deemer clause and preemption for self-insured plans). For
an analysis approving ERISA's regulation-free zone, see Hylton, supra note 82,
at 78 ("Thus, the creation of a risk retention plan enables an employer, regardless
of what the otherwise applicable state [health insurance] mandates require, to
regain the ability to fashion a health plan which meets the particular needs of her
employees at an acceptable price.").
290 Bobinski, supra note 246, at 275.
291 Kathlynn L. Butler, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through ERISA
and the ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1239 (1993) (recognizing ERISA's broad
preemption as successful in protecting employers' interests).
292 McGannv. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,404-05 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
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to self-regulate together with the financial incentives employers have to
reduce the cost of health care, it is reasonably foreseeable that employers
will pragmatically use genetic information following completion of the
HGP to make decisions about health insurance coverages.293
b. ERISA Permits Self-Insured
Employers to Discriminate by Excluding
or Limiting Employees' Health Insurance
The judge-made bottom line under ERISA is that self-insured
employers can discriminate without impunity in the creation, alteration
(e.g., by exclusions or by capping monetary benefits for medical risks or
conditions), and termination of employees' insurance coverages in
employee benefit plans. It is generally understood that if an employee can
establish a causal connection between a medical risk, the loss of insurance
benefits, and an adverse employment action, the employee may be
entitled to relief under section 510 of ERISA, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a [plan] participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
denied sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 506 U.S. 981 (1992). In
McGann, the Fifth Circuit held that an employer was within its rights when
reducing the maximum amount of benefits available to employees with AIDS
from $1 million to $5000. McGann was employed by H & H which provided
insurance to its employees through a purchased plan. McGann had AIDS. After
he filed a claim for benefits in March of 1988, H & H changed its plan, became
self-funded, and reduced the total coverage available for AIDS claims. The
district court found no discrimination because H & H was not required by
ERISA to continue insurance benefits. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit held that
to find discrimination would clearly conflict with congressional intent that
employers remain free to create, modify, and terminate the terms and conditions
of employee benefit plans. Id.; accord Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394,
399 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employer, for economic reasons, could
reduce lifetime AIDS-related benefits from $1 million to $25,000); see also
Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1993). In Custer,
the plaintiff s first claim was for maternity benefits which the insurance policy
did not cover. Moreover, her pregnancy was a pre-existing condition. The court
held that there was no basis for a discrimination claim when medical benefits for
the newborn baby were denied.
293 For a description of possible hiring discrimination based on genetic
information, see supra Part 1I.F (notes 134-39 and accompanying text).
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employee benefit plan... or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan.9
The significance of section 510 is that it could, although it generally does
not, provide redress for employees who are discriminated against because
they are considered insurance risks.295 For instance, self-insureds may
deny, exclude, or limit coverage based on an employee's medical risks.
Also importantly, section 510 is inapplicable to job applicants as well as
to employees who do not receive insurance plan benefits. Therefore, an
applicant who is refused employment because of his/her anticipated
medical costs has no claim for relief under section 510. Any federal or
state insurance/genetics discrimination law should address and rectify
unfair discriminatory wrongs to such employees and job applicants.
In a decision with far-reaching implications for genetic testing of
employees to actuarially ascertain medical risks, the Fifth Circuit, in
McGann v. H & H Music Co.,296 ruled that a self-insured employer can
change its insurance policy to reduce coverage for workers who develop
costly illnesses.297 In December 1987, John W. McGann, an employee
of H & H Music, discovered he had contracted IV. McGann submitted
his first claims for reimbursement under the employer's group medical
plan and informed management he had AIDS. In July 1988, H & H
Music informed its employees that changes would be made in their
medical coverage. These changes included limiting benefits for AIDS-
related claims to a lifetime maximum of $5000. Before the change, the
lifetime coverage was $1 million for all diseases. Other changes included
increased individual and family deductibles, elimination of coverage for
chemical dependency treatment, adoption of a preferred provider plan,
and increased contribution requests. No limitation was placed on any
other catastrophic illness. H & H Music also became a self-insurer under
294 ERISA section 510, as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
295 See, e.g., Joan Vogel, ContainingMedical andDisability Costs by Cutting
Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1024, 1037 (1987) (discussing the elimination of
"expensive" employees as an ERISA section 510 violation).
296 McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
there was no discrimination by employer in limiting AIDS benefits to $5000
because limitation applied to all present and future beneficiaries who might
contract AIDS), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 506. U.S.
981 (1992). For an excellent analysis of McGann, see Hylton, supra note 82.
297 McGann, 946 F.2d at 403-08.
599
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the new plan. By January 1990, McGann had exhausted the $5000 limit
on coverage for his-illness.298
In August 1989, McGann sued H & H Music, alleging that the
company discriminated against him in violation of both prohibitions of
ERISA section 5 10.299 He claimed the coverage limitation for AIDS-
related expenses was directed specifically at him in retaliation for
exercising his rights under the plan and for the purpose of interfering
with the attainment of a right to which he was entitled as a beneficiary
under the plan. The employer, conceding the factual allegations of
McGann's complaint, moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment, reasoning management had an absolute right
to alter the terms of the plan, regardless of intent."0 The district court
also held that "even if the issue of discrimination motive were relevant,
summary judgment would still be proper because the [employer's] motive
was to ensure the future existence of the plan and not specifically to
retaliate against McGann .... 301
In sustaining the lower court, the Fifth Circuit noted that, at trial,
McGann would bear the burden of proving the existence of the employ-
er's discriminatory intent as an element of each of his claims. McGann
conceded the reduction in AIDS benefits will apply equally to all
employees filing AIDS-related claims and the effect of this reduction will
not be felt only by him. McGann did not allege the company's reduction
had any purpose other than to reduce costs. 30 2 Consequently, McGann
could not make the showing necessary to establish that management had
a specific intent to retaliate against him.3 3
298 Id. at 403.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 404.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 403-04.
303 The burden of proof may be insurmountable for an employee. In section
510 actions, courts put the burden on the employee to prove that the employer
had a specific intent either: (1) to retaliate against the employee for exercising
rights under an existing plan, see, e.g., Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889
F.2d 869, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814 (1990); or (2) to
interfere with the employee's attainment of any right to which he or she may
have become entitled, see, e.g., Disterv. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108,
1111 (2d Cir. 1988). Arguably, section 510 should be amended to eliminate the
requirement that the employee prove the employer's specific intent to single out
the employee. If section 510 is amended, the focus could return to the issue of
fair discrimination based on a sound actuarial basis and equal treatment of all
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Because the reduction in AIDS coverage affected all employees and
because there was no evidence that McGann was ever promised that the
$1 million policy limit was permanent, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
McGann could not prove that he was entitled to a higher cap or that he
was the victim of personal retaliation.3 The Fifth Circuit refused to
hold that section 510 prohibits any discrimination in the alteration of an
employee benefit plan that results in an identifiable employee or group
of employees being treated differently than other employees. Instead, the
court held that:
[S]ection [510] does not prohibit welfare plan discrimination between
or among categories of diseases. Section 510 does not mandate that if
some, or most, or virklly all catastrophic illnesses are covered, AIDS
(or any other particular catastrophic illness) must be among them. It
does not prohibit an employer from electing not to cover or continue to
cover AIDS, while covering or continuing to cover other catastrophic
illnesses, even though the employer's decision in this respect may stem
from some "prejudice" against AIDS or its victims generally. The same,
of course, is true of any other disease and its victims. That sort of
"discrimination" is simply not addressed by section 510.305
Thus, McGann creates a safe haven with wide leeway for employers to
limit exposure to claims by employees with high medical costs." 6
Based on the McGann opinion and the foregoing discussion, the
limitations of ERISA in addressing future issues arising from genetic
testing and the use of genetic information in designing employee benefit
plans can be summarized as follows. First, unlike the states' legisla-
tion,3" 7 ERISA does not establish any requirements regarding insurance
employees. Regarding retaliation, see Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d
1473, 1482-84 (4th Cir.) (holding that ERISA section 510 does not preclude an
employer from revoking gratuitous benefits unless it is substantially motivated
by an improper intent to retaliate rather than by legitimate business consider-
ations), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 54 (1996).304 McGann, 946 F.2d at 404-05.
305 Id. at 408. The holding was based on earlier authority. See Aronson v.
Servus Rubber, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.) ("A termination [of benefits] that cuts
along independently established lines... and that has a readily apparent business
justification, demonstrates no invidious intent."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017
(1984).
'06 Freudenheim, supra note 285, at A24.
307 See infra Part IV.C. 1 (notes 391-422 and accompanying text).
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underwriting or insurance coverages for employee health care plans.
Second, only ERISA, and not state insurance regulation, applies to
employer self-funded plans. This situation creates a regulation-free
vacuum. Courts give self-funded employers a hands-off liberty of action
in the creation, alteration, and termination of their employee benefit
plans."' Employers can either refuse to provide health insurance, lower
the monetary limits for health insurance, or terminate some or all health
coverages. 09 As a consequence, all future state insurance/genetic
legislation is of no consequence to employers who can self-insure. Since
this ERISA "opt-out option" makes all state insurance regulation
ineffective and irrelevant, a national rectifying law seems imperative.
Third, ERISA does provide protection prohibiting the firing of employees
to remove them from the insurance pool even if the firing is financially
motivated to reduce health insurance costs.3"' Fourth, ERISA section
308 The Fifth Circuit explained: "If a federal court could prevent an employer
from reducing an employee's coverage limits for AIDS treatment once the
employee contracted AIDS, the boundaries of judicial involvement in the
creation, alteration or termination of ERISA plans would be sorely tested."
McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
309 In addition to McGann, other courts have so held. See, e.g., Owens v.
Storehouse, Inc. 773 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that a unilateral
modification of existing employee plan to provide a $25,000 cap on AIDS
coverage does not state a section 510 cause of action), aff'd, 984 F.2d 394
(1993).
3'0 ERISA section 510 was held in the following cases to proscribe
employers from discharging employees to avoid paying health insurance or to
reduce health coverage costs. Seamanv. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546-
47 (lth Cir.) (holding that section 510 is violated when an employee is
discharged for failing to accept an employer's requirement that she become an
independent contractor with concurrent loss of health and other employee
benefits), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 916 (1993); Kloss v. Western Elec. Co., 701
F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the employee "by alleging that he
was discharged for the purpose of depriving him of continued participation in
Western Electric's company-provided life and medical insuranceplans... stated
a claim cognizable under section 510 of ERISA"); Zipf v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 799 F.2d 889, 894 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that an employee stated a section
510 claim by alleging that her employer fired her to prevent her from obtaining
disability benefits as a result of her rheumatoid arthritis; the employee was fired
one day before she would have been entitled to disability payments); Zimmerman
v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that the
firing of an employee on medical leave while her health insurance application
was pending evidences the requisite discriminatory intent to establish a prima
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510 requires only that an employer's plan treat all employees equally.
That opens the door for genetic testing and the use of genetic information
by employers. Since equal treatment is said to authorize fair discrimina-
tion in the interest of all employees, coverage caps and limitations for
specific diseases, illnesses, or treatments are not permitted unless an
employer could actuarially justify classifying the treatment of a disease
or illness or medical condition differently from other diseases, illnesses,
or medical conditions. Thus, employers could use genetic data to
demonstrate a sound actuarial justification for the unequal treatment of
employees regarding their health insurance benefits. 3 ' Finally, perhaps
some or all of these ERISA limitations may be addressed and solved by
other federal laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.312 Unfortunately, that is generally not the case. Although one
might think the ADA's protection of handicapped employees might alter
the effect of ERISA's preemption provisions on employer self-insured
plans, the ADA's legislative history evidences otherwise.
Section 501(c)(3) [of the ADA] is designed to clarify that self-insured
plans, which are currently governed by the preemption provision of
[ERISA], are still governed by that preemption provision and are not
facie case under section 510 of ERISA), aff'd, 72 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1995);
Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 904-05 (W.D. Mich. 1987)
(holding that prima facie section 510 case established where a company chose to
close one of its two plants; pension expenses were considerably more at the
closed plant than the other plant); Folz v. Marriott, 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1010
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that Marriott violated employee's ERISA rights by
discharging the employee shortly after it was informed that the employee
suffered from multiple sclerosis; plaintiff was fired "to avoid the economic
consequences that would result due to his continued participation in [Marriott's
self-insured medical plan]").
31 However, retaliation without actuarial justification is actionable. See
Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1484 (4th Cir.) (holding that
termination of existing benefits that the employer has no contractual obligation
to continue providing can be actionable under section 510 if there is no actuarial
justification and the employer was motivated by improper intent to retaliate),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 54 (1996). Discrimination under the anti-retaliation
provision of section 510 is not limited to disparate treatment of similarly situated
people but also includes any adverse action taken against a plan participant or
beneficiary that is motivated by a specific intent to retaliate against that person
for exercising ERISA rights. The retaliation in question need not substantially
affect ongoing employment relations between the parties. Id.
312 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II 1994). See infra Part IV.B.2 (notes
315-90 and accompanying text).
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subject to state insurance laws.... Until the preemption provision of
ERISA is modified, these self-insured plans are subject to state law only
to the extent determined by the courts in their interpretation of ERISA's
preemption provision. Of course, under the ADA, the provisions of
these plans must conform with the requirements of ERISA, just as the
provisions of other plans must be based on or not inconsistent with state
[insurance] law. 1 3
One piecemeal solution is to amend ERISA to permit states to mandate
health care benefits that employers must provide under both commercial
group insurance plans and employer self-insured plans. 4
2. ADA: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 1990, the ADA315
requires equal opportunity in employment, public accommodations, public
services, transportation, and telecommunications for the estimated forty-
three million Americans with disabilities 6.3 1  The ADA "will ensure
313 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 71 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 494. "Concerns had been raised that [ADA] Sections
501(c)(1) and (2) could be interpreted as affecting the preemption provision of
ERISA. The Committee does not intend such an implication." Id.
314 Since the federal government does not presently require minimum
universal health care coverages, all employees and their families would be
protected by an ERISA amendment expanding the saving clause and redefining
the deemer clause to include all employee health insurance benefit plans.
In other words, in the absence of federal regulations establishing
minimum requirements for employee health care plans, federal law
[should] remove the obstacles which stand in the way of states that want
to ensure decisions affecting health care for all workers are made with
due concern for the public interest. Therefore, ERISA should be
amended to allow states to mandate the health care benefits employers
provide under group insurance plans and risk retention plans.
Widiss & Gostin, supra note 252, at 654.
315 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
328, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). According to the ADA, as the
demographics of society change and the average age of a citizen increases, so too
does the number of Americans with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1) (1994).
316 The ADA's purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." Id. § 12101(b)(1). The Act is divided into four titles: Title I, Employment;
Title II, Public Services; Title Im, Public Accommodations and Services Offered
604 [VOL. 85
1996-971 INSURANCE/GENETIC FAIR/UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 605
.... [i]ndependence, freedom of choice, control of their lives, [and] the
opportunity to blend fully and equally into the right mosaic of the
American mainstream.""3 7 The ADA seeks to provide individuals with
disabilities with protection similar to that provided by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,318 which prohibits discrimination in employment based
upon race, color, religion, and national origin.31 9
The ADA, however, generally fails to prohibit genetic discrimina-
tion and specifically relegates authority to the states regarding insur-
ance/genetic issues. Thus, the scope of this portion of the Article is
limited to establishing to what extent, if any, the ADA regulates the
use of genetic tests and genetic information in employment and in
employee health insurance plans. In the spirit of the McCarran Act,320
the ADA's insurance exemption, section 50 1(c), 321 primarily leaves
insurance regulation to the states. The ADA, surprisingly, avoids
insurance discrimination issues by adopting the status quo of convention-
al risk underwriting based on legitimate actuarial support by commercial
insurers and self-insured employers. These traditional, customary
insurance practices in underwriting, classifying, and administering
risks generally do not constitute prohibited discrimination under the
by Private Entities; Title IV, Miscellaneous Provisions. The ADA became
effective on a staggered basis. It applied to employers with 25 or more
employees as of July 26, 1992, and to employers with 15 or more employees as
of July 26, 1994.
317 President Bush: Let the Shameful Wall of Exclusion Finally Come
Tumbling Down, in WORKLiFE, Fall 1990, 9, 10 (transcript of oral remarks at
ceremony accompanying signing of ADA on July 26, 1990).
318 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-350, 78 Stat. 241 (amendedby
86 Stat. 103 (1972), 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
319 The ADA extends the coverage of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-122, 87 Stat. 355 (amended by 92 Stat. 2984 (1978))
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The Vocational
Rehabilitation Act covered only the federal government as an employer, federal
contractors and subcontractors, and recipients of federal grants and funds. See
also 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (giving definitions that apply to Vocational
Rehabilitation Act). As with most legislation that attempts to change long-
standing societal norms, the Vocational RehabilitationAct was somewhat limited
in scope.
320 See supra Part IV.A (notes 218-38 and accompanying text).
321 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
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ADA,322 so long as the insurance benefit plan is not used as a "sub-
terfuge" to evade the ADA.323 Moreover, because neither the ADA, nor
its regulations, mention genetic discrimination, serious problems
arise regarding whether the ADA's definition of "disability" covers
genetic conditions.324 In sum: "Of all the areas of the employment
relationship in which individuals with disabilities face major obsta-
cles, health insurance is the area in which the ADA offers the least
protection." '325
322 The term "discriminate" in the employment context includes several
prohibited activities. Genetic discrimination may be covered by the prohibition
against "using qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability"
unless they are shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994). There are six other prohibited activities. First
is "limiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or employee in a way that
adversely affects the opportunities or status of [the] applicant or employee
because of [that person's disability]." Id. § 12112(b)(1). Second is "participating
in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of
subjecting a... qualified applicant or employee with a disability" to discrimina-
tion prohibited by the ADA. Id. § 12112(b)(2) ("includes a relationship with an
employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe
benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing
training and apprenticeship programs"). Third is using "standards, criteria, or
methods of administration... that have the effect of discrimination on the basis
of disability[ ] or... that perpetuatethe discrimination of others who are subject
to common administrative control." Id. § 12112(b)(3). Fourth is "excluding or
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the
known disability of an individual with whom the qualified person is known to
have a relationship or association." Id. § 12112(b)(4). Fifth is failing to make
reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can show undue hardship or
denying employment opportunities because of the need for reasonable accommo-
dation. Id. § 12112(b)(5). The last is failing to conduct employment tests in the
most effective manner to ensure that they test what they purport to test. Id. §
12112(b)(7).
323 See infra Part IV.B.2.b (notes 357-90 and accompanying text).
324 In reviewing the ADA (as well as other federal and state statutes), the
Office of Technology Assessment concluded that the ADA and other statutes
neither prohibit nor effectively address genetic discrimination. CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING
AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE 15-17, OTA-BA-455 (1990).
325 Rothstein, supra note 286, at 79. The best scholarship on this topic is id.
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a. Genetic Conditions and
the ADA Definition of Disability
In determining whether an insurance plan violates the ADA, the first
step is to ascertain if the insurance plan makes a disability-based
distinction.326 With regard to genetic discrimination, the question is
whether the use of employees' genetic data for insurance risk classifica-
tion and underwriting purposes constitutes a disability-based distinction.
The two ADA titles that pertain to this question are Title I concerning
"employment" and Title III regarding "public accommodations." Title I
regulates employment relationships and prohibits employers from
discriminating against any qualified individual with a disability.327
Specifically, section 102(a) provides: "No covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment. 328 Since employee health care benefits are an employment term,
condition, or privilege to which a person with a disability is entitled, an
employer may not discriminate in offering health care benefits.3 29 Title
I prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual with a
disability based on the employer's concern that its insurance does not
cover injuries or accidents that may happen to the individual, or based on
concern that the costs of insurance to the employer will increase because
of the individual. Moreover, under Title III, concerning access to
services, an insurer similarly "may not refuse to insure, or refuse to
continue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage
available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same
coverage solely because of [an individual's] physical or mental impair-
ment. ,,.330 For instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity
at 79-83 (discussing coverage of employees with a genetic condition, coverage
of genetic conditions, and health insurance and discrimination).326 EEOC Issues Guidance on ADA andInsurance, 1993 Daily Lab. Rep. 109
(BNA) § AA (June 9, 1993). These EEOC guidelines are more thoroughly
considered at infra notes 347-53 and accompanying text.
327 42 U.S.C § 12112(a) (1994).
328 Id.
329 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1996) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of disability in regard to fringe benefits whether or not they are adminis-
tered by the covered entity).
330 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1989), reprinted in 1990
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Commission ("EEOC") opines that the ADA would probably prohibit an
employer from setting grossly unequal insurance policy limits, or
financial caps, of $5000 a year for treatment of AIDS and $100,000 a
year for other physical conditions.33" ' In addition, because an insurance
office is considered a public accommodation, a person with a disability
is protected from discrimination even when seeking insurance without
employer assistance. 32 Nonetheless, the bottom-line problem is that
neither the ADA nor its regulations specifically mention genetic issues,
such as genetic screening, genetic disease, or genetic discrimination. The
"subterfuge" provision,333 considered in the next subsection, might
provide relief for genetic-disability insurance discrimination.
In order to employ the ADA to fight genetic discrimination, one must
first demonstrate that genetic conditions are disabilities under the ADA.
Due to the uncertainty of the ADA's definition of "disability" as applied
to "genetic conditions," the ADA neither directly prohibits nor effectively
addresses genetic discrimination in insurance. For instance, because the
ADA does not apply to discrimination based on an employee's genetic
profile, employers apparently can discriminate without ADA restriction
against an employee with a genetic disability so long as that disability has
caused no "impairment." Under the ADA's definition, an individual has
a "disability, 334 if that individual: (1) "has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
the individual;" (2) "has a record of such an impairment;"335 or (3) "is
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420.
331 This policy is a direct response to McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA does not prohibit employers from
modifying benefits and placing explicit coverage limits on certain conditions,
such as AIDS). For a full description of McGann, see supra notes 296-306 and
accompanying text.
332 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182 (1994).
333 See infra Part IV.B.2.b (notes 357-90 and accompanying text).
334 Id. § 12102(2). The term "qualified individual with a disability" means
a person "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." Id. § 12111(8). One of the important components of the ADA is the
broad definition of a disabled person, which includes people who suffer
discrimination because of past disabilities that no longer exist, id. § 12102(2)(B),
or because of the perceptions and attitudes of others, id. § 12102(2)(C).
33' Record of impairment means that the person "has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1996). This second
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regarded as having such an impairment." The key word in this three-
prong definition is "impairment." An impairment is a physiological
disorder, whether physical or mental,336 including presently expressed
genetic diseases.337 Beyond expressed genetic diseases, there is uncer-
tainty as to ADA coverage of genetic conditions. For instance, the impair-
ment definition appears to exclude genetic markers and traits.338 More-
over, the EEOC explains that the ADA impairment definition "does not
include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease."339 Addition-
ally, it is unclear whether a person would be considered to have a
disability based on a genetic test that shows an increased risk of genetic
disease, illness, or other condition, but not a definitive diagnosis that she
or he will get the disease, illness, or condition. In the early 1990s, the
EEOC took the position that the ADA did not cover an asymptomatic
individual. 340 In fact, the "EEOC also ... specifically rejected efforts
definitional prong protects people with a history of heart disease, cancer, or
mental illness, who often suffer discrimination many years after their recovery.
However, genetic conditions or defects that fluctuate, such as acute intermittent
porphyria, would probably not be covered.
336 The ADA regulations define physical or mental impairment as "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskele-
tal, specific sense organs, .. .and endocrine; or..... [a]ny mental or psycholog-
ical disorder ...... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1996).
331 Muscular dystrophy, an X-linked genetic disorder, and multiple sclerosis,
a disease with a genetic component, are cited as covered impairments in ADA
legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333. However, "minor" currently expressedgenetic conditions
- eye color, weight, height, muscle tone, and so forth - may not be covered
unless they substantially limit a "major life activity," which is defined as
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i)
(1996).
338 As an Office of Technology Assessment report notes: "Whether a genetic
marker or a trait constitutes an 'impairment' under [the] ADA is unclear."
GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 324, at
16.
39 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 app. (1992).
340 Neil A. Holtzman & Mark A. Rothstein, Eugenics and Genetic Discrimi-
nation, 50 AM. J. HuM. GENETICS 457, 458 (1992) (citing letter from R.
Blumenthal, Acting Director of Communications and Legislative Affairs, EEEO,
to Bob Wise, Chair, House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice
and Agriculture, Nov. 22, 1991).
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by the National Institutes of Health-Department of Energy Joint Working
Group on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues to interpret the ADA as
prohibiting genetic discrimination and as proscribing mandatory genetic
testing at employee's placement examinations. 341
In March 1995, however, the EEOC reversed its position and issued
a new compliance manual that classified individuals with a genetic
susceptibility to disease as individuals with an asymptomatic illness. In
other words, the EEOC now classifies carriers of genetic defects as
individuals with a disability under the ADA.3
42
Coverage under the ADA will, however, vary depending on the
specific nature of the genetic condition. Only physical or mental
impairments that substantially limit a major life activity are covered as
disabilities under the ADA.3 43 If an individual has a genetic disorder that
is already expressed, and the individual has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, then the
individual is covered under the first prong of the ADA's three-pronged
definition. If an individual carries the gene for a disease that will
definitely develop, such as Huntington's disease, but which has not yet
expressed itself, ADA coverage is problematic. Even though the ADA
does not directly address this issue and, thus, may not prohibit discrimi-
nation against carriers, such an individual might be covered under either
of two theories. First, individuals might be considered to be "already
impaired" because they are limited in their ability to freely procreate,"
which may be considered a major life activity.345 Second, the ADA
arguably may cover carriers of late onset, unexpressed genetic conditions
14, Id. (citing E. Juengst, Priorities in Professional Ethics and Social Policy
for Human Genetics, 266 JAMA 1835 (1991)).
342 See, e.g., RickWeiss, Gene Discrimination in Workplace; EEOC Says Job
Can 't Be DeniedBased on Predisposition to Disease, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1995,
atA3.
343 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
344 "Because there is no treatment or cure for Huntington's disease (HD), and
there is a 50% chance a child of an infected individual will also get HD,
individuals with HD are counseled to refrain from having children." MERCK
MANUAL 1363 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 15th ed. 1987).
3"5 EEOC regulations provide: "Other impairments, however, such as HIV
infection, are inherently substantially limiting." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20). Reproduc-
tion is considered to be a major life function. Because HIV-positive individuals
should abstain from unprotected sexual contact due to the manner in which the
AIDS virus is transmitted, their ability to procreate is circumscribed and, thus,
they suffer from an impairment that is substantially limiting.
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because individuals who are excluded from employment because of future
health risks are "regarded as" having a disability. Thus, they may be
protected under the ADA's third prong of the definition of "disabili-
ty.,
3 46
The 1995 guidelines issued by the EEOC state that "the definition of
the term 'disability,' therefore, is designed to protect against myths, fears,
stereotypes, and other attitudinal barriers ... but [is] not limited to
'concerns about productivity, safety, insurance, liability .... ' "347 The
directive declares that the "issue is whether the employer treats the
individuals as having an impairment that substantially limits major life
activities. 3 48 Accordingly, "'t]he perception of the covered entity is
a key element of this test. ' '3 49 A victim of discrimination need not
show that the employer's perception is inaccurate compared to how other
individuals and.organizations treat the employee.350
Importantly, the EEOC guidelines provide an example of genetic
discrimination covered by the definition of disability:
CP's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to colon cancer.
CP is currently asymptomatic and may never in fact develop colon
cancer. After making CP a conditional offer of employment, R learns
about CP's increased susceptibility to colon cancer. R then withdraws
the job offerbecause of concerns about matters such as CP's productivi-
ty, insurance costs, and attendance. R is treating CP as having an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly,
CP is covered by the third part of the definition of "disability.
351
Robert Silverstein, an assistant to Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), who
sponsored the ADA, explains that "'t]his interpretation doesn't get into
the issue of discrimination, only whether you can make the claim. It can
get you into court to make the claim.'"352 According to Dr. Paul
Billings, a prominent geneticist at Stanford University School of Medicine
346 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
117 2 EEOC Compl. Man. § 902.8, at 5325 (CCH 1995) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990)).
348 Id.
349 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990)).
350 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990)).
31t Id. at 5326.
352 Reginald Rhein, Federal Disability Law Bans Genetic Discrimination,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, May 1, 1995, at 6, available in 1995 WL
2196533, at *1 (quoting Robert Silverstein).
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and a strong opponent of genetic discrimination, the ADA does not
adequately protect people. Characterizing the ADA's definition of
disability as inherently flawed, Dr. Billings explains:
"The ADA was constructed for people with basically phenotypic
[expressed] disabilities who had a long history of discrimination, and to
redress that problem.... We are now diluting those people's interests
with a large number of people who conceivably will argue that they are
being perceived... as disabled even though they only have a gene for
colon cancer, breast cancer, or Alzheimer's dementia, whatever the gene
of the week is .... I don't think we should offer protections to people
with [disease-prone] genesthrough disability [legislation] .... Most...
people are normal with genes for colon cancer.. . . We should be
fighting their perception as disabled, we shouldn't be codifying it in
law.... I think that's a very substantial problem." '353
Discrimination against those with disabilities in employment settings
has often involved the use of questions aimed at discovering the existence
of a disability. The presence of health-related questions, similar to those
found on health questionnaires used by physicians on patients' first visits,
exemplifies this discrimination. The employment applicant is asked to
note whether she has experienced any of a laundry list of medical
conditions, such as high blood pressure, heart disease, or diabetes.
Despite the lack of a correlation between an individual's health and the
individual's ability to perform a specific job, these methods have long
been used to exclude individuals with disabilities from the workplace.3 54
Because the ADA prohibits medical examinations as part of the job
application process,355 employers are now commonly requiring medical
313 Id. at *2-3 (quoting Dr. Paul Billings).
311 Mello, supra note 289, at 76 & n.20.
311 The ADA precludes the use of medical information in any initial hiring
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (1994). A job applicant cannot be asked if he
or she suffers from a disability, id. § 12112(d)(2)(A), and no medical examina-
tion can be made before an offer is extended, id. § 12112(d)(3)(A). The job
applicant can be asked if he or she can perform job-related functions. Id. §
12112(d)(2)(B). If the applicant answers, "No. I cannot perform those tasks," the
ADA is unclear as to whether the employer can ask why. Anyone giving a
reference faces the same dilemma. This dilemma, as well as problems arising
from partial concealment, is explored by Professor Richard Epstein. Epstein,
supra note 5, at 13-18 ("Currently, our policy... is a variation of the policy
'don't ask, don't tell,' or, more accurately for this case, 'can't ask, don't tell.'
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examinations after conditional job offers are made. According to the
EEOC's assistant legal counsel, an employer's concerns about a particular
condition found in a post-offer medical examination are insufficient
reason to withdraw the offer. However, withdrawal of the offer may not
be illegal if the employer can show another - legal - reason, for
instance, that another person seeking the job is more qualified. The
abuses of genetic testing presently outnumber its uses, according to Dr.
Billings, who said, "'I only wish the remedy for people who are being
discriminated against now would be simpler.... They have to basically
be able to have reasonable belief that discrimination that they suffered
arose from genetic information, which is very difficult to prove at times,
and the whole ADA-EEOC process is cumbersome.' ,356
b. ADA Section 501(c) Exempts Insurance and
Recognizes the Primacy of State Insurance Regulation
Given that health insurance is a nationally divisive political issue,
357
Congress, in enacting the ADA, decided via section 501(c) to continue
the status quo of state regulation of health insurance and other insurance
programs. Insurers and entities that administer employee-benefit plans are
given the same traditional insurer rights to underwrite, classify, and
administer risks that existed prior to the ADA. Specifically, section
501(c) exempts insurance companies and employers,35 and does not
This surely is the position with respect to disabilities that are now coveredby the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)." Id. at 13).
... Rhein, supra note 352, at *2 (quoting Dr. Paul Billings).
317 See generally Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy in the 1980"s,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608, 608-18 (1986) (discussing the political context
within which risking health care costs must be viewed). The ADA apparently
would have lost political support if it had made sweeping changes regarding
health insurance.
358 Subsection one of section 501(c) exempts insurers, subsection two
exempts employers, and subsection three continues the ERISA preemption by
recognizing the right of self-insured employers to be exempt from state insurance
law. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) provides:
Subchapters I through mH of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict -
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, [HMO], or
any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or adminis-
tering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
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limit their ability to underwrite, classify, or administer risks under health
insurance plans provided the insurance benefit plans and insurance
programs are based on or consistent with state insurance law and are not
utilized as a subterfuge359 to circumvent the intent of the ADA.
Notwithstanding section 501(c), an insurance company is a public
entity and, accordingly, should be covered under the full provisions of the
ADA. Since an insurance office, for instance, is considered a public
accommodation, a disabled person has ADA protection from discrimina-
tion even when applying for health insurance without employer assis-
tance.36 Whereas employers are subject to Title I, Title II should
govern insurers and self-insured employers involved in the creation,
alteration, capping, and termination of health insurance plans.
In a recent decision, Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Association, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that a self-funded medical reimbursement plan could be subject to Title
III, which prohibits barring an individual, on the basis of disability, the
opportunity to benefit from a service provider who operates a place of
public accommodation.361 In Carparts, a participating member and a
covered employee brought an action against an association and its self-
insured health plan challenging the plan's $25,000 limitation on health
law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a
bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a
bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate
insurance.
... Section 501 (c) concludes by providing that "[p]aragraphs (1), (2), and (3)
[of subsection (c)] shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
subchapter I and III of this chapter." Id.
360 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (defining "public accommodation"to include an
insurance office); id. § 12182 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the services of a public accommoda-
tion).
361 Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler'sAss'n, 37 F.3d 12,
20 (1st Cir. 1994) (A self-funded medical plan limited benefits after a member
suffering from AIDS submitted claims. "[P]lace or accommodation" was read to
include the "substance of what is being offered," not merely physical structures
for people to enter.).
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coverage for AIDS in contrast to a $1,000,000 lifetime cap for other
conditions. Plaintiff claimed that this disparate AIDS cap constituted
illegal disability discrimination under the ADA. The federal district court
dismissed the claim because neither the association nor the plan was an
"employer" or a "public accommodation" under the ADA. Taking
guidance from Title VII opinions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
First Circuit reversed and held that the lower court had taken too narrow
a view of the ADA. Discussing Title I of the ADA, the First Circuit
noted that "public accommodations" are not necessarily limited to "actual
physical structures., 362 Although acknowledging that a claim under
Title I "may be a less promising vehicle" than a claim under Title I for
AIDS-infected plaintiffs, the court held that "services" may properly be
within the ambit of public accommodations.363
Discrimination, such as that in Carparts, against an insured by a self-
funded medical reimbursement plan would presumably have an actuarial,
and thus legal, basis under the ADA. By not addressing insurance issues
relating to genetic testing and discrimination and by not otherwise
restricting insurers and similar entities in underwriting, classifying, or
administering risks, the ADA provides little, if any, assured guidance or
solutions for future insurance/genetic problems. The critical points
regarding section 501(c) include: (1) the ADA fails to provide a uniform
approach to insurance/genetic discrimination issues by deferring to
hundreds of non-uniform state health insurance laws and regulations;3"
and (2) the ADA accepts and continues the traditional insurance concept
of fair discrimination based on sound actuarial principles.365
Under the ADA, it is not illegal for a health insurer or an employer
to alter, limit, or cap insurance coverage or to charge higher rates for
genetically-based conditions, provided state law is not violated and such
action is not a subterfuge to evade the ADA. Under section 501(c), an
insurer or employer may fairly discriminate based on classification of
362 Id. at 19.
3163 Id. at 20.
'6' For instance, a 1991 study reported that almost 1000 state laws mandate
coverage of discrete health services or medical conditions. Tally of Mandated
Benefits Nears 1000, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8 (citing data
compiled by the Health Benefits Letter based in Alexandria, Va.). Most of these
mandates concern home health care, maternity, alcoholism, drug abuse, mental
health, outpatient surgery, and nursing home benefits. For a more extensive
catalogue of state mandates and insurance/geneticlaws, see infra Part IV.C. 1.-2.a
(notes 391-533 and accompanying text).
365 See supra Part II.A (notes 68-93 and accompanying text).
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risks by refusing to insure, limiting insurance coverage, or charging a rate
differential, so long as such choices are justified by sound actuarial
principles.366 A House Committee Report explained that if an insurance
benefit plan is based on sound actuarial principles, the amount, extent, or
kind of coverage available to an individual can be limited.3 67 The basic
principle is that section 501(c) is intended to require that "[e]mployees
with disabilities ... be given equal access to whatever insurance or
benefit plans the employer provides. 3 68 Across-the-board coverage
366 Employers may, for instance, create as well as change the terms of a bona
fide benefit plan based on sound actuarial data. Thus, an employer may be able
to charge a different premium to an individual with a disability for the identical
coverage provided to other employees if the decision is based on customary
actuarial principles or related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience. See
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989) (discussing legal discrimination in the same
language used by the House of Representatives (see infra note 367)).
367 The report states that a plan may limit coverage, but that:
[T]he plan [may] not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure,
or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage solely
because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal,
limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or
is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
For example, a blind person may not be denied coverage based on
blindness independent o[f] actuarial risk classification.
H.R. Rae. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 420.
368 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, A Technical Assistance
Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, at VII-8 (1992) [hereinafter Technical Assistance Manual on Employ-
ment Provisions ofADA]. A House Committee on Education and Labor Report
explains that "employers may not deny insurance coverage completely to a
person based on that person's diagnosis or disability [but] it is permissible for
an employer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures
or treatments" [e.g., a limit on the extent of kidney dialysis, whether dialysis will
be covered at all, or a limit on the amount of blood transfusions or whether
transfusions will be covered]. Id. It would not be permissible, however, to deny
coverage to individuals, such as people with kidney disease or hemophilia, who
are affected by such limits, for other procedures or treatments connected with
their disability. It would also not be permissible to deny coverage to such
individuals for other conditions not connectedwith such limitations on coverage,
such as treatment for a broken leg or heart surgery. While "limitation may be
placed on reimbursements for a procedure or the types of drugs or procedures
covered,... that limitation must apply to persons with or without disabilities.
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limitations, exceptions, and exclusions applicable to all plan participants
are permissible even though they may adversely affect people with
disabilities. Lifetime or yearly financial caps applying equally to all plan
participants are legal. For instance, a plan that sets a maximum lifetime
benefit of $1,000,000 or a yearly limit of $25,000 does not violate the
ADA.
A second fundamental principle is that "[a]n employer cannot fire or
refuse to hire an individual with a disability because [its] current health
insurance plan does not cover the individual's disability, or because the
individual may increase the employer's future health care costs."3 69 A
third and final principle is that "[a]n employer cannot deny insurance to
an individual with a disability or subject [him] to different insurance
terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the disability
does not pose increased insurance risks. 370
In sum, section 501(c) is intended to afford to insurers and employers
the same opportunities they would enjoy in the absence of this
legislation to design and administer insurance products and benefit plans
in a manner that is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk
classification. This legislation assures that decisions concerning the
insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based on bona fide
risk classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination
requirements. Without such a clarification, this legislation could
arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by an insurer
or employer which treats disabled persons differently under an insurance
All people with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance
coverage that is provided by the employer to all employees." H.R. REP. No. 101-
485, pt. 2, at 59, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, at 341.
369 Technical Assistance Manual on Employment Provisions of ADA, supra
note 368, at VII-9. An example is Finley v. Cowles Business Media, No. 93 Civ.
5051 (PKL), 1994 WL 273336, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1994). An employee,
Finley, one month on the job, was fired only a few weeks after he completed a
life insurance application revealing his heart condition. Id. at * 1. In an ADA
action, that evidence was sufficient to withstand summary judgment because a
reasonablejury could find that the employer learned of the heart disease and then
fired Finley so it would not be liable for expensive treatment under its health
insurance plan. Id. at *3.
370 Technical Assistance Manual on Employment Provisions of ADA, supra
note 368, at VII-8. Also, an employer cannot execute a contract or agreement
that would have the same effect. Id.
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or benefit plan because they represent an increased hazard of death or
illness.37 '
Notwithstanding this permissible disability-based benefits discrimina-
tion, the ADA may provide relief for insurance-related genetic discrimi-
nation when the disability-based distinction resulting in disparate
insurance benefits is being used as a subterfuge to circumvent the intent
of the ADA. Even though the ADA permits insurers and employers to
refuse insurance coverage, limit insurance coverages, or charge a different
actuarially-sound premium based on a person's disability, they cannot
engage in insurance practices as a subterfuge to evade the ADA's
purposes. What conduct, practices, and policies will be held to constitute
a subterfuge is an open question. Neither the ADA nor the EEOC
regulations explain what actions constitute subterfuge.
372
In 1993, however, the EEOC issued its first formal guidance
regarding the relationship between the ADA and employer-provided
insurance.373 The complex document, described as "interim enforcement
guidance," took effect June 8, 1993, and generally declares that the ADA
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of disability in
employee health insurance plans.
In applying this EEOC policy to ascertain if an employer-provided
insurance plan violates the ADA, one must address three issues. First is
whether the plan makes a "disability-based distinction."374 On the one
hand, the guidelines permit employers to make very broad distinctions.
For example, an employer may elect reduced coverage for mental and
371 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 137-38 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 420-21.
372 See, e.g., Health Insurance: ADA's Effect on Plans Remains Puzzle
Attorney Says, 19 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 824 (May 18, 1992) ("Pre-existing
condition clauses and other restrictions may not be used as 'a subterfuge' to
evade the purposes of the act .... In other words, employers and insurance
companies may be liable under the ADA if policy exclusions are not in line with
valid risk-assessment principles.") (description of District of Columbia Bar
Seminar presentation by attorney Jonathan Mook on May 12, 1992); Kimberly
A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring Americans with Disabilities: How Far Can
Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1189-99
(1991) (discussing definition of "subterfuge" and determination of to what
employment practices it applies).
13 EEOC Issues Guidance on ADA and Insurance (June 9, 1993), supra note
326.
374 Id.
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nervous conditions or for eye care. Such broad distinctions are not
distinctions based on disability because they apply to all people, with or
without disabilities, and to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar
conditions. Moreover, an employer does not violate the ADA by
generally refusing to cover experimental drugs and treatments since such
distinctions are not based on disability and may affect people with
different diseases and conditions. On the other hand, a disability-based
distinction occurs when a discrete disability is singled out. An employer
may not, for instance, set a lower level of benefits for a specific
disability, such as AIDS, or a discrete group of disabilities, such as
cancer. The guidelines show that an employer makes a disability-based
distinction by setting unequal policy limits of $5000 a year for AIDS
treatment and $100,000 a year for other physical conditions.375
If a disability-based distinction exists, then two issues arise as the
burden of proof shifts to the employer. The employer must prove that: (1)
it has a bona fide plan37 6 and (2) the disability-based distinction at issue
is not being used as a subterfuge to circumvent the ADA.377 The
employer must prove that the disability-based disparate treatment is
justified by the risks or costs associated with the disability. In other
words, the ADA gives an employer a chance to demonstrate a legitimate
business or insurance justification for the distinction. Although an
employer can rely on costs and on legitimate actuarial data for making a
disability-based distinction, the employer also may have to produce
evidence to support its decision to show that other alternatives are not
available."' An employer who, for example, asserts that it restricted
37- EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health Insurance,
1993 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 109 § E, E-2 (June 9, 1993). This policy is a direct
response to McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that ERISA does not prohibit employers from modifying benefits and placing
explicit coverage limits on certain conditions, such as AIDS). For a full
description of McGann, see supra notes 296-306 and accompanying text.
176 This burden of proof can be easily satisfied. An employer need only prove
that the plan exists and pays benefits, and that the plan's terms were accurately
communicated to the covered employees. Id. at E-3.
377 Id.
378 The EEOC has established a non-exclusive list of potential justifications.
These justifications include assertions that the health insurance plan actually
treats all similar catastrophic conditions in the same way, the disability-based
disparate treatment is attributable to the application of customary risk classifica-
tion and underwriting procedures to the increased risks of the disability, and the
specific treatment has no medical value - it does not cure, slow deterioration,
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coverage of certain disabilities to avoid a large increase in insurance
premiums or to avoid insolvency of its plan is required to prove that its
management evaluated alternative ways to save money without having to
discriminate against disabled individuals. An employer may not use
justifications based on myths, fears, or stereotypes. For instance, an
employer cannot exclude epilepsy from its insurance plan based on
unsupported testimony that people with epilepsy will have more accidents
and file more claims.
The EEOC guidelines provide the following example of a disability-
based distinction that violates the ADA unless the employer can carry the
burden of proving the distinction is not a subterfuge:
R Company's new self-insured health insurance plan caps benefits for
the treatment of all physical conditions, except AIDS, at $100,000 per
year. The treatment of AIDS is capped at $5000 per year. CP, an
employee with AIDS enrolled in the health insurance plan, files a
charge alleging that the lower AIDS cap ... is a disability-based
distinction. Accordingly, if R is unable to demonstrate that its health
insurance plan is bona fide and that the AIDS cap is not a subterfuge,
a violation of the ADA will be found.379
Unlike the ERISA section 510 opinions, the EEOC guidelines shift
the burden of proving a non-discriminatory purpose to employers. To
prove the absence of subterfuge, an employer is required to present "a
detailed explanation of the rationale" for its decision, which typically will
be based on sound actuarial data showing legitimate insurance risk
classification and underwriting.38 Even if an employer cannot produce
such evidence of customary insurance risk classification, the guidelines
permit an employer to prove "necessity" as evidence of no subterfuge.
Necessity can be proven by negative implication in one of two ways
under the guidelines. First, an employer may prove that there was no non-
disability-based change that could have been made without making an
unacceptable change in the premiums for or coverage proyided by the
insurance.38' An unacceptable change is a change that either makes the
plan effectively unavailable to a significant number of other employees,
alleviate symptoms, or maintain the current health status of the disabled person.
Id. at E-3.
319 Id. at E-2.
380 Id. at E-3.
381 Id.
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makes the plan so unattractive as to cause significant adverse selection,
or makes the plan so unattractive in comparison to other employer health
insurance plans in the community as to harm the employer's ability to
recruit and maintain qualified employees.382 Second, an employer may
demonstrate necessity by proving that there is no non-disability based
health insurance plan that could be drafted without breaching the
commonly accepted or legally required standards for a fiscally sound
health insurance plan.
3 83
The efficacy of the new EEOC guidelines is an open issue. The
courts may give little weight to the guidelines in light of legislative
history demonstrating that the ADA was not intended to disrupt current
insurance practices and the primacy of state insurance laws and regula-
tion.3 4 However, unlike the ERISA section 510 opinions as well as
opinions by courts interpreting the subterfuge provision in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 385 the guidelines make
a positive shift in discrimination law by shifting the burden of proving
discrimination from employees to their employers, who must prove a
non-discriminatory reason or a lack of subterfuge. The open question is
how courts will treat cost justifications. All serious diseases and
conditions are costly. As the guidelines suggest, courts should require
employers to prove more than that a specific disease or condition will
impose a financial burden on the plan. When a discrete disease, illness,
or condition is excluded, limited, or financially capped in an insurance
plan, courts should require employers to prove why the relative financial
burden is greater for insuring that condition than for insuring other
conditions. In other words, employers must introduce "legitimate cost or
actuarial data" evidencing that expenses for treatment, or other costs, for
the discrete disability are greater than treatment expenses and costs for
other covered genetic or medical diseases, illnesses, and conditions. Also,
382 id.
383 Id.
384 See, e.g., The Impact of the ADA on Medical Plans, 1 ERISA Litig. Rep.
(P-H) No. 11, at 31 (Dec. 1992) (predicting that the Supreme Court will give
little weight to the EEOC regulations as it did in interpreting and construing the
ADEA subterfuge provision).
385 For example, in Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158,
159-60 (1989), the Supreme Court put the burden on the employee under the
ADEA to prove the employer had a "subjective intent" to discriminate in relation
to an employee benefit plan. Note, however, that Congress responded to the Betts
decision by amending the ADEA in 1990 to require a cost-based justification to
avoid a finding of subterfuge. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
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an employer must prove that it considered, but found unworkable, other
insuring methods which might have saved costs and avoided the
discriminating disability-based distinction.
Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey386
appears to confirm the three-step approach of the EEOC guidelines.
Donaghey was a construction worker and union member who was
diagnosed with AIDS. Thereafter, Donaghey's self-insured union fund
rewrote its medical insurance plan by adding an exclusion of all payments
for AIDS and AIDS-related conditions. Donaghey brought an action
against the self-insured, multi-employer labor management-sponsored
medical plan. Because the express exclusion of AIDS is a disability-based
distinction, the EEOC placed the burden on the union fund to prove that
its AIDS exclusion was not a subterfuge to evade the ADA. Although the
union fund produced no evidence of an actuarial justification for the
AIDS exclusion or of necessity for the change, it vigorously explained
that prudent management of the medical insurance fund necessitated
eliminating insurance coverage for AIDS.387 But as the guidelines
explain, expected substantial future medical cost alone is not a justifica-
tion for a disability-based distinction. The EEOC, therefore, found that
the union fund "ha[d] no viable defense to the charge of discrimina-
tion"388 and held that the union's action violated the ADA.
3 89
386 Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 25 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at D-1 (Feb. 9, 1993).
387 Certainly the costs of treating a person with AIDS or HIV is substantial.
Experts estimate that the lifetime cost of treating an individual with HIV from
the date of infection until death is approximately $119,000; $50,000 is the
estimated health care cost from HIV infection until AIDS develops; and $69,000
is the estimated cost from AIDS development until death. Fred J. Hellinger, The
Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person with HV, JAMA, July 28, 1993, at 474, 474;
see also David J. Solomon et al., Analysis of Michigan Medicaid Costs to Treat
HIV Infection, PUB. HEALTH REP. 416 (Sept.-Oct. 1989) (analyzing medical
payment records of people who had indications of IV infection).
388 Mason Tenders, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-1.
389 See also Estate of Kadinger v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
110, No. 3-93-159, 1993 WL 597548, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 1993) (A union
health plan agreed to rescind its $50,000 cap on AIDS in settlement of a claim
that an AIDS cap violated the ADA. The plan provided a lifetime maximum
benefit of $500,000 for all other conditions.); cf Gonzales v. GarnerFood Servs.,
Inc., 855 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (granting employer's motion to
dismiss because terminated plaintiff was no longer an employee of the company
when the AIDS cap amendment was adopted); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v.
Automobile Whblesaler's Ass'n, 826 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding
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In conclusion, the ADA will probably have little effect on fair
discrimination insurance practices. The ADA permits disability-based
insurance practices provided the practices are based on customary risk
management having legitimate, sound actuarial support."' With actuari-
al justification or a showing of necessity, insurers and employers can then
exclude disabilities from coverage or financially cap them. They can price
discriminate by fixing price differentials for the same level of coverage
to reflect the higher expected cost. Given the necessity defense and
traditional cost/accounting/actuarial justifications for a disability-based
distinction in a proffered health insurance contract, the EEOC guidelines
may do little more than authoritatively approve and continue the
insurance principle of fair discrimination based on actuarial soundness.
If so, the ADA will probably be ineffective in restricting insurers from
using genetic information to make actuarial predictions of disease and
other health risks.
C. State Insurance/Genetic Legislation Is Inchoate But Promising
1. Mandating Coverage Through Proscription and Prescription
An insurance policy is aptly characterized as a mass-standardized
contract,"' often called a contract of adhesion, customarily sold on a
mass marketing take-it-or-leave-it basis. Seldom does true bargaining over
its terms occur. Consumers buy the insurance product like any other
mass-produced good. Consequently, states intervene in the public interest
to regulate standardized insurance policy coverage terms, conditions,
exclusions, and exceptions. The standard insuring coverage language,
that Title I of the ADA does not apply to sponsor of health benefit plan that
placed a cap on AIDS-related benefits because sponsor was not the plaintiff's
employer).
390 ADA section 510(c) is "not intended to disrupt the current nature of
insurance underwriting ..... 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(t) app. (1996); see also Ted
Storer, Comment, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Will the Insurance Field
Change?, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1031, 1031-32, 1033-40 (1994) (discussing the
small impact of the ADA because both the ADA and state law protect insurers
in their grouping of classes and risks provided they use "sound actuarial
principles").
391 How an insurance policy becomes a mass-standardized product is
complicated and well beyond the sc6pe of this Article. For a history, examina-
tion, and evaluation of the standardization process, see generally HOLMEs, supra
note 6, §§ 2.1-2.18, at 189-330.
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historically speaking, is created in part through an ongoing process of
state legislative and regulatory proscription and prescription of an
insurance policy's coverage language.392 State insurance law is best
described as a vast wilderness of some discrete and some comprehensive
legislative statutes and administrative regulations on a common subject.
The sheer number and diversity among the states' regulatory schemes
makes it difficult to chart and summarize them with certainty. All states,
for instance, now regulate and proscribe/prescribe the terms of group
health insurance contracts. By mandating certain coverages, these
provisions indirectly address issues of genetic discrimination. One study
reports that as of 1990, there were nearly one thousand state mandates for
health insurance coverage.3 93
Another concern is finding all the relevant statutes and regulations.
Placement of all the relevant statutes within a state's compilation of
statutes varies. Typically, these statutes are placed somewhere within the
state's insurance code, and often within a chapter prohibiting unfair trade
practices. In some states, however, there are additional prohibitions found
in other places. California's Insurance Code, for example, contains a
comprehensive body of law pertaining to discriminatory practice in
insurance, including an article specifically referring to the use of genetic
characteristics in underwriting; 39 t yet further regulation, however, is
392 See id. at 197-200, 203-18 (§ 2.2 A. Legislative Prescription and
Proscription of Policy Terms, § 2.2 B. Legislative Requirementsfor Administra-
tive Approval of Policy Forms, and § 2.3 Effect of Legislation Standardizing
Insurance Policy Language). While all states have enacted legislation and
promulgated regulatory schemes to proscribe/prescribe the terms of a variety of
policies, there are numerous model acts and model regulations drafted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. These model acts and
regulations, in whole or in part, form the basis of many of the schemes enacted
by the states. One example pertinent to this Article is the 1989 Group Health
Insurance Definition and Group Health Insurance Standard Provisions Model Act,
which has been adopted in virtually all states. The state citations are compiled
at id. at 243 n.24. In that model act, section 2. D. provides: "'An insurer may
exclude or limit the coverage on any person as to whom evidence of individual
insurability is not satisfactory to the insurer."' Id. at 244 (quoting the Act).
Moreover, the Act does not address the issue of genetic testing of applicants or
an insurer's use of genetic information to determine insurability.
'9' Rothstein, supra note 286, at 80.
391 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.3 (prohibiting discrimination by self-insured
employee welfare benefit plans based on genetic disability traits), 10123.35
(assessing civil penalties for unauthorized disclosure of genetic test results),
10140 (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, national
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found within the Health and Safety Code.395 State statutes also differ by
lines of insurance, regulating providers of life, health, or disability
insurance, and a variety of combinations thereof. Notwithstanding the
maze of state statutes, statements of general trends and generalizations
regarding specific mandated coverage are possible.
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed an explosion in state statutes
that mandate certain coverages in health and health-related insurance.
From 1979 to 1989, the number of state statutes mandating coverage
more than doubled.3 96 All fifty states now have some insurance cover-
age mandates. A 1986 survey found that insurance benefits had been
mandated in the following areas (the number of states mandating
coverage is shown in parentheses): alcoholism (thirty-eight states);
psychologists (thirty-four states); mentally/physically handicapped (thirty-
two states); chiropractors (twenty-six states); mental health (twenty-six
states); divorced spouse (twenty-three states); nurse practitioners (eight
states); nurse midwifes (seventeen states); home health (fifteen states);
hospice (five states); drug abuse (fifteen states); and breast reconstruction
(eight states).397
origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, or genetic disability trait), 10143 (prohibiting
discrimination "solely by reason of the fact that the person to be insured carries
a gene which may, under some circumstances, be associated with disability in
that person's offspring, but which causes no adverse effects on the carrier"),
10146-10149.1 (collectively, article 2.6, establishing standards related to
underwriting on the basis of tests of genetic characteristics) (West 1993 & Supp.
1996).
39S CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West 1996) (containing
language very similar to CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (see supra note 394)).
396 Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, State Mandated Benefits and the Small
Firm's Decision to Offer Insurance, 4 J. REG. ECON. 379, 380 (1992). This
article takes a cautionary view toward more state mandates.
Mandates typically stipulate that certain benefits be included in a group
plan, if one is offered. By making insurance more expensive, minimum
coverage rules may price some finns out of the insurance market.
Especially vulnerable are small firms, which face a much higher
premium to begin with. ERISA grants employer self-insured benefit
plans exemption from all state insurance laws and taxation. Small firms,
however, cannot viably self-insure as a means of circumventing
mandated benefits requirements. Ironically, it is these very firms where
coverage needs to be encouraged if we are to reduce the number of
employed uninsured.
Id. at 404, quoted in Hylton, supra note 82, at 75 n.53.
... Linda E. Demkovich, CoveringOptions Through MandatedBenefits, Bus.
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It is not feasible to cite all the statutes that mandate coverage. The
following list demonstrates the breadth of state mandates: treatment of
mental health conditions,39 alcohol and drug treatment, 99 kidney
disease treatment,400 coverage of diabetes,01 special dietary treat-
40210 404ment, coverage of infertility procedures, 4°3 maternity coverage,
coverage of newborn infants from moment of birth,405 coverage for
children's preventive health services such as immunizations and
406cytological screenings, coverage of newborns with cleft palate or
cleft lip,4 7 extended hospital or medical expense coverage into adult-
hood for dependent handicapped children,40 8 coverage for pap
AND HEALTH, Jan.IFeb. 1986, at 27, 28 (listing "selected mandated benefits by
number of states" (source: Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association)).
398 D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2302 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431M-2 (1993);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-3185 (Michie Supp. 1994); MIsS. CODE ANN.
§ 83-9-39 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.381 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a
(1991 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2601 (1994); Thx. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 3.51-14 (West Supp. 1997).
399 D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2302 (1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 431M-2 (1993);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.18-130-.18-180 (Michie 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 62A.149 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1995).
400 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.895(4) (West 1995).
401 IOWA CODE ANN. § 509.3-6 (West 1988) (coveragefor diabetic outpatient
and self-management education programs); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 40.52(1)(b)
(West 1992).
402 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.26 (West 1996).
403 MASS. REGs. CODE tit. 211, § 37.05 (1994) (coverage of six infertility
procedures); cf. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10119.6, 11512.28 (West 1994 & Supp.
1996) (requires health and disability policies to offer coverage for infertility
treatment except in vitro fertilization).
404 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123180(6) (West 1996); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62A.041 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B: 26-2.1b (West 1996);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(10)(A) (McKinney 1985).
405 COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-16-104 (1994 & Supp. 1996); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304.17-042 (Michie Supp. 1994) (coverage includes "medically
diagnosed congenital defects and birth abnormalities"); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
632.895(5) (West 1995) (coverage includes "congenital defects and birth
abnormalities" and "functional repair or restoration of any body part when
necessary to achieve normal body functioning" but does not cover surgery "to
improve appearance").
406 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(17)(A) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
407 COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-16-104(1)(c)(U) (1994).
408 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.88 (West 1989).
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409 ,- i410smears, coverage for low-dose mammography screening, coverage
for reconstructive breast surgery resulting from a mastectomy,
4
'
coverage for diagnostic prostate cancer screening for male insureds age
fifty and over,412 coverage for treatment of temporomandibular joint
disorders and craniomandibular disorders,4" 3 coverage for prosthetic
devices4 14 including "coverage for hair prostheses worn for hair loss
suffered as a result of alopecia areata," '4 5 and coverage of lIV and
AiDS.
4 16
In addition to prescribing insurance coverage, another method of
mandating coverage is for a state to supplement its definition of unfair
409 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3552 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (pap smears); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2230 (1993) (pap smears and mammographies).
410 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-316 (Michie Supp. 1994).
41 WASH. REV. CODE § 48.20.395 (1994).
412 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-16-9 (1994).
413 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-319 (Michie Supp. 1994).
414 ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.375 (Michie 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A §
354Q (1994).
415 MINN. STAT. § 62A.28, subd. 2 (1996).
416 When the AIDS epidemic arose in the 1980s, the initial reaction of some
states was to prohibit insurers from using the HIV antibody test to ascertain
insurability; others prohibited insurers from requiring applicants to undergo blood
testing. Now, with the rise in medical and insurance costs, the trend is not to
prohibit HIV testing information but rather to regulate insurers' use of HIV
information and protect the applicant's confidentiality. See, e.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-448.01 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring confidentiality and
required insurance procedures relating to HIV information); CAL. INS. CODE §§
799-799.09 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (establishing standards for insurers); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (West 1996); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787
(McKinney 1993). Statutes generally require that insurers first obtain an
applicant's written, informed consent. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
4724(20)(B) (1993) (requiring informed consent be obtained before HIV-related
tests are performed). Texas permits an HIV test only if the test is based on the
applicant's "current medical condition or medical history or if underwriting
guidelines for the coverage amounts require all persons within the risk class to
be tested." TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-4(b) (West Supp. 1997). Kentucky,
which has the same requirement as Texas, requires informed consent for IV
testing, protects confidentiality, and provides that the insurer "shall not exclude
coverage for [HIV and] ... [the] contract shall not be canceled or nonrenewed
solely because [of an IlV diagnosis and] [s]exual orientation shall not be used
in the underwriting process .... " KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-013(5)
(Michie Supp. 1994).
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trade practices.417 In other words, a state can prescribe coverage through
specific prohibitions - these proscriptions are phrased as specific bars on
unfair discrimination. Illustrative is blindness, a particular state concern.
The proscribing statute states: "Unfair discrimination against individuals
on the basis of blindness or partial blindness is prohibited.' ' 418 In
addition to proscribing specific discrimination based on a specific disease,
or mental or physical condition, states can generally proscribe unfair
insurers' customs and practices that constitute discrimination.
All fifty states have enacted statutes or ordinances prohibiting
employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, national
origin, or religion.419 At the federal level, comparable "insurance civil
rights" legislation was considered in the 1980s but was not enacted.420
At the state level, unfair trade practices statutes proscribe such discrimi-
nation by insurance companies. This Kentucky statute is an example:
No person shall, whether acting for himself or another in connection
with an insurance transaction, fail or refuse to issue or renew insurance
to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex
except that rates determined through valid actuarial tables shall not be
violative of KRS chapter 344.421
4" For a description of state regulation of unfair trade practices in insurance,
see supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
418 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-215(1) (Michie 1988). The statute defines
unfair discrimination: "For the purposes of this section, unfair discrimination
against individuals on the basis of blindness or partial blindness consists of
refusing to insure, refusing to continue to insure, limiting the amount, extent, or
kind of coverage available to an individual, or charging an individual a different
rate for the same coverage solely because of blindness or partial blindness." Id.
§ 304.12-215(2).
419 For a compilation and discussion of these state statutes and pertinent case
law, see MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & JAMES A. WRIGHT, EMPLOYEE LIFESTYLE AND
OFF-DUTY CONDUCT REGULATION 105-15 (1993). These statutes are also
important because Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires the EEOC
initially to defer processing employment discrimination charges to those states
that have a comprehensive fair employment statute (defined as a "706 agency").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1996).
420 For a discussion of proposed federal insurance civil rights legislation, see
Wortham, supra note 76, at 364-70.
421 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085 (Michie 1988). This statute, as
written, may have limited impact on insurance risk classifications because its
reference to actuarial tables appears to permit insurers to use fair discrimination
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The issue is whether states will amend their civil rights or insurance
statutes to add "genotype" or perhaps "genetic characteristics" to the list
of traits that constitute unfair discrimination by insurers. On March 14,
1996, New Jersey did just that by adopting an insurance civil rights
amendment similar to the Kentucky statute above, and adding:
No person shall discriminate against any individual on the basis of
genetic information or the refusal to submit to a genetic test or make
available the results of a genetic test to the person in the issuance,
withholding, extension or renewal of any hospital confinement or other
supplemental limited benefit health or credit life or credit accident
insurance coverage... or in the fixing or rates, terms or conditions
therefor. 422
The statutory amendment proscribes the defined insurers from requiring
applicants to undergo genetic testing, conditioning insurance coverage on
genetic testing information, inquiring or determining if an applicant has
had a genetic test, and using genetic testing information to determine
classifications, rates, or benefits. This type of statute could also protect
genetic privacy and confidentiality, create a private cause of action for
aggrieved parties, and empower the state attorney general to sue for
violations that deny applicants and insureds rights created under the
statute. As the next section explains, approximately eight states have
specific genetic condition statutes while ten states have enacted more
comprehensive, but non-uniform, insurance/genetic legislation.
2. State Laws Concerning Genetic
Testing and Use of Genetic Information
As the summary below demonstrates, there .is a significant trend at
the state level to address issues concerning genetic testing and the use of
genetic information by insurance companies and others.
a. Summary of State Insurance/Genetic Laws
The following list alphabetically summarizes current state laws, as of
mid-1996, concerning genetic testing and the use of genetic information
by insurance companies.
to justify differentiating applicants and charging different premiums based on
actuarial principles.
" Genetic Privacy Act, S.B. 695, 207th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1996) ("An Act
Concerning Genetic Testing and Privacy and Medical Underwriting").
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Alabama - Section 27-5-13 of the Alabama Code prohibits any
health or disability insurance policy from denying coverage to applicants
diagnosed as having sickle-cell anemia.423
Arizona - Section 20-448 of the Arizona Revised Statute Annotated
prohibits any insurer from "refus[ing] to consider an application for life
or disability insurance on the basis of a genetic condition,424 develop-
mental delay or developmental disability."425 However, an insurance
company may reject such an applicant if "the applicant's medical
condition and history and either claims experience or actuarial projections
establish that substantial differences in claims are likely to result from the
genetic condition, developmental delay or developmental disability."426
In sum, Arizona requires that life and disability insurers use
information regarding a genetic condition only if actuarial projections
establish that the genetic condition will result in substantial differences
in claims made. In effect, Arizona permits fair genetic discrimination
based on sound actuarial analysis.
California - On October 9, 1995, the governor signed Senate Bill
Number 1020, effective until January 1, 2002, which in practical effect
puts a moratorium on the use of genetic testing information in insurance
until the approximate completion427 of the HGP.428 The law amends:
(1) the California Civil Code by adding Chapter 2.5,429 (2) section
1374.7 of the California Health and Safety Code43" by adding section
1374.9,431 and (3) the California Insurance Code by adding sections
10123.31, 10123.35, 10140.1, 10140.5, 11512.96, and 11512.965 to
existing sections 10123.3, 10140, 10147, and 11512.95.432
423 ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1982).
424 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(H)(5) (Supp. 1996) ("Geneticcondition
means a specific chromosomal or single-gene genetic condition.").
425 Id. § 20-448(D).
426 Id. § 20-448(E).
427 See supra note 1.
428 S.B. 1020 (Cal. 1995).
429 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1996) (unlawful disclosure by
health care service plan).
430 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting
genetic discrimination by health service plan).
431 Id. § 1374.9 (administrative penalties for violations of § 1374.7).
432 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.31 (administrative penalties for violations of
section 10123.3); 10123.35 (unlawful disclosure by self-insured welfare benefit
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The general purpose of this legislation is to prevent insurance
discrimination on the basis of a person's genetic characteristics. "Genetic
characteristic" is defined as:
any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or
alteration thereof, which is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder,
or determined to be associated with a statistically increased risk of
development of a disease or disorder that is presently not associated
with any symptoms of any disease or disorder.
4 33
The law applies to the following entities: health care service plans,434
life and disability insurers,435 nonprofit hospital service plans,436 and
self-insured employee welfare benefit plans.437 The statute prohibits
those entities "on the basis of a person's genetic characteristics" from: (1)
refusing to enroll or accept an applicant,438 (2) refusing to issue an
insurance policy to any applicant,4  (3) cancelling the applicable
insurance," (4) charging a higher rate or premium, 44' (5) offering or
providing different terms, conditions, or benefits," 2 and (6) placing a
limitation on coverage under the applicable insurance."1
3
Additionally, the law recognizes a person's right to privacy regarding
genetic testing by proscribing the disclosure of genetic test results
I
plan); 10140.1 (unlawful disclosure by a life or disability insurer); 10140.5
(administrativepenaltiesforviolationofsection 10140); 11512.96 (administrative
penalties for violation of section 11512.95); 11512.965 (unlawful disclosure by
a nonprofit hospital service plan); 10123.3 (prohibiting genetic discrimination by
self-insured employee welfare benefits plans); 10140 (prohibiting genetic
discrimination by insurer); 10147 (definitions); 11512.95 (prohibiting genetic
discrimination by nonprofit hospital service plan) (West Supp. 1996).
411 Id. § 10147(b).
434 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7.
431 CAL. INS. CODE § 10140.436 Id. § 11512.95.
417 Id. § 10123.3. This provision appears to fit under ERISA's saving clause.
See supra Part IV.B. L.a (notes 257-93 and accompanying text).
438 Id. §§ 10123.3(a), 10140(b), 11512.95(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.7(a).
439 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.3(a), 10140(b), 11512.95(a).
440 1d. § 10140(b).
441 Id. §§ 10123.3(a), 10140(b), 11512.95(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.7(a).442 Id.
443 CAL. INS. CODE § 10140(b).
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contained in an applicant's or enrollee's medical records.' The law
penalizes any such disclosure by imposing civil penalties for negligent
and willful violations, and by imposing criminal liability if "economic,
bodily or emotional harm" results from the violation." 5
Colorado - The Colorado statute regulating the use of genetic
information is based on four premises:
(a) Genetic information is the unique property of the individual to
whom the information pertains;
(b) [Genetic testing information] may be subject to abuses if
disclosed to unauthorized third parties without the willing consent of the
individual to whom the information pertains;
(c) To protect individual privacy and to preserve individual
autonomy with regard to the individual's genetic information, it is
appropriate to limit the use and availability of genetic information;
(d) The intent of this statute is to prevent information derived from
genetic testing from being used to deny access to health care insurance,
group disability insurance, or long-term care insurance coverage." 6
The covered entities "may not seek, use or keep" genetic testing
information for any underwriting or nontherapeutic purpose.4 47 Genetic
testing information is "confidential and privileged," except when used in
diagnosis, treatment, or therapy; it can be released only with the "specific
written consent of the person tested." ' Note, however, that there is no
liability if a covered entity receives genetic testing information.
Additionally, the statute applies only to entities that provide health,
group disability, and long-term care insurance that are within the
Colorado Insurance Commission's jurisdiction."9 Significantly, the
statute does not apply to employer self-insured employee welfare benefit
plans.
44 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 56.17 (applying to disclosure by a health care service
plan); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.35 (applying to disclosure by a self-insured
welfare benefit plan), 10140.1 (applying to disclosure by a life or disability
insurer), 11512.965 (applying to disclosure by a nonprofit hospital service plan).
445 id.
446 COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (1994) (effective July 1, 1994).
447 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(3)(b).
441 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(3)(a).
449Id. § 10-3-1104.7(2)(a).
[VOL. 85
1996-97] INSURANCE/GENETIC FAIR/UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 633
Genetic testing is defined as "any laboratory test of human DNA,
RNA, or chromosomes that is used to identify the presence or absence of
alterations in genetic material which are associated with disease or
illness.""45 This very specific definition may be flawed in that it
circumscribes the legal protection granted to personal genetic information.
This definition does not, for instance, cover other tests used to diagnose
genetic conditions, such as chemical, immunochemical, and biochemical
tests measuring chemicals or enzymes in the body, or examination of
chromosomes by microscopy. Nor does the definition cover medical or
physical examinations, or written or anecdotal family medical histories of
genetic disease, illness, or conditions. Moreover, new technological
complexities following completion of the HGP may present formidable
tasks in the interpretation and construction of this discrete statutory
definition.
Violation of the statute is an unfair insurance practice subject to
Insurance Commission sanctions.45 In addition, the statute provides a
private right of action for people injured by wrongful use of genetic
information, with both legal and equitable remedies available.452 The
prevailing party may recover attorney fees.453
Florida - Effective October 1, 1994, Florida amended its civil rights
statute to protect individuals from the misuse of DNA typing and genetic
testing information.454 The statute defines "DNA analysis" as "the
medical and biological examination and analysis of a person to identify
the presence and composition of genes in that person's body ....
includ[ing] DNA typing and genetic testing."455 Except for criminal
prosecutions and for determining paternity, DNA analysis and genetic
testing information are "confidential" and "the exclusive property of the
person tested.4 56 The test cannot be performed or the results disclosed
without the tested person's informed consent. A violation constitutes a
first degree misdemeanor.457
450 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(2)(b).
451 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(11).
452 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(12).
453 Id. § 10-3-1104.7(13).
454 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West Supp. 1996) (establishing the
confidentiality of DNA typing and genetic testing information and limiting
insurers' use of this information by assuring its accuracy).
451 Id. § 760.40(1).
456 Id. § 760.40(2)(a).
457 Id.
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The statute also provides that any person who conducts a DNA/gene-
tic test must provide a notice to the person tested stating "whether the
information was used in any decision to grant or deny any insurance,
employment, mortgage, loan, credit, or educational opportunity." 458 In
the event of a denial, the test "must be repeated to verify the accura-
cy. 45
9
In 1978, Florida passed a series of laws proscribing sickle-cell testing
and screening, and the use of sickle-cell trait information. Life and
disability insurers may not deny insurance or "carry a higher premium
rate or charge solely because the [applicant] has the sickle-cell trait. 460
Other 1978 acts prohibited any condition requiring sickle-cell testing or
screening in public and private employment, state higher education, and
eligibility for adoption.461 Moreover, private and public employers shall
not "deny or refuse employment to any person or discharge any person
from employment solely because such person has the sickle-cell
trait.
4 62
Georgia - Effective July 1, 1995, chapter 54, Genetic Testing, was
added to title 33, Insurance, of the Georgia Code.463 Virtually identical
to the Colorado and Virginia legislation,4 4 the legislative findings state
that genetic information "is the unique property of the individual
tested,"465 genetic testing is subject to abuse if disclosed to third
parties,466 and, to protect privacy and personal autonomy, the use and
availability of genetic information should be limited.467 The stated
intent of the chapter "is to prevent [defined insurers] and other payors
from using information derived from genetic testing to deny access to
accident and sickness insurance., 4 68 Section two defines "insurers" to
458 Id. § 760.40(3).
459 Id.
460 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706 (life insurance), 626.9707 (disability
insurance) (West 1996).
461 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.043 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.201
(West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.096 (West 1981).
462 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West Supp. 1996).
463 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 to -8 (1996).
464 See supra note 446 and accompanying text and infra notes 524-29 and
accompanying text.
465 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1).
466 Id. § 33-54-1(2).
467 Id. § 33-54-1(3).
468 Id. § 33-54-1(4).
[VOL. 85
1996-97] INSURANCE/GENETIC FAM/UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION 635
mean "an insurer, a fraternal benefit society, a nonprofit medical service
corporation, a health care corporation, a health maintenance corporation,
[or] a self-insured health plan not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
[ERISA]. ' 469
Similar to the Colorado statute, Georgia's law also applies a
restrictive definition of genetic testing.470 It limits "genetic testing" to
include human DNA or chromosomal laboratory tests for "the purpose of
identifying the presence or absence of inherited alterations in genetic
material or genes which are associated with a disease or illness that is
asymptomatic at the time of testing and that arises solely as a result of
such abnormality in genes or genetic material."47' It further restricts the
definition by excluding "routine physical measurements; chemical, blood
and urine analysis; tests for abuse of drugs; and tests for the presence of
[I-I ." 472
Although genetic testing is narrowly defined, information derived
therefrom is confidential and privileged.473 Furthermore, the statute
prohibits an insurer from seeking such information.474 But if an insurer
has genetic testing information, the insurer "may not use the information
for any nontherapeutic purpose" 475 and cannot release it to third parties
without the tested individual's written consent.476 Notwithstanding these
protections, use of genetic testing information is authorized in criminal
investigation and prosecution and for scientific research purposes.477
Any violation of the act constitutes an unfair trade practice and is
punishable by a civil penalty plus court costs and attorney's fees if
applicable.478
Louisiana- Title 22, section 652.1 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
Annotated prohibits unfair discrimination in life insurance rates or
coverage because of severe disability or the presence of the sickle-cell
trait.479 Furthermore, title 23, Labor and Worker's Compensation,
469 Id. § 33-54-2(2).
470 See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
471 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-2(1).
472 Id.
41 Id. § 33-54-3(b).474 Id. § 33-54-3(a).
415 Id. § 33-54-4.
476 Id. § 33-54-3(b).
477 Id. § 33-54-5.
478 Id. § 33-54-8.
479 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West 1995). Discrimination in life
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section 1002 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated, makes it
unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any
individual or otherwise discriminate" because such individual has the
sickle-cell trait.
40
Maryland - The Insurance Code of the Annotated Code of
Maryland, section 223, prohibits unfair discrimination in rate, premium,
or dividend differential in life and annuity contracts "solely because the
applicant or policyholder has the sickle-cell trait, thalassemia-minor trait,
hemoglobin C trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or any genetic trait which is harmless
within itself, unless there is actuarial justification for it."41
Minnesota - In Minnesota the Genetic Discrimination Act regulates
the use of genetic tests by health, life, and fraternal benefit societies.4 82
In subdivision 2(b), "genetic test" is defined as:
a presymptomatic test of a person's genes, gene products, or chromo-
somes for the purpose of determining ... [genetic] abnormalities,
defects, or deficiencies, including carrier status, that are known to be the
cause of a disease or disorder, or are determined to be associated with
a statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disorder....
[But] "genetic iest" does not include a cholesterol or other test not
conducted for the purpose of determining the presence or absence of a
person's gene or genes.483
The statute prohibits health insurers from using genetic testing
information to determine eligibility, "establish[ ] premiums, limit[ ]
coverage, [or] renew[ ] coverage., 4 4 It also prohibits health insurers
insurance rates or coverage because of severe disability is permitted if the rate
differential "is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual
experience."Id. § 22:652. 1(A). Section (D) regarding sickle-cell trait was added
in 1982 and does not allow for discrimination based on actuarial principles or
actual experience. Id. § 652.1(D).
480 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1002 (West 1985) (prohibiting sickle-cell trait
discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations).
481 MD. CODE ANN., INs. § 223(a)(3) (Supp. 1996) (effective Oct. 1, 1996).
Prior to this 1996 Amendment, unfair discrimination was prohibited regarding
health insurance contracts as well. Id. § 223(b)(4) (repealed 1996). However,
effective September 30, 2002, health insurance contracts will once again be
prohibited from such discrimination, id. § 223(b)(4) (effective Sept. 30, 2002).
482 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A. 139 (West Supp. 1996) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
483 Id. § 72A.139.2(b).
484 Id. § 72A.139.3.
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from requiring or requesting a genetic test and from inquiring or
determining whether or not an individual has had a genetic test.485 On
the other hand, life insurers and fraternal benefit societies may request
that an applicant undergo a genetic test to determine insurability
provided the applicant gives "written informed consent,, 486 the insurer
pays the testing costs, 487 and the applicant is told the genetic test
result.488
Montana - Subsections (3), (4), and (5) to section 33-18-206 of the
Montana Code Annotated prohibit unfair discrimination in life and
disability insurance.489 The 1991 Montana Act is the same as section
20-448 of the Arizona Revised Statute Annotated. 49' Both the Montana
and Arizona acts prohibit insurers from refusing to consider an applica-
tion for life or disability insurance on the basis of genetic condition,
developmental delay, or developmental disability. Rejecting an application
or determining rates, terms, or conditions of the policy based on these
three factors constitutes unfair discrimination, "unless the applicant's
medical condition and history, and either claims experience, or actuarial
projections establish that substantial differences in claims are likely to
result from the genetic condition ....
New Hampshire - On May 16, 1995, New Hampshire enacted a
sweeping new Genetic Testing Act effective January 1, 1996.492 Signifi-
cantly, the law states that "no individual or member of the individual's
family shall be required to undergo genetic testing as a condition of doing
business with another person., 493 The statute also specifies conditions
for any genetic testing done in New Hampshire.4 94 "Genetic testing" is
defined as:
485 Id. § 72A.139.3(2), (3).
486 Id. § 72A.139.5.
487 Id. § 72A. 139.7.
488 Id. § 72A.139.6.
489 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1995).
490 See supra notes 424-26 and accompanying text.
491 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206(4).
492 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1 to H:6 (1996) (describing the proper
conditions and use of genetic testing).
491 Id. § 141-H:2(1).
494 Id. § 141-H:2 (prohibiting the genetic testing of individuals without
written consent except in certain specified instances and for bidding disclosure
of results without written and informed consent).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
a test, examination or analysis which is generally accepted in the
scientific and medical communities for the purpose of identifying the
presence, absence or alteration of any gene or chromosome, and any
report, interpretation, or evaluation of such a test, examination, or
analysis, but excludes [any lawful test to determine if a person] meets
reasonable functional standards for a specific job or task.495
New Hampshire prohibits health insurers from requiring a genetic
test, from inquiring or determining whether or not an individual has had
a genetic test, from conditioning health insurance coverage on the results
of genetic testing, and from considering genetic testing in the determina-
tion of rates or benefits.496 The genetic testing statute does not apply to
life, disability income, and long-term care insurance.4 97
Regarding employment, the statute prohibits the use of genetic testing
as a condition to employment, as affecting the terms of employment, or
for termination purposes.498 However, the law "shall not prohibit or
limit genetic testing for evidence of insurability with respect to life,
disability income, or long-term care insurance under the terms of an
employee benefit plan." '499
The New Hampshire law provides for civil damages of at least $1000
for each violation, plus costs and reasonable legal fees.5"0
New Jersey-New Jersey adopted, on October 24, 1996, the Genetic
Privacy Act which concerns genetic testing, genetic privacy, and medical
insurance underwriting.5 ' The statute commences with eight legislative
findings of fact, including:
b. Genetic information is personal information that should not be
collected, retained or disclosed without the individual's authorization.
49 Id. § 141-H:l(IV).
496 Id. § 141-H:4 (listing prohibited uses of genetic testing by health
insurance companies).
497 Id. § 141-H:5. However, the statute prohibits life, disability income, or
long-term care insurers from using genetic "information in writing a type of
insurance coverage other than life, disability income or long-term care
insurance." Id. § 141-1-I:5(11).
498 Id. § 141-H:3.
419 Id. § 141-I-:3(V).
500 Id. § 141-H:6.
51' Genetic Privacy Act, S.B. 695, 207th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1996)
(amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 1996)).
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c. The improper collection, retention or disclosure of genetic
information can lead to significant harm to the individual, including
stigmatization and discrimination in areas such as employment,
education, health care and insurance.
d. An analysis of an individual's DNA provides information not
only about an individual, but also about an individual's parents, siblings
and children, thereby impacting family privacy, including reproductive
decisions.
e. Current legal protections for medical information, tissue samples
and DNA samples are inadequateto protect [individual] genetic privacy.
f. Laws... are needed both to protect individual privacy and to
permit legitimate genetic research.
g. Progress in mapping the genes that cause breast cancer and other
diseases has far outpaced the development of a legal and ethical context
in which genetic information can be properly evaluated."0 2
"Genetic test" is defined as "a test for determining the presence or
absence of an inherited genetic characteristic in an individual, including
tests of nucleic acids such as DNA, RNA and mitochondrial DNA,
chromosomes or proteins in order to identify a predisposing genetic
characteristic." ' 3
The law generally proscribes discrimination "against any person or
group of persons because of race, creed, color, national origin or
ancestry" in rate classifications, acceptance of applications, and renewal
of policies. 0 4 This important civil rights provision, however, does not
explicitly mention genetic discrimination."' The statute, however,
subsequently prohibits discrimination in underwriting, rates, acceptance,
and renewals, and contract terms in "hospital confinement or other
supplemental limited benefit health or credit life or credit accident
insurance coverage" based on "genetic information or the refusal to
submit to a genetic test .... 506
Finally, New Jersey prohibits "any unfair discrimination against an
individual in the application of the results of a genetic test or genetic
502 Id. § 2b-g. Additionally, section h recognizes the "devastating potential
for discrimination against carriers" of genes "that cause breast cancer and other
diseases." Id. § 2h.
503 Id. § 3e(2).
" Id. § 3a.
105 Similarly, gender is not included as a class protected from insurance
discrimination.
" Id. § 3e.
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information in the underwriting of or determining insurability" for a
policy of life insurance, an annuity, or disability income insurance
contract.0 7 The insurance commissioner is authorized to determine by
hearing if an insurer's act or practice conflicts with this section and can
seek a cease and desist order.
Note that the statute does not provide any civil liability, penal-
ties,0 8 costs, or attorney's fees for a violation as some other recent state
insurance/genetic legislation does. 09
Additionally, the law empowers life, annuity, and disability income
insurers (in the issuance, withholding, extension, or renewal of any
policy) to notify the applicant or insured that the insurer requires a
genetic test. The insurer must first obtain the individual's written
informed consent prior to the required test.5 0
In sum, and contrary to the law's title, the statute seems to be a
watered-down compromise that neither specifically nor adequately
responds to the eight legislative findings of fact stated at the outset, nor
does the statute provide comprehensive privacy protection to genetic
testing and personal genetic information.
North Carolina - Since July 1, 1975, a series of North Carolina
statutes have, in effect, prohibited life and health insurers both from
refusing to issue or deliver a policy and from charging a higher rate or
premium for applicants having the sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C
trait.511
Ohio - Ohio enacted three statutory revisions, effective February 9,
1994, that prohibit the requirement and use of genetic testing information
by HMOs, sickness and accident insurers, and governmental self-
insurers.512 However, the three statutes are automatically repealed on
507 Id. § 3f.
.S However, the Act does give the commissioner the power to "order
payment of a penalty consistent with the provisions of N.J.S. 17B:30-1 et seq."
Id.
509 See, e.g., supra notes 445, 453, 478, & 500 and accompanying text.
510 Genetic Privacy Act § 3f
5" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-51-45, 58-58-25 (prohibiting insurance companies
from refusing to issue policies or charging higher rates for individuals with the
sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C trait), 58-65-70 (prohibiting hospital, medical,
dental, and other health service plans from refusing to issue or charging higher
rates for individuals with the sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C trait) (1995).
512 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.42 (HMOs), 3901.49 (sickness and
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February 9, 2004, the approximate completion date for the HGP.513 The
legislature provided back-up statutes, which foreseeably will be repealed
or amended following the mandated 2004 repeal." 4 The legislation also
established a Task Force on Genetic Testing in Health Insurance, which
was to report back no later than December 31, 1995.' 5 In other words,
Ohio put a ten-year moratorium (1994-2004) on the use of genetic testing
information by health insurers.
The extensive provisions under the three acts are identical. In
summary, the statutes prohibit health insurers from refusing to issue
policies, cancelling or renewing coverage, or limiting benefits based on
genetic testing or screening. The statutes prohibit health insurers from
requiring genetic tests or asking applicants about the results of genetic
tests. A violation is considered an unfair trade practice. The statutes allow
an insurer to consider genetic testing if the results are favorable to the
applicant and the results are voluntarily submitted.516 Each statute
defines "genetic screening or testing" as:
a laboratory test of a person's genes or chromosomes for abnormalities,
defects, deficiencies, including carrier status, that are linked to physical
or mental disorders or impairments, or that indicate a susceptibility to
illness, disease, or other disorders, whether physical or mental, which
test is a direct test for abnormalities, defects, or deficiencies, and not an
indirect manifestation of genetic disorders.517
On December 31, 1995, the Task Force reported the following
recommendations:
The Task Force feels that the moratorium on the use of genetic
information is an adequate safeguard to protect consumers' interests for
the time being. The Task Force, however, has formulated several
accident insurers), 3901.50 (government self-insurers) (Anderson Supp. 1995).
513 See supra note 1.
514 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.43 (HMOs), 3901.491 (sickness and
accident insurers), 3901.501 (government self-insurers).
515 Id. § 1742.42(G). "The Task Force shall conduct a comprehensive study
of genetic screening and testing as they relate to the medical underwriting of
health benefit plans.. . ." Id. § 1742.42(E).
516 Id. §§ 1742.42, 3901.49, 3901.50.
57 Id. §§ 1742.42(A), 3901.49(A)(1), 3901.50(A)(1).
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recommendations in order to ensure that the consumers are protected
even after the moratorium is repealed." 8
1. The Department of Insurance should conduct a yearly review of
complaints regarding genetic testing. The Department's Division of
Consumer Services has added a specific complaint code for genetic
testing in their database. By conducting a yearly review, the Department
will be able to gauge when or if the problem is manifesting itself.
2. Another Task Force on Genetic Testing, similar in size and
composition, should be appointdd near the expiration date of the
moratorium. This will allow policymakers to assess the current
definition and impact of genetic testing in health insurance. This
recommendation is, of course, subject to legislative action.
3. The Department of Insurance should continue to monitor the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Working Group on
Genetic Testing in order to keep current with advances in genetic
technology and to remain engaged in discussions regarding possible
regulatory mechanisms." 9
Oregon - A straightforward, one-half page 1995 statute, provides:
"An insurance provider may not use genetic information to reject, deny,
limit, cancel, refuse to renew, increase the rates of, affect the terms and
conditions of or otherwise affect any policy for hospital or medical
expenses."52 Additionally, the law requires that the insurer reveal the
use of the test to the applicant and obtain consent.5 21 Finally, the statute
prohibits an insurance provider from using "a favorable genetic test as an
inducement to purchase insurance., 522
Tennessee - In 1988, Tennessee passed a statute prohibiting any life
insurer from refusing to issue or deliver a policy solely because the
applicant possesses the sickle-cell trait or hemoglobin C trait5 23
Virginia - Virginia enacted the Genetic Privacy Act in April
1996.524 For a period of two years, the law prohibits health insurance
18 OHIO TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4,
at 22-23.
519 Id. at v.
520 OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135(3) (1995).
521 Id. § 746.135(1).
522 Id. § 746.135(2).
523 TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207 (1994).
524 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-508.4 (Miechie Supp. 1996).
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companies from using genetic information for the purpose of denying,
restricting, cancelling, or imposing other criteria on current or future
policyholders on the basis of the results of genetic testing or the request
for genetic testing services.525 Similar to Ohio's ten-year moratori-
um,526 this Act established a two-year moratorium on health insurers'
use of genetic testing information.527
Concurrently with the law's passage, the legislature established a
subcommittee to study genetic testing issues, including insurance.
Adopted March 4, 1996, the Virginia Senate Joint Resolution Bill
Number 50 created the Joint Subcommittee to Study the Legal and Policy
Ramifications of Genetic Research to study and review "existing and new
Virginia law on genetic information and privacy." '528 The legislature
made thirteen findings of fact to justify creating the subcommittee,
including recognition of the HGP's accomplishments, accounts of health
insurers' abuse and misuse of genetic information, insurer and societal
misunderstanding ("the presence of a genetic marker does not imply that
the carrier will ever develop the disease but only that the person has a
higher predisposition to such malady, thereby giving rise to the term
'asymptomatic ill"'), and concerns about genetic discrimination and an
individual right to privacy ("without adequate protection for persons to
ensure privacy and prevent discrimination, future research will be greatly
hindered"). 529
Wisconsin-Effective July 1, 1992, section 631.89 of the Wisconsin
Statutes Annotated prohibits health insurers from using genetic testing
information to determine rates, requiring a genetic test, or inquiring if a
genetic test has or has not been performed.53 The statute also prohibits
insurers from conditioning the provision of insurance coverage or benefits
on genetic testing.53' "Genetic test" is narrowly defined as "a test using
deoxyribonucleic acid extracted from an individual's cells in order to
determine the presence of a genetic disease or disorder or the individual's
predisposition for a particular genetic disease or disorder."532
525 Id. § 38.2-508.4(B).
526 See supra notes 512-19 and accompanying text.
527 VA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-508.4 is effective until July 1, 1998.
528 VA. S.J. REs. 50 (Va. 1996).
529 id.
530 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1995).
531 id.
532 Id. § 631.89(1).
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Additionally, Wisconsin's mandatory health insurance risk sharing
plan provides that people "are not ineligible for coverage under the plan
by reason of" payments or reimbursements for conditions such as
hemophilia or cystic fibrosis.533
b. State Trend Toward Proscribing
Insurance/Genetic Discrimination and
Protecting Privacy of Genetic Testing Information
The statutes from the foregoing eighteen jurisdictions are neither
sufficiently uniform nor plentiful to draw broad, assured conclusions. But
the trend is there and additional state legislation is anticipated. 534 The
statutes may be grouped into two categories: (1) eight states have adopted
a limited, genetic-specific, insurer-specific resolution, and (2) ten states
have enacted a comprehensive insurance/genetics solution.
In the first category, the laws of Alabama, Arizona, Florida,
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, and Tennessee do not
suggest a comprehensive solution due to the limited scope of the
protection against potentially unfair insurer use of genetic information.
With the exception of Florida,535 seven states do not address issues of
511 Id. § 619.12(3)(b).
534 OHIO TASK FORCE ON GENETIC TESTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4,
at 22-23. The unpaginated appendix to the December 31, 1995, Final Report of
the Ohio Task Force on Genetic Testing states that the following states are
presently considering insurance/genetic legislation: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Vermont. Earlier, New York and
Wyoming introduced insurance/genetic bills but failed to pass them. 1992 N.Y.
LAWS A.11956 (1992) (bill prohibiting discrimination based on genetic
predisposition), S. 1432 (1992) (bill establishing a sickle-cell anemia screening
program and prohibiting discrimination based on same); 1992 Wyo. Sess. Laws
0098 ("an act ... relating to genetic testing"). The Wyoming bill stated: "No
person who has undergone forensic DNA testing and whose test results indicate
the person has a genetic characteristic determined to be associated with a
statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disorder may apply for,
or obtain, insurance coverage without first disclosing the results of the testing to
the insurance carrier." Id.
... Effective October 1, 1994, Florida amended its civil rights statute to
require informed consent and privacy protection of DNA typing and genetic
testing information as well as to restrict insurers' use of personal genetic
information by requiring mandatory reanalysis if the use results in a denial of
insurance. Amending a state's civil rights statute is an important consideration
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individual privacy and of disclosure of personal genetic information to
third parties. Five states' statutes very narrowly restrict insurance/genetic
discrimination, prohibiting insurers from discriminating only against
people who are carriers of specific genetic traits, such as sickle-cell or
Tay-Sachs. 36 Most of these states restrict only life and disability
insurers.
These states appear to have continued the traditional approach
epitomized by state-mandated coverages - the micro-management of
insurance discrimination. To continue this approach state legislatures will
have to evaluate each genetic trait, disorder, or condition and each type
of insurance. Obviously, as the thousand or so state-mandated insurance
coverages demonstrate, such genetic-specific, insurer-specific legislation
is a possible solution following completion of the HGP. But a piecemeal
approach in enacting hundreds of statutes seems politically impractical
and ineffective when compared to a comprehensive genetic testing act
protecting privacy and addressing the insurer's use of genetic testing
information in insurance. However, a potential solution (especially if
limited to life, annuity, disability income, and, possibly, supplemental or
excess health care insurances) is to authorize fair insurance/genetic
discrimination, as do Arizona and Montana with their identical stat-
utes. 37 Their approach is to proscribe life, annuity, and disability
insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic condition; however,
that law has very minimal impact because: (1) it does not cover health
insurers, and (2) the prohibited discrimination is permitted if the insurer
can prove that substantial differences in claims are likely based on either
the applicant's genetic condition and medical history, claims experience,
or actuarial projections. Similarly, Louisiana and Maryland permit
"actuarially justifiable" '38 insurance/genetic discrimination. In other
words, Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, and Montana codify the insurance
principle of fair discrimination based on sound actuarial analysis. These
statutes indirectly make a useful distinction: certain types of insurafice
in fashioning an appropriate solution to insurance/genetic discrimination. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40 (West 1995).
536 ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706, 626.9707
(West 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 652.1 (West Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 58-51-45, 58-58-25, 58-65-70 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207
(1989).
537 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West 1990 & West Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (1987 Supp. 1992).
538 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.1 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., INS.
§ 223 (1986).
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such a life insurance, disability insurance, and annuities are purchased for
financial protection and as investments. Therefore, the idea of fair
discrimination based on economics seems appropriately fair. But that
principle may be unfair if applied to health insurance, which has the
dominant purpose of providing medical care. The bargained-for exchange
is health care protection and not financial protection. Foreseeably, the
insurance industry would favor the fair discrimination approach for all
lines of insurance.
The statutes of California, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin better
portend the future of insurance/genetic legislation. Although precious
little uniformity exists among these ten state statutes, they evidence the
contemporary trend toward comprehensive genetic testing, anti-discrimi-
nation, and privacy legislation in insurance generally and health
insurances in particular. Comprehensive legislation, rather than piecemeal
sections scattered throughout state statutes, appears more appropriate for
addressing the diverse genetic testing information issues, including
privacy and disclosure issues.53 9 These ten statutes represent the point
"' When insurers make underwriting decisions, they rely on several sources
for medical information, including individual medical and health reports from the
Medical Information Bureau ("MI"). The MIB is an association of about 750
health insurance companies who underwrite 90-95% of all health insurance. The
MIB maintains a national computer network of approximately 11 million files on
Americans and Canadians. See Russell S. Burnside, Note, The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The Challenge of Applying Ambiguous
Statutory Language to Intricate Telecommunication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451 n.27 (1987). There is no statutory authority to
discover the information contained in MIB records. However, in addition to the
genetic state statutes cited in this section, other states have taken steps to protect
people from inaccurate and unauthorized disclosures. For example, Rhode
Island's Confidentiality of Health Care Information Act permits the release of
medical information to insurers only if the patient has given written consent, and
the release describes both the need for and the purpose of the disclosure and the
extent of the information to be disclosed. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.3-1 to .3-11
(Supp. 1986).
For a description of privacy concerns related to "gene banks," see George
J. Annas, Rules for Gene Banks: Protecting Privacy in the Genetic Age, in
JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PRoJECr 75 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc
A. Lapp6 eds., 1994). Gene banks would ostensibly store genetic samples or
profiles of individuals. Annas proposes that respected genetic libraries can only
be maintained if legislatures pass rules governing the collection and storage of
genetic materials. To accomplish that, Annas proposes rules that require public
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of the compass toward more meaningful legislation, with a focus on the
practice of genetic testing and the use of test results, rather than on the
presence of specific genetic traits or conditions.540 Moreover, these state
acts apply primarily to health insurance and reject the fair discrimination
actuarial principle. Minnesota, New Hampshire, and New Jersey make
that point clearer by drawing a bright line between health care insurance
and the financial-protection insurance (e.g., life, annuities, disability
income, fraternal benefit societies). These three states either include only
health care with the proscriptions or they allow life, disability income,
and other similar forms of insurance to practice fair discrimination.
But these assorted state statutes have flaws. The principal drawback
is the lack of uniformity. There is no consistency regarding the types of
insurance covered by the legislation.54' Some define genetic testing
broadly, some narrowly. Some provide explicit privacy protection, some
do not. Some provide a private cause of action under the unfair trade
practices law, civil penalties including attorney fees and costs, and
criminal sanctions; others do not. Recognizing and understanding these
flaws and choices in language and provisions will aid in drafting future
legislation. For instance, even a statute mandating broad bans on insurers'
notice of the establishment of gene banks, informed consent in their policies, and
restricted use of their samples.
540 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1 to 33-54-8 (1995) (prohibits insurers from
using information derived from genetic testing for any nontherapeutic purpose);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West 1996) (prohibits health insurers from
requiring, inquiring about, considering refusal to take, or considering results of
genetic tests in determining or limiting eligibility or coverage, establishing
premiums, or in any other underwriting decision).
s4 See, e.g., Regulating health insurers only: OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135
(1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 631.89 (West 1992). Regulating life insurers only:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207 (1989). Regulating health and disability insurers
only: ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1742.43 (Baldwin
1994) (repealed). Regulating life and disability insurers only: ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 20-448 (West 1990 & West Supp. 1992); CAL. INS. CODE § 10143 (West
Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706, 626.9707 (West 1984); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 652.1 (West Supp. 1993). Regulating life and health insurers only:
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 223 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West 1996).
Regulating "sickness and accident"insurers only: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
3-1104 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (1995). Regulating health, life,
and disability insurers: MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206, 33-22-507 (1987 Supp.
1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 101:1-141-H (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-
51-45, 58-58-25, 58-65-70 (1991).
647
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use of information obtained through genetic testing can be avoided by
insurers.
A possible end-run by an insurer can be illustrated with reference to
California's Senate Bill 1146, authored by state Senator Patrick Johnson
and enacted into law in September 1994. "No [health care service, self-
insured employee welfare benefit, or nonprofit hospital] plan shall require
a higher rate or charge on the basis of a person's genetic characteris-
tics." '542 Because the law merely prohibited insurers from charging
higher premiums due to an insured's genetic profile, the insurers simply
lowered the benefits under the terms of their policies. Consequently, the
legislature amended the law the following year to close this loophole. 43
Three observations are offered in conclusion. First, the deficiencies
at the federal level in ERISA and the ADA, both of which defer to state
insurance law,5" will be cured through comprehensive state insur-
ance/genetic acts, with one exception. The exception is employer self-
funded employee benefit plans which the Supreme Court has held, in
interpreting ERISA, are to be regulated only by ERISA and are exempt
from state insurance regulation. 45 Thus, if all states pass comprehensive
acts, millions of American employees under employer self-funded plans
will not be affected. That is a critical consideration in determining the
best solution.
Second, one reason that only a handful of states have enacted
insurance/genetics laws may stem from the fact that some states, such as
Kentucky,546 indirectly address the genetic information problem by
mandating health coverages through health purchasing alliances. Health
purchasing alliance legislation requires that rates be determined by
community rates in which "the premium for each individual policy and
542 SB 1146 (Johnston); 1994 Stat. Ch. 761 (referring to CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 (1995)).
143 For example, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.7 now reads, "No
plan shall require a higher rate or charge, or offer or provide different terms,
conditions, or benefits, on the basis of a person's genetic characteristics ...."
5" See supra Part IV.B (notes 239-390 and accompanying text).
54 FMC v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). See supra notes 282-83 and
accompanying text.
546 Effective July 17, 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly created the
Kentucky Health Purchasing Alliance to serve its state employees (mandatory
alliance members) and voluntary alliance members (employers with 100 or fewer
employees, affiliated groups with 100 or fewer members, and any citizen who
chooses to join). KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.17A-010-.17A-160 (Michie
1994).
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group policy is determined solely on the basis of age, geography, family
composition, benefit plan design, and cost containment provisions
. .,,57 In practical effect, a health insurer under the alliance can ask
only the applicant's age, address, and family composition. Thus, this type
of state legislation indirectly eliminates any health insurer from seeking
genetic testing of applicants and from using genetic information in fixing
rates and premiums.
The third, and final, observation concerns the moratorium solution
adopted by California, Virginia, and Ohio. Serious consideration should
be given to the ten-year Ohio moratorium with its interim insurance
genetics statutes and the establishment of a Task Force on Genetic
Testing in Health Insurance.
D. Reasons for State and Federal Legislative Solutions
Several solid reasons support a state solution to the insurance/genetics
dilemma.548 (1) History favors state regulation of the insurance busi-
547 Id. at 304.17A-120(1). No attempt was made to canvass all 50 states to
catalogue which states had health insurance alliances. The core of the President's
failed universal health care legislation was the creation of regional health
purchasing alliances. Clinton's Health Plan: A New Frameworkfor Health Care,
supra note 11, at A22. One goal of health purchasing groups or alliances is to
equally redistribute the good and bad health risks among all policyholders by
using a modified community rating system controlled by a state board, such as
the Kentucky Policy Health Board. In essence, the premium is levelled among
the group. The good risks pay a higher price than a rating system using risk
classifications; the bad risks pay less and are thus subsidized. The down side is
that health insurers may decide to stop selling individual health insurance policies
which they cannot rate based on personalized medical and other data from the
individual applicant. That may be reflected in Kentucky's short-term experience
with its alliance. Under the insurance reforms of 1994 and 1995, 15 of the 20
companies that sold individual health policies have stopped doing so. Another
potential problem is that associations can sell insurance without using the
community rating system that drives up rates for younger, healthier people under
the law. That means healthy people might flock to association insurance policies,
leaving other carriers- particularly the state-ran insurance alliance- to pick up
higher-risk people. Bill Estep, Insuranceindustry "Unstable" CommissionerSays
Reform Changes MustBeReconsideredHERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Aug.
28, 1996, at B 1 (discussing impacts of state insurance reform or availability and
affordability).
548 For a more thorough discussion of the rationale supporting continued state
regulation, see Spencer Kimball, The Case for State Regulation of Insurance, in
649
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ness. "When the States speak in the field of 'insurance,' they speak with
the authority of a long tradition." '549 The vital centers of modem
insurance regulation are the fifty departments of insurance in the fifty
states. The charter for state authority over the insurance business is the
McCarran Act of 1945 in which Congress struck a "hands off" attitude
and expressed a strong public policy for the continued state regulation of
the business of insurance.55 Thereafter, with extensive cooperation
among the state insurance commissioners and their agencies, the states
achieved a degree of national uniformity by enacting legislation promul-
gated by the NAIC.551 In some states, this body of insurance law is
sufficiently unified and codified to be characterized as an "insurance
code," which leads to the second point. (2) States can achieve a uniform,
national approach.55 2 This point undercuts the notion that the requisite
uniformity to this national issue can be done only at the federal level. (3)
States can better experiment with innovative approaches. Unlike one
national approach affecting everyone, any state legislation will have a
smaller, discrete impact which encourages experimentation to achieve the
most fair and nondiscriminatory method of regulating genetic testing, use
of genetic information, and privacy. (4) No federal insurance regulatory
structure exists. Instead of creating yet another level of expensive,
untested bureaucracy, it is more economically efficient to utilize the
extant, seasoned state system of insurance departments to effect and
regulate any statutory reform. (5) One federal insurance agency is more
easily lobbied than fifty insurance departments (oddly, a point often
INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE
REGULATION 411-34 (Spencer Kimball & Herbert Denenberg eds., 1969).
9 Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.
65, 68 (1959) (stating that while regulation of insurance is within the "ambif of
federal power, it has been traditionally controlled by the states).
550 See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
55, See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
552 To achieve more coherence and uniformity, many states have codified
their insurance laws or re-codified their earlier codified statutes. The quintessen-
tial effort in this regard occurred in Wisconsin, commencing in 1965 and
finishing in 1974. See Spencer L. Kimball & Herbert S. Denenberg, Modem
Insurance Code Revision: Reflections on the Art of Legislative Reform, 21
C.L.U.J. 34 (No. 4 1967); Symposium, Insurance Regulation, 1969 WIS. L. REV.
1019-1170 (discussing generally the history of insurance regulation, purposes for
regulation, and needs for reform). In many states, however, the insurance statutes
are not sufficiently unified (in form or substance) to be called a "code" or even
a body of insurance law.
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boldly asserted by the insurance industry). Also, any federal insur-
ance commissioner would be an insignificant, less effective official in
the massive federal bureaucracy. In contrast, each state insurance
commissioner is closer to the citizens and has considerable power to
implement their preferred social and economic policies. (6) Any supposed
ineffective state regulation is restricted to a mere handful of states,
in contrast to unknown and potentially ineffective federal regulation
which would have national adverse consequences. Most insurers are
licensed in states (such as California, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
New York, and Pennsylvania) which are effective, vigorous regulators.
(7) Prevailing current public opinion endorses state regulation. Recent
trends in national and state politics regarding health care.. as well
as the American deregulation movemen 54 suggest that responsibility
for regulation of health insurance and health benefits will remain with
the states.
The foregoing points merit consideration, especially the fact that
long-standing, experienced, and effective state insurance departments are
in place to provide the regulatory enforcement vehicle for any federal
insurance/genetics law(s). Such a sharing of enforcement duties would
avoid costly administrative duplication as well as the traditional turf battle
fought by the states to maintain their primacy in insurance regulation. For
example, Congress could enact a comprehensive federal Insurance Act
Regulating Genetic Testing Information and Privacy which by its terms
would be uniformly administered and enforced by the fifty state
departments of insurance. Alternatively, a federal insurance administrator
or ombudsman position could be created for the limited purpose of
supervising the states' implementation of the federal insurance/genetics
law.
"' The failure of President Clinton's 1993 proposal for universal health
insurance (a 1300-page statute titled Health Security Act) is well known. More
recent but less far-reaching federal legislation has been introduced in Congress
but none has been enacted.
... Since the mid-1970s, there has been an expansive deregulation movement
in America generally, including portions of the insurance industry. See generally
INSURANCE DEREGULATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (N. Weber ed., 1982);
JERRY, supra note 14, at 78-80. Rate regulation has been the primary insurance
concern for deregulation. See, e.g., Stewart W. Kemp, Insurance and Competi-
tion, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 547 (1981) (evaluating proposed federal bills to promote
competition; concluding that although more price competition would be
beneficial, total regulation would not be).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The following are some of the reasons favoring a uniform, compre-
hensive federal approach - which, again, could be enforced by the
existing state regulatory structures:
1. Uncertainty under the McCarran Act, ERISA, and judicial
decisions preempting state insurance/genetic legislation. The McCarran
Act concedes power to the states to regulate the "business of insur-
ance. '555 However, given the vagaries of the judicial meaning given to
"business of insurance" under the three-part Pireno-Royal Drug test,556
one must make an educated guess as to what activity will be held to be
the business of insurance (to which state law applies) and the business of
companies, including insurance companies (to which federal law applies
by preemption). In Royal Drug, for example, an agreement between the
health insurer (Blue Shield) and pharmacies to sell prescription drugs for
$2 each to Blue Shield policyholders was held not to be the "business of
insurance" (not exempted from federal law), but rather, was the business
of insurance companies. 57 Moreover, in Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno,58 the insurance policy limited the insurer's liability to pay "the
555 See supra Part IV.A (notes 218-38 and accompanying text).
556 See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
this three-prong test, see, for example, United States v. Title Ins. Rating
Bureau, 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1240 (1984);
Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 972 (1984); see also Donovan, supra note 236, at 11; Comment, Definition
of 'Business ofInsurance' Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act After Royal Drug,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 1475 (1980); Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance
Companies: The Disappearing McCarran Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340.
517 Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210-11
(1979), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
558 Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). Consider this
activity: When insurance rates and premium financing are regulated by state law,
does the federal Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667) apply to credit financing of
auto insurance premiums? Under premium financing, an insurer or a third party
advances the insured money to pay the premium, and thereafter the insured
makes installment payments of the premium plus interest on the loan. Some
decisions hold that the insurer is engaged in the business of insurance subject to
state regulation, and thus (under McCarran) the Truth in Lending Act does not
apply by preemption. See, e.g., Ben v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 374
F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (D. Colo. 1974) (holding that claims under the Truth in
Lending Act were barredby the McCarran Act); Gerlachv. Allstate Ins. Co., 338
F. Supp. 642, 651 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (holding that a Florida Statute and the
McCarran Act precluded application of the Truth in Lending Act). However,
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'reasonable' charges" for "'necessary' medical care and expenses." 559
In determining if a chiropractor's treatments of an insured were medically
"necessary" and the charges "reasonable," an insurance company's use of
a professional Peer Review Committee (consisting of ten chiropractors)
in processing, evaluating, and making decisions to deny or to pay claims
was held not to be the business of insurance and, thus, exempt from
federal antitrust laws. The point is that the uncertainty and ambiguity
surrounding federal preemption make it difficult to predict the fate of
state regulatory schemes that are passed. Moreover, under the ERISA
saving clause,56 the Supreme Court has held that the same uncertain
three-prong test determines whether ERISA preempts a state law that
purports to regulate insurance.56' The uncertainties thereby created by
the McCarran Act, ERISA, and the Court can be clarified and resolved
only by federal congressional action. If varied federal statutes can
preempt state insurance laws in surprising and unforeseeable situations,
then a state insurance/genetic discrimination statute will not provide the
assured solution so necessary in definitely resolving the insurance/genetic
dilemma.
2. Deficiencies in federal laws necessitate federal rectification and
other actions. It would not entirely solve the insurance/genetics dilemma
even if all states were to enact legislation that fairly addressed the issues
arguably these holdings would be reversed under the subsequent Pireno-Royal
Drug test because a loan to pay a premium is "business" and not "insurance."
In other words, financing insurance premiums does not transfer a policyholder's
risk and is ancillary to and not an integral part of the policy relationship between
insurer and insured. Accordingly, some decisions would allow the federal Truth
in Lending Act to preempt state insurance regulatory law and apply to the
insurer/creditor. See, e.g., Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 467 (5th Cir.
1979) (holding that premium financing in connection with automobile insurance
did not constitute the "business of insurance" under the McCarran Act, and that
the Truth in Lending Act, therefore, applied); Perry v. Fidelity Union Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that premium financing by an
insurance company did not constitute the "business of insurance" and, thus, the
Truth in Lending Act applied), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980); Cody v.
Community Loan Corp., 606 F.2d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that loan
offices were not in the "business of insurance" for purposes of the McCarran Act
and, as a result, the Truth in Lending Act applied), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988
(1980).
5" Pireno, 458 U.S. at 119.
560 See supra Part IV.B. .a.(2) (notes 265-81 and accompanying text).
561 See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
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voiced by all parties. These laws would still have a limited effect on the
insured population even if it were possible to reconcile the insurers'
concerns for economical and actuarial fair discrimination, financial
stability, potential for adverse selection, and the public policy concerns
that large numbers of individuals may be unfairly denied access to health
insurance. The great majority of health insurance is acquired by insureds
through their employers. 62 Over half of all employees work for
companies that are partially or fully self-insured,563 and ERISA exempts
employer self-insured health plans from state laws which regulate
insurance."' Because so many Americans are being affected by the
restrictions ERISA places on the states' ability to prohibit self-insurance
plans from inappropriately using genetics tests, it is necessary for
Congress to intercede with legislation directly addressing the issues which
are peculiar to employers' use of genetic information.
Employer self-insured health plans should not be exempt from state
laws which require insurers to contribute to states' uninsurable risk pools.
A few states have such pools but do not require self-insured employers
to contribute.565 If ERISA is revised to provide that these self-insured
562 For a statistical analysis of the connections between employment and
insurance, see Kronick, supra note 74.
563 Pear, Court Approves Cuts, supra note 285. From 1988-90, self-insurance
grew 19.4% (from $32 billion dollars to $38.2 billion) while traditional insurance
increased only 3.8% (from $115.6 billion to $120 billion). Otis, supra note 285,
at 1, 38. In 1992, self-insurance constituted 27% of the commercial financing
market and approximately 30% at the end of 1993. Marley, supra note 285, at
3.
" The Supreme Court holds that ERISA's preemption of state laws, but not
state insurance regulatory laws, means that employer self-insured benefit plans
are to be regulated solely by ERISA. In other words, employer self-insured
insurance plans are exempt from state insurance laws. See, e.g., FMC v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990) (under ERISA's "deemer" clause, an
employee benefit plan is not deemed an insurance company insurer). See
generally Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Health Policy and ERISA:
Interest Groups and Semipreemption, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y, & L. 239
(1989) (discussing unintended effects of ERISA on health policy). For an
examination of the negotiated accommodation that authorizes states to regulate
insurers of employers' benefit plans but not to regulate self-insured employers,
see Fox & Schaffer, supra note 275, at 48-52.
565 For a discussion of fairly recent state efforts to regulate "risk pool"
coverage and to finance health care for the uninsured, see GEORGE J. ANNAS ET
AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 159-62 (1990). For example, in January 1989, the
Illinois General Assembly created a statewide insurance pool called the
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plans pay their fair share, the costs of health care for high-risk individuals
will be spread more evenly among all insured individuals. Another
solution is to adopt a taxation approach. For example, federal legislation
could offer tax incentives for states to form high-risk medical insurance
pools and tax employers who do not voluntarily participate in the state
high-risk pools. 6
3. Minimize foreseeable market disruptions. Federal legislation is
essential to minimize potential market disruptions following completion
of the HGP which could result from piecemeal, state-by-staie insur-
ance/genetic legislation. Uniform action across the entire insurance market
would eliminate any market disadvantages which might occur in those
states choosing to proscribe insurers use of genetic tests and genetic
information in insurance.
4. Disparity in state regulation and inconsistency in state funding and
staffing. In 1859, New York created a superintendent of insurance. The
New York example has been widely followed so that now all states have
an official with the duty of seeing that insurance regulations are enforced.
Customarily, this official is appointed by the governor, with the
confirmation of the state senate. In a few states, the insurance commis-
sioner is chosen by popular vote. While many able and distinguished
people have held this state office, many second-rate politicians have also
held it. The compensation is only fair, and the office has frequently been
a stepping stone to more lucrative employment with insurance organiza-
tions.567
Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan ("CHIP"). This plan provides coverage for
the "hard-to-insure" who have been denied health insurance or charged exorbitant
premiums by private insurers. See Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger, Confidenti-
ality of Genetic Information in the Workplace, 17 AM. J. L. & MED. 75, 103
n.190 (1991) (analyzing "existing legal protections for confidentiality of
information collected through genetic screening or genetic monitoring in the
workplace.").
S66 See, e.g., Clifford & luculano, supra note 14, at 1822 (advocating federal
legislation).
567 An additional rub is that given the high turnover of insurance commis-
sioners who leave the post to work for the insurance industry, they are less likely
to protect consumers and insureds. Commissioners who promote and protect
insurance industry interests are more likely than consumer-oriented commission-
ers to be rewarded with an industry job. For the archetypal studies regarding
these concerns, see Jon S. Hanson & Thomas E. Obenberger, Mail Order
Insurers: A Case Study in the Ability of the States to Regulate the Insurance
Business, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 175 (1966); Spencer L. Kimball, Introduction:
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Governmental control of the insurance business is exercised almost
exclusively by the states and the District of Columbia under acts of
Congress. One cannot speak of a single, uniform set of insurance
regulations, but only of fifty-one sets. Some insurance departments are
massive, others are tiny annexes to another state agency; some do a
commendable job, while others do precious little or nothing; and some
appear to be captives of the powerful insurance industry, while others
actively harass the insurance industry. This unevenness and inefficiency
of fifty-one state regulators of a truly interstate business argues for a
uniform federal law enforced, or at least overseen, at the federal level.
The counterpoint is that the current state insurance regulatory system does
operate with extensive cooperation among the several state departments,
which helps diminish the disparity in funding, staffing, and enforcement
among the states. The insurance commissioners act in concert through the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners which might be an
additional vehicle for implementation and enforcement of any comprehen-
sive federal insurance/genetics law.
Finally, the potential for misuse of genetic information by insurers
seems sufficiently compelling for Congress to act pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power to enact legislation which addresses how genetic
information may be used by insurers. The McCarran Act leaves open to
Congress the option of taking specific action regarding insurance
regulation."' Enactment of a comprehensive federal Insurance Genetics
Act addressing insurers' use of genetic information and privacy issues
will avoid many of the problems which limit the effectiveness of leaving
insurance regulation at the state level. A comprehensive federal insur-
ance/genetics law would resolve the issues resulting from the lack of
uniformity among state statutes and eliminate the problem of delay in
state legislative action. As outlined, numerous obstacles accompany state
insurance regulation, and federal legislation may be the remedy.569
Unfinished Business in Insurance Regulation, 1969 WIs. L. REv. 1019.
Moreover, some state insurance agencies are so underfinanced and understaffed
that insurance regulation is mostly an illusion. See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball &
W. Eugene Hansen, The Utah Insurance Commissioner: A Study ofAdministra-
tive Regulation in Action, 6 UTAH L. REv. 1, 19 (1958) (reporting that although
the state collected about $100,000 from the insurance industry in fees, only
$30,000 was available for Insurance Department services).
568 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
569 For additional reasons, see Wortham, supra note 76, at 416. Wortham
proposes:
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CONCLUSION
As society becomes more technologically advanced, the task of
deciding how best to utilize new technology and information in the
insurance industry becomes increasingly difficult. The economic aspects
of health care in this country are driven by a system of private insurers,
and technology is giving insurers an arsenal with which, unless regulated,
they can justify excluding individuals from the insurance system. The
HGP, in attempting to characterize the human genetic make-up and
identify the causes of genetically transmitted disorders, is stocking that
arsenal. Arguably, the federal government should not be permitted to
subsidize the insurance industry by allocating three billion dollars for a
scientific project, and then allowing the insurance industry to use the
information obtained in that project to exclude from the health insurance
system those very individuals who were the intended beneficiaries of the
project. The overriding problem is how to assure that all citizens have
affordable access to health and health-related insurance. Any solution
ought to be a balanced one which has a societal consensus.
Rather than adopting comprehensive, uniform insurance/genetic
legislation, Congress recently took a micro-management approach by
addressing the discrete problem of "pre-existing conditions" and
"employee job lock"57° by amending ERISA in its Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (better known as the Kennedy-
Kassenbaum Act).57' One goal of the Act is to improve portability and
[a]n increased role in federal legislation for the following reasons: (1)
reform efforts in individual states frequently have been frustrated by
insurers' threats of withdrawal from doing business in the state; (2) it
has proven difficult for state regulators to withstand the political
pressure that can be exerted by insurers; (3) because so much insurance
business is done across state lines, state regulators are often no match
for large national and international insurers; (4) to divert competitive
efforts in selection competition to more desirable forms of competition,
all insurers must be required to play according to the same rules; (5) the
proposed study of availability would require considerable resources and
should look at availability concerns nationwide.
Id.
570 Employee "job lock" occurs when an employee decides not to change
employment due to fear of losing health insurance coverage because the
employee or family member has a present, or genetically potential, illness,
disease, or medical condition. See Mark L. Glassman, Comment, Can HMOs
Wield Market Power? Assessing Antitrust Liability in the Imperfect Market for
Health Care Financing, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 147 n.255 (1996).
511 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), effective Aug. 21, 1996.
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continuity of an employee's group health insurance coverage under
ERISA when an employee, or an employee's family member, with a pre-
existing condition changes employers. The Act not only circumscribes
pre-existing condition exclusions but also prohibits discrimination in
enrollment in the new employer's group health insurance against a new
employee or family members based on health status, including genetic
information.572 Consequently, the Act assures continued health insur-
ance coverage for employees and their families when employees leave
one employer group-insurance plan for another.
The Act also guarantees that individual (non-group) health insurance
shall be renewed or continued in force at the insured's option. A private
health insurer can refuse to renew or continue individual health insurance
coverage in only five instances: (1) for nonpayment of premiums, (2)
fraud, (3) insurer ceasing to offer coverage in individual market, (4)
individual moves outside service area, or (5) individual ceases member-
ship with association that offered the insurance.5 7 Since genetic
information is not listed, genetic information implicitly is not a legitimate
ground for nonrenewal or discontinuance.
In sum, the Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act has two restrictions on health
insurers' use of genetic information. First, regarding group health insurers
under ERISA, the Act has two prohibitions. It prohibits insurers from
treating genetic information as a pre-existing condition unless the genetic
572 Id. §§ 701, 702(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1181, 1182(a)(1) (1996). Section
702, entitled Prohibiting Discrimination Against Individual Participants and
BeneficiariesBased on Health Status, provides that a group health plan or insurer
ma not establish rules for eligibility (including continued eligibility)
of any individual to enroll under the terms of the plan based on any of
the following health status-related factors...
(A) Health status.
(B) Medical condition (including both physical and mental illness).
(C) Claims experience.
(D) Receipt of health care.
(E) Medical history.
(F) Genetic information.
(G) Evidence of insurability (including conditions arising out of
acts of domestic violence).
(H) Disability.
573 110 Stat. at 1892 § 2742(a), (b). By negative implication, section 2742
GuaranteedRenewability of Individual Health Insurance prohibits private health
insurers from using genetic information to justify nonrenewal or discontinuance
of individual health insurance policies.
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information results in a medical diagnosis of an actual condition needing
medical care or treatment. The Act bars genetic discrimination by
excluding as pre-existing conditions: asymptomatic people; at risk
presymptomatic people having a genetic predisposition to disease, illness,
or medical condition; and unaffected genetic carriers (heterozygotes). The
Act also assures continuity for employees changing jobs by prohibiting
group plans and insurers from using genetic information in fashioning
eligibility criteria for enrollment or continuation. Second, regarding
individual health insurance policies, the Act implicitly prohibits the use
of genetic information in decisions regarding renewal or continuance of
coverage.
Notwithstanding the Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act's very real signifi-
cance for a majority of employed workers as well as for individual
insureds, it is only a patchwork solution to the insurance/genetic dilemma.
The Act, for instance, does not address the problems of genetic privacy,
or of ERISA's exemption of self-insured employers and others, such as
HMOs, 74 from regulation and liability under state insurance laws, or
4 Any legislative recasting of the ERISA preemption clauses should address
all related health care issues including HMO liability, a subject beyond the scope
of this Article. The popular press explains the effect of ERISA's preemption on
over 30 million HMO members under ERISA plans:
ERISA was meant to protect us from corporate misdeeds, but it includes
a special provision that health organizations have been throwing around
themselves like a Teflon blanket whenever a lawsuit comes their way:
employee-benefitplans are exempt from state law. For consumers, that's
bad news. Why? Because under state law you can sue for damages
(such as lost income and suffering) as well as for medical expenses.
Under federal law, however, you can sue only for the costs of the
medical benefit denied you. So if your loved one dies of leukemia
because your HMO wouldn't authorized an early blood test, for
instance, you can recover no more than the $130 cost of the test.
Ellyn E. Spragins, HMOs: To Sue or Not To Sue, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at
50. For scholarly discussions of the effects of ERISA's exemption of HMOs
from state law liability, see, for example, Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J.
Maedgen, Emerging Theories ofLiability in the Managed Health Care Industry,
47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285 (1995) (exploring the issues, problems, and trends
regarding liability in the managed health care industry); L. Frank Coan, Jr., Note,
You Can't Get There From Here - Questioning the Erosion of ERISA Preemp-
tion in MedicalMalpracticeActions AgainstHMOs, 30 GA. L. REV. 1023 (1996)
(discussing whether HMOs that are part of employer provided benefit plans can
use ERISA as a viable defense to state medical malpractice claims asserted by
plan participants and beneficiaries); Laura H. Harshbarger, Note, ERISA
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of insurers' use of genetic tests and genetic information in risk classification
and in individual insurance underwriting. As this Article suggests, the insur-
ance/genetic dilemma is simply too complex and too important for piece-meal
solutions. Whether at the federal or state level, the dilemma .demands assured,
unifor, and comprehensive resolution in the public interest.
This Article has strongly stated the positions of the insurance industry and
those who would restrict insurers' use of genetic testing information. No
attempt was made to state the best or preferable solution. Rather, a variety of
discrete as well as comprehensive solutions have been presented with an
emphasis on a private law approach at either the state or federal level. Of
course, a public law approach provides possible solutions. National health
care insurance or state health care reforms"75 are options.
Taxation is another option.576 A noted insurance expert, Professor
Spencer Kimball, addresses the tax approach:
Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social
Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 191, 192 (1996) (exploring the issue of ERISA
preemption of vicarious liability claims and noting: "[ijf ERISA is found to
preempt claims for physician malpractice, millions of injured plaintiffs will find
that their claims are limited or barred").
171 Universal health care must be addressed at the federal level. States could
create a general health care reform package which addresses genetic testing issues
such as community-based rating and small market reform. Community rating
would eliminate most insurer incentives for using genetic testing information.
Insurers would not be able to use genetic information in setting rates but could
use it in denying coverage - an issue which should be addressed. Community
rating ) ould introduce other problems, such as defining "community" and
concerns over payment equitability. Small market reform permits a range of
insurance prices within a community. A cost limit could be established for
applicants with adverse genetic testing results. Issues of test validity and accuracy
would have to be addressed. For an example of limited state reform, see
Kentucky's health insurance purchasing alliance, supra note 546.
576 For an explanation of public taxation as the preferable solution rather than
a "forced subsidy" in private insurance, see Epstein, supra note 5, at 20, 21.
Amending the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, the Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act of
1996, for instance, provides: (1) in section 301, an itemized deduction for
individual medical savings account, (2) in section 311, an increase in self-
employed persons' deduction for health insurance costs, and (3) in sections 341
and 342 an exemption from taxation for state insurance pools providing health
coverage for high risk people and for state-sponsored worker's compensation
reinsurance organizations. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
110 Stat. at 2036, 2070-71.
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State legislatures have been quick to put burdens on health insurance
companies by mandating coverage for particular illnesses. This raises
public policy questions fundamental to the health care issue. How far
should the private insurance industry be pressed into service as a vehicle
for cross-subsidization within society, compelling the transfer of
particular medical costs from one portion of society (the afflicted) to
another portion (insureds)? Should not any humanitarian transfers of
that kind be from the afflicted to the whole society, at least as repre-
sented by all those who are taxed to support the good works legislatures
choose to engage in?57 7
An example is to encourage, through taxation, state high-risk health
insurance pools. A federal act could establish tax incentives for the states
to mandate pools that offer comprehensive health insurance to all citizens,
thereby fairly apportioning the social responsibility of providing health
insurance to the uninsurable citizens.
5 78
577 SPENCER L. KIMBALL, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR CASES AND MATERIALS
ON INSURANCE LAW 70 (1982).
178 A thorough discussion of all the available options for assuring health
insurance coverage for unwanted insureds is beyond the scope of this Article.
The problem of unwanted and uninsurable applicants is a recurrent concern in
insurance. There are many existing legislative and regulatory approaches in other
lines of insurances which could be adapted to health insurance. Probably the
most familiar is automobile liability insurance, which is a prerequisite to
registering a car. Most states have an "assigned risk plan" which distributes the
unwanted insureds among the auto liability insurers doing business in the state.
These insurers must each insure a pro rata portion of the uninsurable applicants.
See, e.g., Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saccio, 133 S.E.2d 268, 272-74
(Va. 1963) (discussing how an assigned risk plan works). In property insurance,
"FAIR" plans require insurers to accept (sharing them ratably) applications for
insurance on inner-city properties that are exposed to exceptional hazards. See
WLLiAM F. YOUNG & ERIC M. HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSUR-
ANCE LAW 505 n.5 (2d ed. 1985). For a discussion of five statutory approaches
for assuring Workers' Compensation Insurance for employers, see KEETON &
WIDIss, supra note 105, at 982-84. Another technique is governmental
sponsorship of insurance either through governmental participation, subsidy, or
prescription. Id. at 971-80. For example, public debate in the mid-1950s led to
legislation that established the Federal Flood Insurance Program of 1956 which
provided flood insurance and reinsurance as well as disaster relief. The 1956 act
was repealed by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 572 (1968)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988)). The list of areas in which either
federal or state government participates as an insurer or reinsurer would include:
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Although the public approach provides viable solutions, this Article
has focused on solving genetic testing issues within private insurance. In
the private law context, varied solutions were explained. One is to
continue the customary insurance practices of fair, equitable underwriting
- fair discrimination - by allowing insurers to use genetic information
in ways similar to other medical information in insurance risk classifica-
tion based on sound actuarial principles.579 That approach should
require that applicants give informed consent, allowing insurers to have
access to genetic testing information.8 ° As a practical matter, however,
insurers will refuse to consider an applicant if consent is not given. Under
this approach, no state has authorized insurers to require an applicant to
undergo genetic testing without the insured's consent. That prohibition
seems preferable. Moreover, state incontestability statutes could be
amended."' If an applicant has been tested for a genetic condition and
it is revealed that the applicant will develop the condition, insurers should
not be precluded from challenging the policy's validity after the two-year
incontestability statute has expired.
However, the contemporary trend at the state level is to restrict or
prohibit insurers' use of genetic testing information and to provide
explicit privacy protection for personal genetic information. This state
legislation evidences several considerations in fashioning a comprehensive
statutory insurance genetics law. The following are illustrative but not
exhaustive: (1) a distinction has been made between health insurance and
other related insurance lines such as life, annuities, and disability income;
(2) insurers are precluded from using genetic testing information in
establishing eligibility for health and other health-related insurance, or
alternatively, genetic information can be used if the insurer can demon-
strate sfgnificant variances in the applicant's claims experience or in the
applicant's actuarial projections; (3) insurers are prohibited from using
genetic information in decisions to price, deny, limit, cancel, fail to
renew, or impose other criteria on present or future policyholders; (4) the
social security (including old-age, survivors, supplemental security, disability,
Medicare, and Medicaid), unemployment insurance, crop insurance, bank deposit
insurance, bank guaranty funds, public property insurance, public official bonding
funds, title insurance, housing mortgage insurance, veterans' life insurance, postal
insurance, war risk insurance, and nuclear hazards insurance. Obviously,
universal health insurance, a less universal medical savings account, or other
governmental health insurance approaches could be added to this list.
... See supra Part II.A. (notes 68-93 and accompanying text).
580 See supra Part H.B.1-2 (notes 94-102 and accompanying text).
581 See supra Part II.B.3 (notes 103-09 and accompanying text).
[VOL. 85
1996-97] INSURANCE/GENETIC FAIR/UNFAM DISCRIMINATION 663
term genetic tests can be broadly or narrowly defined; (5) privacy rights
are given to genetic information as well as ownership attributes to one's
unique genetic property; and (6) civil remedies, including attorney's fees,
are statutorily provided. Finally, and most importantly, is the moratorium
on the use of genetic testing for insurance. Serious consideration ought
to be given to the California, Virginia, and especially the ten-year Ohio
moratorium with its interim insurance genetics law and its Task Force on
Genetic Testing in Health Insurance."'
The field of genetics presents a unique set of problems because of the
nature of the information it can reveal. The information to be obtained
from the HGP is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. Rather,
what gives the HGP value is what our society chooses to do with the
information. The choice in private insurance presents a dilemma.
Insurance is a societal institution for risk-sharing through the transfer and
distribution of fortuitous medical expenses among all the insureds. If an
individual suffers from an immutable genetic condition, should that not
be simply accepted as part of the human condition to be redistributed by
the risk sharing pool? But, since insurers customarily make risk
classifications based on medical data to minimize the economic risks of
all policyholders, why should insurers not have equal access to accurate
genetic testing information which evidences the presence of genetic
conditions which may affect an individual's health or life expectancy? To
address these and other issues and to protect the interests of both insurers
and those seeking health and related insurance coverages, a comprehen-
sive and uniform approach through federal legislation which is adminis-
tered by state insurance departments ostensibly offers a middle ground
solution to the insurance/genetic fair/unfair discrimination dilemma. Thus,
on balance, a comprehensive federal "Insurance Genetics Act" implement-
ed by the states in conjunction with a moratorium on insurers' use of
genetic testing information merits serious consideration.
582 For a description of the Ohio moratorium and Task Force, see supra notes
512-19 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX 
583
Test for
Charcot-Marie-Tooth Disease
Cystic Fibrosis
Duchene Muscular Dystrophy
Fragile X
Galactosemia
Glycogen Storage Disease
Huntington's Disease
Myotonic Dystrophy
Prader Willi-Angelman Syndrome
Sickle-Cell
Spinocerebellar Ataxia
Thalassemia
Velocardiofacial Syndrome
Cost of Test
$385
$125-$245
$250 - $435
$120 - $250
$350
$200
$205
$250 - $305
$250
$210 - $500
$250
$210-$300
$135
... The information in this Appendix is from the Final Report of the Ohio
Task Force on Genetic Testing. See Ohio Task Force on Genetic Testing, supra
note 4, at app. 5.
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